

Special Warfare

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THEN AND NOW



On the Cover

Then and Now: Change is the only constant and in this issue, members of ARSOF return to their roots for a road map forward, while the U.S. Army Special Operations Command offers a new casebook on insurgency drawn from the lessons learned from previous engagements.

Left: Members of the Philippine Armed Forces host a medical clinic in a remote village. Often, meeting the needs of the populace can keep them from becoming radicalized and joining insurgent groups. U.S. Army photo.

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**U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL**

MISSION: The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, trains, educates, develops and manages world-class Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces warriors and leaders in order to provide the Army special operations forces regiments with professionally trained, highly educated, innovative and adaptive operators.

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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FROM THE COMMANDANT



“Our only security is our ability to change.”

Change is the only constant. While this quote was not directed to the U.S. Army special operations forces, it does have merit. Our ability to adapt is key to our success in ongoing operations around the world. For those of us who have been involved in special operations for a number of years, we have seen our share of change, and if we are honest, most of the change is simply a return to our roots.

In April, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School published its annual course guide; on the flip side was the landmark document, *ARSOF 2022*, which is driving current changes within our ARSOF regiments. In this issue, we will explore some of the proposed changes that have major impacts on our regiments.

Members of our Civil Affairs Proponent take a historic look at the proposed Institute for Military Support to Governance. The article discusses the role of the newly formed Civil Affairs formations following the end of World War II and what it means to today's force. The article explains the role of Civil Affairs planning during the build-up to the war and its key role in nation-building following the end of hostilities. It is imperative that the skills required for this special work is resident in our force today, and through the creation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance, our Civil Affairs brothers will be prepared to meet the needs of our future operating environments. In a related article, Lt. Col. Frederick Little, of the U.S. Special Operations Command, argues for another return to our roots by bringing the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command back under the umbrella of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

In World War II, the Jedburgh Teams, of the Office of Strategic Services, were tasked with the conduct of sabotage and guerrilla warfare, as well as leading the local resistance forces. The team's goal was to inspire overt rather than clandestine resistance activity. Today's Special Forces is the progeny of these storied teams. With the articulation of *ARSOF 2022*, a redesign of the Special Forces 4th Battalion pays homage to its rich heritage.

With a focus on continuous forward support, the men and women of the Military Information Support Operations Command are working diligently to operationalize the CONUS base, which will allow their “regionally expert forces to provide continuous, proactive and responsive support to forward deployed forces.”

As the regiments continue to move forward to meet the changing operating environment, a partnership between the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University has resulted in new tools for our unconventional warfare practitioners, which are formulated upon the lessons we have learned in recent engagements.

As a force, we will continue to change and adapt, remaining ever ready, ever vigilante and at the tip of the spear in the defense of this great nation.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "EMR Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

Major General Edward M. Reeder Jr.

BEYOND BASIC TRAINING BY KRISTY HENDERSON

A LOOK AT A NEW MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM IN INTERAGENCY STUDIES

In a career that takes them around the world and presents unpredictable challenges, military officers like Maj. Lino Miani can never be too prepared. Even with a master's degree and 12 years' experience in the Army, when Miani came to Fort Leavenworth for advanced officer education he was eager to take advantage of an opportunity to earn another master's degree.

In 2009, Miani was part of the first class of a new master's degree program in interagency studies, a collaboration between Fort Leavenworth's U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer College, and the University of Kansas. The degree was developed in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences.

"What we got was some of the best professors in the world who weren't willing to give us any slack," Miani said. "What they got out of that was motivated, experienced guys who were engaged and didn't have the ability to quit."

In just 10 months, Miani was a graduate of both the CGSOC and the University of Kansas. Following a special operations tour of almost two years, he is now an aide to the commander of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters in Belgium.

Broad knowledge for a complex job

Officers in the interagency studies program come from the CGSOC course at Fort Leavenworth. The course is the third of four tiers in the Army's Officer Education System. Its goal is to improve officers' abilities to conduct operations that encompass multiple agencies and regions, and to enhance their competencies as higher ranking officers.

With its short time span, the Army course on its own is intensive training. Officers typically come directly from an operational unit overseas, spend 10 months at the CGSOC course, then go on to their next assignment, most often to another operational unit overseas.

Although the course is enough to keep them busy, some officers elect to take advantage of opportunities to complete a master's degree at the same time. Their time to pursue advanced training is limited amid assignments all over the globe. A master's degree can pave the way for new assignments down the road.

"Possessing a master's degree from a serious academic institution like KU says a lot about an officer when viewed by superiors in the Army," said Maj. Duane Mosier, a current master's student with 17 years' experience in the military.

The KU program is designed specifically for Army special-operations officers, which is made up of Special Forces, Military Information Support Operations and Civil Affairs. It's also open to personnel from other agencies, including government civilians, Navy Special Warfare officers (SEALs) and Marine Special Operations officers. Eligible students are nominated by the Army CGSOC and admitted by KU.

To meet the needs of military students, who have extensive international and field experience, the Center for Global and International Studies was an ideal match to design and coordinate the new KU master's degree in interagency studies.

Special-operations forces implement unconventional-warfare strategies that require broad knowledge of cultures and regions, and an ability to communicate and coordinate with other military agencies to ensure successful completion of assigned missions.

CGIS' connections across KU ensure the program includes courses from faculty with expertise in international cultural studies, and equally important, in public administration, political science, law, philosophy and more.

"I can look at a complex situation in a broader manner than someone who hasn't benefited from the program," Miani said.

John Kennedy, director of CGIS and associate professor of political science, said the partnership between the Army and an external institution like KU reflects a trend in the military to help officers break through group think and to think outside-of-the-box.

"One thing I heard almost everyone coming out of the program say is, 'I was really able to get a sense of the big picture,'" Kennedy said. "They really felt they were getting an education independent of the military."

Building a reputation

For three decades, offerings in the college have helped KU meet the demand for higher education for officers at Fort Leavenworth and

across the Department of Defense. Hundreds of students have pursued tracks in military history, public affairs and administration and foreign area officer training.

Programs that have been active in military training in the College include the Departments of History and Political Science, the School of Public Affairs and Administration and international area studies centers that focus on Russian, East European and Eurasian studies and East Asian studies.

The college's offerings have also played a major role in KU's reputation as one of the most military-friendly universities in the nation. KU has been named by Military Times among the Top 10 public universities that are "Best for Vets." The university has also been named as one of 20 military friendly colleges and universities by Military Advanced Education magazine.

The interagency studies program is one of the newest graduate programs at KU for officers and is closely coordinated with the military.

The program is funded through the Army's Special Operations Command, but the content of the course work is entirely planned by KU faculty.

Because it is customized for SOF, the interagency studies master's degree has attracted a strong following among officers. It is also known for educational excellence.

"We compete for it because we know it's tailor made for Special Forces and it's going to be the most rigorous and enriching," said Maj. Tom Craig, a current student with experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and across the Middle East. "KU has the best program. That was the right choice for me."

Since the program launched in 2009, at least 15 officers have enrolled each year, with a capacity for 25.

"They're coming back in droves," Kennedy said.

An intense year

To accommodate the Fort Leavenworth course schedule, the interagency studies program takes about half the typical amount of time spent pursuing a master's degree. It requires significant commitment on the part of the officers and the faculty teaching courses.

OTHER GRADUATE MILITARY PROGRAMS IN THE COLLEGE

For more information visit:
www.gmp.ku.edu

Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

Providing courses in more than 40 foreign languages, 12-month MA programs deepen regional knowledge for well-prepared FAOs in the Americas, South Asia, Europe, Eurasia, China, North Africa, the Middle East and North Asia. More than 150 FAOs have graduated from KU since 1968.

Military History

Over the past 30 years, more than 35 students have completed M.A. degrees emphasizing military history, and more than 20 students have earned Ph.D. degrees in this subfield of the Department of History. KU faculty and graduate students have access to the extensive holdings of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth.

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Ph.D.

Launched in Fall 2012 for the Special Forces community, this degree in the Department of Political Science offers specializations in American politics, Public Policy, International Relations, or Comparative Politics. Graduates will contribute to SOF at the institutional and strategic level of command.

Public Affairs and Administration

Based in the theories of social science disciplines, the Master's of Public Administration develops each student's knowledge and understanding of issues in public service and effective administration of public organizations, providing flexibility to the student in career choices.

The classes are condensed to eight-week sessions. In the fall, when coursework at Fort Leavenworth is most demanding, the faculty travels to the base to teach courses there. In the spring, students travel to the Lawrence campus to take courses.

"They structured our classes so that we were only at KU twice a week," Miani said. "The tradeoff to that is you go to school for nine hours a day."

Officers agree that the program is challenging but manageable, given the demands and responsibilities they are accustomed to managing in their military careers.

"After the demands of combat ... task prioritization and time management have become vital facets in my way of life," Mosier said. "I think I speak for all ISP students when I say that the program is very challenging, and yet reasonable when placed in context with our experiences in austere places of the world."

"No matter what stresses the program places on us, we still get to hug our families and sleep in our own beds every night. There's something relaxing about that perspective," he said.

Mutual benefits

The KU Faculty has been enthusiastic partners in the program, viewing their participation as a contribution that gives officers skills and knowledge that enable them to come up with diplomatic solutions to complicated problems on the ground.

They also appreciate the depth of experience the officers bring to KU classrooms.

"The students at the fort are highly motivated and bring a variety of real-world experiences into class," said Marilu Goodyear, director of the School of Public Affairs and Administration in the College.

Goodyear added that their wealth of experience enhances faculty's understanding and knowledge of how the principles they teach can be applied outside of the classroom, as well.

"I have learned that the Army is much less command and control than I assumed," she said. "The officers are anxious to learn successful techniques for collaboration with other military units, the State Department and non-governmental organizations because much of their work is accomplishing things together with other organizations."

Students list several classes and professors among their favorites, including Goodyear and other public-administration faculty. A course on Islamic law taught by Raj Bhala, a distinguished professor in the School of Law, was commonly noted as a valuable experience, as well.

"A fantastic and passionate professor," said Maj. Pat McCarthy, a current student who has served since 1998 with tours in Iraq and throughout Europe and the Pacific. "Having experienced the culture of Muslims firsthand and not fully understanding the history of Islam, I appreciate his explanation and research. A lot of prior experiences became clearer to me upon his instruction and my reflection."

Ready for the future

The benefits of the master's degree from KU can be both immediate and long-term for the officers. For those who plan to head back to assignments overseas, officers expect to be prepared with a better understanding of the culture and history in regions where they're stationed. They also plan to utilize lessons in organizational change and analysis to be better leaders.

"I'll be a much more effective team builder and change manager," Craig said. "There's no question I'll be able to apply the education I've had."

Miani can confirm the value of the program in advancing his career. The activities that Special Forces officers are expected to facilitate include coordination on missions among various agencies, ranging from the CIA to the FBI to Health and Human Services. The knowledge Miani built in negotiation, organizational communication and team building is among the skills he uses in his post at NATO.

"In general, having a master's, especially one like the KU interagency, which is so broad, in a way, you really have a number of frameworks to approach different problems from," he said.

For long-range plans, officers see a variety of options ahead. Graduates are prepared to work in many capacities, continuing as SOF leaders, coordinating efforts of multiple agencies, or as educators.

For some, their future could even include more time at KU. The success of the master's degree program has spurred the development of a Ph.D. in political science.

McCarthy plans to take advantage of the college's newest offering. He has applied for the Ph.D. program, which starts its second cohort in fall 2013. McCarthy said his experience at KU sparked a newfound interest in higher education.

"Adding graduate school at a later age has provided a much deeper appreciation for education," he said. **SW**

DOCTRINE 2015 BY GREGORY ORME

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, is making sweeping changes to its doctrine as part of the Army's *Doctrine 2015* initiative. Under *Doctrine 2015*, the Army is drastically reducing the number of field manuals from more than 600 to just 50, and instituting several new publication types, including Army Doctrine Publications, Army Doctrine Reference Publications and Army Techniques Publications.

Principles of Doctrine 2015

Gen. Robert W. Cone, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, implemented *Doctrine 2015* on Aug. 23, 2011. Under *Doctrine 2015*, the remaining 50 FMs must be revised by December 2013, and all ATPs replacing current doctrine in FMs must be completed by December 2015.

Gen. Cone recognized the success of *Doctrine 2015* relies on having the right people in the right positions. "Ensure we have our best and most experienced talent writing the doctrine our Army will learn, train with, and use in combat," he stated. "We must produce quality, and it must be produced by our best and brightest."

To accomplish his directives, he asked each Center of Excellence commander to increase the manning levels of military doctrine positions and to fill those positions with the best-qualified personnel, preferably Soldiers with recent operational experience, subject-matter expertise and a strong understanding of concepts. Gen. Cone said that, when available, officers who are competitive for battalion command and beyond should be considered for key doctrine positions. In addition, he directed commanders to maintain current civilian manning in all doctrine sections, even in light of continuing resource constraints.

The new FMs describe how the Army and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. FMs may contain principles, but focus largely on tactics. Tactics involve the arrangement and maneuver of units — how the Army translates combat power into successful results. Tactics change according to the situation and the enemy, and require judgment in application.

Employment of tactics may require integration of procedures and techniques. Procedures now will be contained in appendixes to FMs. Techniques — nonprescriptive methods used to perform missions, functions or tasks — will be in ATPs. The purpose of housing techniques exclusively in ATPs is to employ technology to gain feedback from current operations and rapidly update these publications to reflect changing environments and the needs of deployed forces. Unlike with the other doctrinal publication types, there is no prescribed page length for ATPs.

"...after a decade of war, the Army is in a unique position to gather the collective wisdom gained from combat and to reflect on what future conflicts will require as its posture changes from a mostly deployed force to one preparing for combat operations."

Lt. Col. Jeff Allen, public affairs officer, Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., explained the two primary reasons for these substantial changes. "One is just to reduce the mass of doctrinal publications that are out there. It's also an attempt to make our doctrine just as flexible and fluid as the Soldiers who use it."

Doctrine 2015 establishes a framework for educating, training and equipping Soldiers for operations through a common professional language.

The timing of the change is not coincidental; after a decade of war, the Army is in a unique position to gather the collective wisdom gained from combat and to reflect on what future conflicts will require as its posture changes from a mostly deployed force to one preparing for combat operations. "We must seize the initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war our Army has fought," Gen. Cone said. "We have too many hard-earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across our force to ensure the next fight we find our Army in, we can win upon arrival."

The New Doctrine Hierarchy

Doctrine 2015 requires all doctrine publications be reviewed and separated into new categories of information: well-defined fundamentals, relevant tactics and standard procedures and techniques.

The ADPs and ADRPs will contain fundamental principles, providing the basis for action and incorporation of new ideas, technologies, and organizational designs. These documents will express the Army's collective wisdom — the intellectual underpinning for adaptive, creative military problem-solving at all levels of war.

ADPs are to be short — no longer than 10 pages — and written in a manner keep them stable for a long time so that the principles become well known and understood throughout the force. ADRPs provide a more detailed explanation of the principles in ADPs, ensuring consistent interpretation. Gen. Cone's guidance was to craft enduring documents that would remain relevant in the near future. ADPs are the doctrinal foundation for FMs and ATPs.

There is also no limit on the number of ATPs a doctrine proponent may produce.

Changes to ARSOF Doctrine

Prior to the implementation of *Doctrine 2015*, FM 3-05 was the capstone publication in the doctrine hierarchy of the U.S. Army special operations forces. There were six ARSOF keystone manuals covering ARSOF Aviation, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Rangers, Special Forces and survival. These were supported by eight FMs on overarching ARSOF subjects, 14 on Special Forces subjects, two about PYSOP and one covering CA.

Under the new hierarchy, there will be one ADP, one ADRP, four FMs (for ARSOF, CA, PSYOP, and SF) and 33 ATPs. In keeping with the standards of *Doctrine 2015*, some information is being moved to general-purpose technical manuals. Although the Army SOCoE exceeded the *Doctrine 2015* goal, new requirements in the subsequently published TRADOC Regulation 25-36 have necessitated additional updates prior to December 2013.

Even though ARSOF principles will be covered in the new ADP and ADRP, special operations will retain FM 3-05. Other general ARSOF doctrine will be in a series of seven new ATPs. The first of these — ATP 3-05.20, *Special Operations Intelligence* and ATP 3-05.40, *Special Operations Sustainment* — were published in May.

The former top CA manual, FM 3-05.40, was completely overhauled and published as FM 3-57 in October 2011. The tactics and techniques included in the former FM 3-05.401 are expanded upon in a series of five ATPs, which will join three new ATPs in the CA doctrine hierarchy.

The former top PSYOP manual, FM 3-05.30, has also been entirely revised and published as FM 3-53. The information in two discontinued PSYOP FMs will be enhanced and included in a planned series of four ATPs and five TMs, scheduled for completion between 2013 and 2015.

The current top SF manual, FM 3-18, will remain in place but is being retooled to meet the requirements of *Doctrine 2015*. To contain the remainder of SF doctrine, 12 ATPs are planned.


The overarching Ranger and ARSOF Aviation publications — FM 3-75 and FM 3-76, respectively — were published in 2011 but are being updated as ATPs to make them *Doctrine 2015* compliant. The propensity for survival has returned to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, so FM 3-05.70 will be revised as an ATP under its oversight.

ADP 3-05

ADP 3-05, *Special Operations*, is a major step forward for ARSOF. For the first time, a special-operations doctrinal publication will be among the Army's core educational requirements, as this new manual takes its place among the documents that are required knowledge for Soldiers at all levels, from cadet to general officer.

In America's most recent conflicts, success has depended increasingly on the interdependence of special operations forces and conventional forces. ADP 3-05 and the accompanying

publication ADRP 3-05, *Special Operations*, lay the doctrinal foundation for ARSOF in unified land operations. These publications describe the role of ARSOF in shaping operational environments, preventing conflict and helping



to win our nation's wars. These publications describe the functions, organization, employment and synchronization of ARSOF and their unique contributions in addressing national security challenges.

ADP 3-05 defines and discusses special operations in the strategic context within which ARSOF expect to operate. It discusses the roles and capacities of ARSOF, including the two distinct but mutually supporting critical capabilities of *special warfare* and *surgical strike*. Taken together, they provide a population-centric, intelligence-enabled capability to work with multinational partners and host nations, to develop regional stability, enhance global security and facilitate future operations.

The strategic context for the employment of special operations forces is determined by the nature of the threat, the character of the operational environment and requirements of national policy, the geographic combatant commander, the joint force commander or ambassadors. ARSOF represent more than half of the Department of Defense special operations capabilities and normally deploy as part of a joint special operations task force.

Special warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or hostile environment. Special warfare involves units capable of long-duration operations in denied areas to build the indigenous warfighting capability and train, advise and assist HN's in conducting special operations.

Surgical strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets or influence adversaries and threats. ARSOF units are trained and equipped to provide a primarily unilateral, scalable, direct-action capability for hostage rescue, kill/

capture operations against designated targets and other specialized tasks.

ADP 3-05 concludes by describing the principles, regional mechanisms, characteristics and imperatives of ARSOF. As a key component of *Doctrine 2015*, ADP 3-05 will provide the whole Army with the fundamental principles necessary for understanding the capabilities of ARSOF and the value of their interrelationship with other forces.

In all, the transformation of ARSOF doctrine will help ARSOF Soldiers learn lessons from the past decade to better prepare for the uncertainties of the next. "Remember doctrine is not just about today," Gen. Cone instructed. "It's about posturing us intellectually as a profession for the next fight." **SW**



THE MORE THINGS CHANGE the more they stay the same. The reorganization of the SF 4th Battalion takes a page out of history. *Department of Defense photo.*

SF Returns to Its Roots with 4th Battalion Redesign

BY MAJOR ANDREW BASQUEZ

As the nation's premier force to confront, contain, degrade and defeat unconventional, asymmetric and irregular threats, the priorities of the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) are to fight the war on terrorism, maintain force readiness and to prepare the force to meet current and future operational requirements. Special Forces continuously face challenges in enhancing or developing capabilities that will enable them to deploy rapidly with agile, flexible and self-contained forces, fully capable of performing the most demanding, sensitive special-operations missions throughout the world.

Special Forces are used across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime humanitarian missions to full-scale war, and are the most suitable elements to defeat transnational non-state actors that threaten our national security objectives. The principle operational use of Special Forces is its ability to partner with host military or paramilitary forces using the principle of through and with. Using this principle, the force is able to achieve U.S. military and political goals and objectives with a small footprint at minimal cost. As the indirect approach gains more emphasis in cur-

rent and future operations, the ability of Special Forces to have developed capabilities in austere and denied environments is essential. To that end, Special Forces will reorganize, find efficiencies and build more capable Special Forces groups to set the conditions for success.

The intellectual foundational concept for the reorganization of the Special Forces regiment is contained in two documents. *ARSOF 2022*, a special edition planned produced under the auspices of *Special Warfare* by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Office of Strategic Communication and the article "Toward Strategic Landpower," written by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland and Lt. Col. Stuart L. Farris, *Army Magazine* July 2013 edition. The article addresses the need for an overhaul of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). It states that "looking to the future, the Army should have the foresight and courage to adapt its structures and prepare its Soldiers for operating in the human domain, supported by a coherent strategy that knits together the proper joint, interagency and inter-

national partners resident within a global landpower network. The changes required are largely **cognitive** and **cultural** in nature. The solutions lie mainly in **investing in people and ideas**, not platforms. Recognizing a **human domain** of warfare, analyzing and producing the associated DOTMLPF outputs and working to create a global landpower network that continually evolves is but a proposed first step."

The most recent capability assessment conducted to make this first step and meet the reorganizational requirements outlined in *ARSOF 2022* involved a complete analysis of the SF group's current task organization and its ability to meet future strategic and operational requirements in prolonged unconventional and irregular warfare environments. Identified requirements necessitate an increase in capacity for Special Forces globally, depth in Advanced Special Operations and an organic sustainment capability for prolonged operations in under developed areas. Specifically, active duty SF group's capability needs include: additional military intelligence assets; mission-tailored, direct support logistics elements for deployed SF-Operational Detachments



SPECIAL WARFARE The men of the U.S. Army Special Forces prove out the SOF Truth that people are more important than hardware. During the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, Special forces teams adopted local dress and road across country on horseback. *U.S. Army photo*

Alpha, SF-Operational Detachments Bravo and Special Operations Task Forces; and information operations and technical support elements organic to the groups.

In order to achieve a regiment with an this level of enhanced capability, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (A) will initiate transformation to the *ARSOF 2022* model progressively over a period of two years, with 3rd SFG(A) beginning immediately with the 4th Battalion redesign. USASFC(A) will continue to command the five active component SFG(A)s. The 4th Bn within each group and the Group Support Battalion will transform to enable the required enhanced capability. By redesigning the 4th Battalions, the group's flexibility, responsiveness and depth for sustained operations globally is increased.

Each SFG(A) will have full command and control responsibilities for its subordinate battalions. Active component SFG(A)s will be comprised of a Group HHC, three line Special Forces battalions, one reorganized 4th Bn and one GSB. Each line battalion will have three line companies. The redesign of the 4th Bn. will transform its organizational focus to its special-warfare capability support-

ing the geographic combatant command requirements. The fundamental redesign will reorganize into three O4 level command elements with specific roles and responsibilities in the special warfare spectrum. These elements will undergo a specific selection and training pipeline and will consist of 18-series personnel with prior Special Forces experience.

To facilitate Mission Command, one of the three O4 level command elements will be focused on answering the theater special operations commands supporting the GCC. This element will remain assigned to the groups while conducting duty at their respective TSOC. It will assist with planning, task development and mission command of Special Forces conducting sensitive operations within their assigned area of responsibility. It will also represent the nucleus for the respective groups interaction with the TSOCs coordinating with Special Forces, interagency and coalition forces through the TSOC to support the campaign plan. It is the persistent, forward Special Forces mission command of the SF groups at the TSOCs.

The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of the 4th Bn., will consist of a

command team and staff sections that will support the battalion in day-to-day administrative operations. The HHD will have a robust signal detachment, S2 section, operational fusion cell, Human Engagement Team and logistics cell. The HHD will be a deployable element, capable of providing mission command in the early stages of a potential UW campaign. In the event of deployment, the HHD requires supplemented logistical support from the GSB.

This reorganization will give USASFC(A) the improved ability to posture and network in a manner that enables them to anticipate and prevent threats to the stability of our allies. It allows them to rapidly respond to contingencies and enhance U.S. strategic effects throughout the globe. This is a first step. Continuing to invest in our soldiers and the innovative ideas and plans outlined in *ARSOF 2022* is essential to thriving in a future operating environment characterized by uncertainty. We must realize that this change is **cognitive** and **cultural** in nature. Continuously learning, anticipating and evolving is critical to the success of the change and a cornerstone of Special Forces. **SW**



CLOSING THE GAPS in Governance

Future Army forces require the capability and capacity to engage with partners on a sustained basis to address shared interests and enhance partners' security, governance, economic, development, essential services, rule of law and other critical functions as part of unified action.

— 7th Warfighting Function input into Army Capstone Concept, 19 December 2012

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL WARMACK, MAJOR MICHAEL CHAGARIS AND MAJOR TONY VACHA

Introduction – The Gaps

In the past, successfully shaping the environment to achieve national security end states required unique skills, expertise and capabilities not always inherent in the armed forces. Absent any changes, this gap is likely to continue in future operating environments. Across the range of military operations — from pre-conflict shaping, to responding to humanitarian disasters, to post-conflict transitional administration — the U.S. military must effectively employ a range of political, economic and security functions as part of a whole-of-government strategy. Achieving long-term objectives will require targeted application of civilian skills to properly and successfully develop partners' capacity to secure populations, deliver essential services, and establish or re-establish the conditions for viable economies and effective governance through rule of law. Determining the best method of meeting these demands in a constrained budget environment requires a creative approach that balances the cost of recalibrating existing capabilities against the costs of establishing new programs. A cost effective approach includes retooling the capabilities and capacities of the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs Regiment to meet current and emerging global governance and stability challenges.

The role of the Army in governance and stability is rooted in its historical experiences and is outlined in recent national security documents.¹ The *2012 National Defense Strategy* posited that the Department of Defense requires the capability, “to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”² Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, dated December 21, 2010, requires the Army to conduct Civil Affairs operations and “occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.”³ These challenges reflect the challenges outlined in the White Paper *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills* and the formation of the Strategic Landpower Task Force to tackle the, “growing problem in linking military action to achieving national objectives” and “ensuring we provide the right capabilities for the nation in an era of fiscal responsibility.”⁴

In current Joint and Army doctrine, the term military government is aptly called Transitional Military Authority to clarify the temporary scope of these operations.⁵ Currently, these operations are codified in Civil Affairs doctrine within the core task of Support to Civil Administration in occupied territory. *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept* acknowledges these responsibilities and describes the operating and generating force capabilities and capacities required to meet the demands for Army 2020. First, a more adaptive generating force is required.⁷ This includes possessing, “unique capabilities that are necessary either to support deployed forces through reachback or to function in an operating force role by deploying assets forward.”⁸ Generating force platforms must embrace the expeditionary mindset of the operational force in order to, “meet combatant commander demands and execute the requirements of the national strategy.”⁹ This adaptation requires, “the Army to modify how it learns while recognizing that Army units must learn the right things, and must learn them quickly.”¹⁰

In order to prevent, shape and win the Army will require force design changes. Army forces provide joint force commanders with the capabilities to set the theater, including those areas of Army Department of Defense executive agent responsibilities.¹¹ The Army is the executive agent for military government or transitional military authority.

The United States Army Special Operations Command, through the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the Civil Affairs proponent, plays a unique role in developing future Civil Affairs and military governance capabilities. The capabilities required in the ACC for *Army 2020* were informed by two foundational USA-SOC documents, *Army Special Operations Forces 2022* and the 7th Warfighting Function. These future required capabilities include:

- The capability and capacities to engage with partners on a sustained basis to address share interests and enhance partners' security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law and other critical functions.
- Tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities, to assess, shape, deter and influence people, governments, militaries and the operational environment.
- To work through and with host nations, regional partners and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner.

Historical Background

The scope of the challenges our nation faced in World War II generated significant debate regarding the policies, doctrine and authorities required for effective Civil Affairs. The Army's official history of CA and military government recognizes that, "because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the United States Army evoked bitter debate."¹² Out of this debate emerged the role and function of CA to ensure the U.S. meets its transitional governance obligations under international law to ensure the protection of civilians, the prevention of civilian interference with military operations and the preservation of civilian capacity to deliver essential services. Military necessity and the Hague Convention established the roles and responsibilities for the military's involvement in transitional governance.¹³ In establishing the World War II strategy for CA and military government, both President Franklin Roosevelt and General Dwight Eisenhower agreed that military support to governance, while necessary, should be transitioned to civilian entities as soon as possible.¹⁴

The U.S. Army's World War II experiences in stability and governance provides insight into retooling effective practices for military support to governance. World War II marked the first time in over a century and a half of service where the Army committed proponent solutions — in policy, doctrine, personnel, training and organization — necessary to secure and stabilize civilian populations and infrastructure, consolidate gains, establish transitional governance, build a partners' capacity for governance and transition these responsibilities to a civilian authority. A number of strategic leaders, both civilian and military, anticipated the chaos in the aftermath of combat based on the provisional nature of occupation and stability experiences in the previous 50 years in the Philippines, Cuba, Siberia and the Rhineland. In these previous efforts, the Army lacked the proponent to generate, organize and train forces specifically organized by role and function to execute transitional governance and stability operations in order to consolidate gains.

As the Army prepared for war in the 1940s, the planning for stability and transitional governance occurred concurrently with the preparation for combat operations. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall played a central role in the development of the Civil Affairs and military government capabilities due to his unique background. In the Philippines, then Second Lt. Marshall conducted stability and counterinsurgency operations as a platoon leader and company commander. Following U.S. agreement to the military government obligations outlined in the Hague Convention of 1907, Marshall, among other future Army leaders, contributed to the Army Staff College (progenitor to Command and General Staff College) 1908 collection of essays on military government operations.¹⁵ After World War I, Marshall participated in the ill-prepared occupation of the Rhineland. Based on his experiences, Gen. Marshall recognized the need for a proponent to generate the critical civil capabilities required for governance and stability operations. As Chief of Staff of the Army he went on to approve the establishment of a school to train CA and military government officers.¹⁶

In 1941, Army Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion, who initiated the first manual on CA and military government in 1940 as a Judge Advocate General, spearheaded the efforts to form this school. He realized the importance of civil expertise and deliberately chose to establish this school in a civilian environment.¹⁷ Gen. Gullion recruited, and later direct commissioned, Jesse I. Miller, a civilian attorney practicing in Washington, D.C., to lead the effort.¹⁸

In April 1942, the U.S. Army School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Va.¹⁹ This institution prepared officers for worldwide Civil Affairs and Military Government deployments and served as the proponent for CA and military government doctrine, organization and training. It also served as a hub in forming partnerships with premier academic institutions including Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford and Michigan.²⁰

The SOMG generated the governance and stability capabilities that proved critical to achieving U.S. strategic objectives during and following World War II. The first students were civilians with civil expertise who received direct commissions followed by basic military skills training and additional CA and military government training at the SOMG.²¹ These officers also received further diplomatic, language and cultural training specific to the nations and cultures of their expected assignments.

Whole-of-Government Challenges

World War II was drastically different from current and future military operations in which the collapse of Cold War rivalries have, "given way to wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health are increasingly shared..."²² The ability to confront these problems requires a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to the integrated application of the instruments of national power.

Consistent with the American preference for civilian leadership of governance efforts, current presidential policy directs the Department of State to lead capacity building activities and stability operations. History demonstrates that while civilian agencies lead in these operations, in areas where there is instability, civilian agencies lack sufficient capacity to generate the right skills that allow for the concurrent requirements of maintaining security and implementing governance-related activities. Thousands of government employees volunteered to serve in austere conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan to support national-security objectives. Even with this volunteer effort to support governance and stability operations, the number of deployable civilian employees to support these operations "does not exist in large numbers."²³ Previous and current civilian agency-led efforts to generate additional governance capacity include hiring contracted civilians, temporary hires and the creation of the Civilian Response Corps. These practices came with challenges associated with oversight, turnover and integration as well as recruiting dilemmas related to uncertain employment conditions and locations.²⁴

In unstable areas, in which there are threats to local populations, Civil Affairs is ideally organized, trained and equipped to support joint-force commanders in a wide range of requirements including: steady-state shaping, building partner capacity, humanitarian assistance/disaster response and stability operations. Additionally, CA is the only branch with organic force structure specifically organized in the functions of civil security, governance, infrastructure and economic development, the restoration of essential services and rule of law. This capability is currently organized as the Functional Specialty teams within Army Reserve CA formations.

The current Functional Specialist program is an inherited remnant from the branch's World War II origins. It relies on civilian skills that individual Army Reservists bring into uniformed service. This model worked in World War II, primarily due to the accession of civilians with key skills and the development of a generating platform — the SOMG. A survey by the CA proponent in March 2013 found that out of 559 Functional Specialist coded positions in the Army Reserve, none were filled



IMSG Civil Affairs Soldiers interact with host-nation government officials. In the future, Functional Specialists trained at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Institute for Military Support to Governance will be able to efficiently integrate best practices and support interoperability with unified action partners. *U.S. Army photo*

with an officer with the prerequisite qualifications. Furthermore, the civilian skills associated with the functional specialist categories may not inherently apply in a regional/cultural context or translate appropriately in capacity or capability to the strategic, operational or tactical levels.

The atrophy of this program occurred over a 70-year period due to changes in doctrine, personnel policies and operational utilization. Following World War II, the Army's Cold War doctrine focus on conventional containment of the Warsaw Pact drove CA doctrine and training to be heavily weighted on minimizing civilian interference with military operations.²⁵ The lack of focus on utilization of civilian specialties in stabilization, shaping and building partners' capacities minimized the operational demand for these skills. The CA Branch retained its well-considered World War II ability to direct commission civilian experts in Army through the 1970s. The diminished Cold War demand for stability and governance related civilian expertise perpetuated the decline of these authorities. From a force-structure perspective, the number of Functional Specialist positions winnowed from comprising approximately half the positions within the force to a current composition of only 8 percent of billets.²⁶

CA 2020 / 2022 – Retooling CA support to governance

Currently USAJFKSWCS is adapting the CA generating capabilities to meet current and future operational challenges across the range of military operations. In 2011, USAJFKSWCS reorganized from a function-based organization (doctrine, training, personnel) to regimental proponents (CA, PSYOP and SF) with commandants. This streamlined the ability to explore and develop proponent solutions in force structure, personnel policies, doctrine and training development for all CA forces. The optimized proponent structure enables CA to incorporate the required capabilities outlined in Army 2020 and ARSOF 2022 across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. *Civil Affairs 2020/2022* is the vision that synthesizes these requirements that unifies

and meets or exceeds projected SOF and conventional demands for the force. Intrinsically woven within CA 2020/2022 is the restoration of effective management of civilian expertise accessible under USC Title 10 and the expansion of the CA force's ability to support Army, ARSOF, joint force commanders and ambassadors in pre-conflict shaping, transitional administration, stability operations and building partners' capacities for effective governance.

The Institute for Military Support to Governance

In October 2012, Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the commander of the United States Special Operations Command, in consultation and coordination with Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Talley, the Chief of the Army Reserve, directed the creation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance. While drawing from the historical legacy of the School of Military Government, the IMSG will serve as a broader entity in coordinating with governmental, private and academic institutions to foster efficient integration, cross-pollinate best practices and support interoperability with unified action partners. Comprised of current and reorganized force structure, the IMSG is currently in its first phase of inception. In this phase it will establish its facility, begin hiring and assigning personnel; developing a research agenda; and analyzing and shaping the policies, authorities and doctrine required to leverage and employ civilian expertise across the range of military operations. In its second phase, the IMSG will provide the Army with a mechanism to procure degreed and credentialed professionals from stability-related fields and adjudicate their capability to support Army, ARSOF, joint commanders and ambassadors at the tactical, operational and strategic echelons.

38G Area of Concentration

The next crucial step is the conversion of existing Functional Specialist billets (559 CA positions) in Army Reserve CA into a distinct area of concentration within the CA career management field. This will allow the IMSG to establish quantifiable accession gates and academic and professional tracks within the fields of civil security, governance,

rule of law, economy, infrastructure and social or humanitarian services. Developing this AOC, with the nominative classification as 38G, combined with direct commissioning authorities will enable CA to procure the necessary civilian experience to support Army, ARSOF and joint commanders across the range of military operations. The direct commissioning authorities of civil experts into civil affairs existed within Army policies for Army Reserve CA from WWII through the 1970s.²⁷

CA and MG Future Operating Concept

The IMMSG will assist the proponent and enable the development of a Civil Affairs and Military Governance Future Operating Concept that will describe the employment of these capabilities across the range of military operations, and demonstrate how they will enable Army, ARSOF and joint commanders to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society in anticipated operational environments. The concept will enable the CA proponent and the IMMSG to scope the future development of DOTMLPF solutions into the required capabilities for future CA forces.

Doctrine

As part of the larger *Army Doctrine 2015* initiative, CA doctrine is planning for the development of doctrine for military government operations. Currently in CA doctrine, military support to governance, exists in the core task Support to Civil Administration in friendly or occupied territory. The development of the IMMSG will enable the civilian expertise required to inform the doctrine development process.

CA 2020/2022 represents the most substantive and cost effective transformation of CA and military governance capabilities and capacities since World War II. These changes provide an affordable solution to enable the Army to prevent, shape and win. Upon completion, the Institute for Military Support to Governance and the 38G Area of Concentration will provide the Army, ARSOF, joint force commanders and ambassadors with viable conduits to build partners' capacity in order to consolidate tactical and operational gains, that in time, will set the conditions for achieving strategic aims. The IMMSG provides the Army with a mechanism to reach out and up to develop best practices among other government departments and agencies, private entities and the academic community in order to achieve unified action. The 38G Officers, recruited, trained and certified through the IMMSG, will provide stability-related civilian expertise across the range of military operations. **SW**

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Operationalizing the CONUS Base

MISOC EFFECTS GROUP



BY MASTER SERGEANT JAMES MONROE

ARSOF 2022, the United States Army Special Operations Command's forward-looking "blueprint for change," envisions a complex, ill-structured operational environment with increasing fiscal and access constraints that potentially restricts our nation's ability to act allowing greater freedom of actions for our adversaries.¹ The challenge going forward is to build campaigns in these uncertain and politically sensitive environments where the threshold for deploying significant force structure is limited all the while achieving the national strategic end state. To better support our nation's options, *ARSOF 2022* calls for operationalization of the CONUS base, which means, "Our regionally expert forces provide continuous, proactive and responsive support to forward deployed forces."² This article explores the Military Information Support Operations Command's efforts to date to pull forward the future – today – by building interagency partnerships, developing operational concepts and generating talented leaders to provide adaptive, innovative and versatile influence capabilities to meet the challenges and opportunities in 2022 and beyond.

Since World War II, CONUS-based elements have provided support to forward-deployed elements. For example, the Office of Strategic Services Headquarters in Washington D.C., provided technical and planning support to teams scattered across the globe. Similarly, the Joint Staff Security Office was directly involved in strategic decep-

tion plans implemented in support of the theaters of operation. Since the late 1980s, deployed MISO forces received CONUS support under the concept of reachback to the multimedia production and the product-distribution system capabilities of the 3rd Military Information Support Battalion, research of civilian PhD Cultural Intelligence Analysts, and mission planning and logistical support from the deployed element's parent battalion. While reachback to CONUS support is not new, operationalization of the CONUS base differs substantially from these earlier efforts both in scope and in the formal institutionalization of the concept into the operating systems of USASOC and its subordinate units and commands. Expanding upon the concept of reachback, operationalizing the CONUS base seeks to bring to bear the capabilities and resources of the unified action partners — joint forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as the private sector — in support of operational missions and to develop new capabilities, e.g. social media analytics. The efforts of the MISOC to operationalize the CONUS base are in direct support of the USASOC Commander's goal of "providing forces to ambassadors and geographic combatant commanders capable of navigating, operating and prevailing within the most complex and unpredictable of all environments – the human domain."³

Within the MISOC, the mechanism for implementing *ARSOF 2022* concepts,

including operationalizing the CONUS base, is the MISOC Effects Group. It is one of USASOC's four platforms to operationalize the CONUS base. The other USASOC platforms are U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Institute for Military Support to Governance, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command's Office of Special Warfare and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade's Civil Military Advisory Group.

The MEG is "a collaborative forum and working group — set in an interagency space in order to synchronize and integrate CONUS-based information related capabilities and influence entities and networks to provide innovative influence capabilities to warfighters globally."⁴ The MEG was established in the fall of 2012 as an experimental test bed for developing approaches to implement the concepts of *ARSOF 2022*. The MEG was created within the conceptual frame of a Silicon Valley startup, with maximum flexibility to approach the problem set while attempting to minimize any disruption to the rest of the organization. It is chartered to experiment and develop innovations in support of the dynamic and complex *ARSOF 2022* environment without being tied to a formal organizational structure. Standing up the MEG as a separate entity allows the existing MISOC units and staff sections to remain focused on their current missions, while the MEG works to develop operational-

and strategic-level capabilities and concepts in support of *ARSOF 2022* that ultimately transition to the operating units of the MISOC. As the MISOC's understanding of the future operating environment develops, it is possible that the MEG will be formalized as a TDA entity of the MISOC via a force-design update. It is also possible that the organizational and integrating concepts of the MEG construct may be adopted by a higher echelon of command or another USASOC component subordinate command in order to aid in the building of campaigns to shape, prevent and win in uncertain and politically sensitive environments where the threshold for significant force structure is limited all the while achieving the required national-strategic end state.

Opinion Research; the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications; other ARSOF commands; Army Reserve MISO Groups; the Marine Corps Information Operations Command; and numerous other Department of Defense, academic and interorganizational participants. The purpose of the community of interest is to encourage collaboration and communication among the members and to seek ways to support the forward effort making the MEG a critical enabler in harnessing and operationalizing the CONUS base for joint SOF campaigns. The MEG aggressively partners with outside agencies for their unique expertise, such as the narrative research of the DARPA; the polling data of the INR-OPN; and the ideology research

usually a senior representative from one of the community of interest participants or a subject-matter expert who leads discussion in the respective area of expertise. Previous chairs have included Lt. Gen. Ken Tovo, at that time Commander of the Special Operations Command, Central Command, and Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, Coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Recent notable sessions include the May 2, 2013 presentation by Dr. William Casebeer from DARPA on narrative construction and deconstruction, and the May 16, 2013 presentation by Dr. Erica Chenoweth from the University of Denver on her research into the efficacy of civil resistance.

Outside of the secure video teleconference, the community of interest main-

“Standing up the MEG as a separate entity allows the existing MISOC units and staff sections to remain focused on their current missions, while the MEG works to develop operational- and strategic-level capabilities and concepts...”

The MEG staff currently consists of eight officers, including an Air Force Behavioral Scientist, two PSYOP NCOs and two civilian PhD cultural intelligence analysts. These personnel were handpicked by the MISOC commander for the special skill sets they possess, such as a demonstrated keen understanding of influence, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, revolution, social-movement theory or a grasp of social media and emerging communication technologies and media.

The MEG has put several key initiatives in motion — most notable is the Inform and Influence Community of Interest. Membership in the MEG community of interest includes representation from the theater special operations commands, which serve as points of entry to the supported geographic combatant commands; the Joint Staff; the U.S. Special Operations Command; the National Counterterrorism Center; the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of

of the NCTC. In return, the community of interest gains an understanding of MISO missions and can coordinate through the MEG with the TSOCs for deployed MISO support to the members' own mission sets. It is important to note that the community of interest is not a hierarchy; rather, it is a network that the MEG facilitates. In addition, the community of interest is an informal entity, thus the concepts, work and information discussed must therefore offer a value-added benefit to the participants in order for members to want to continue and even increase participation.

Central to the Community of Interest activities is the secure video teleconference hosted by the MISOC every two weeks. During these one-hour MEG sessions, the community of interest receives presentations oriented around a predetermined theme and participants are encouraged to ask questions and even to challenge the material presented. Each session has a chair, usually the MISOC commander and a guest co-chair who is

tains contact and participates in episodic working groups, tackling special topics in greater depth than a one-hour MEG session can afford. An example of this relationship is the countering violent-extremist ideology workshop hosted by the MEG. During this workshop, members of the community of interest detailed their efforts, offered feedback and worked to achieve a consensus approach in this vital endeavor. Additionally, members of the community of interest participated in USASOC's Silent Quest 13-01 exercise and are anticipated to participate in Silent Quest 13-02, ensuring unified-action partner integration into these critical exercises.

In addition to building the community of interest, the MEG has begun development of Social Media Analytics Regional Teams. These teams, when fielded, are intended to provide the forward-deployed ARSOF elements a resource for understanding the social-media environment, from key-word mapping to trend monitoring and social network analysis.

The Social Media Analytics Regional Team concept is still in the nascent stages with the initial goal being the creation of a team within each Military Information Support Group, followed by the creation of a team within each regionally aligned Military Information Support Battalion. The final Social Media Analytics Regional Team configuration will be informed by lessons learned as the initial team is put into action. The MEG is currently collecting a suite of existing training programs, such as the Naval Postgraduate School's seminars on social network analysis and the Open Source Center's social-media training, which will provide the Social Media Analytics Regional Teams with an initial operating capability until a formal training pipeline can be developed in partnership with USAJFKSWCS. The approach to Social Media Analytics Regional Teams demonstrates a cornerstone of the MEG experiment: spinning off of concepts to the appropriate venue once sufficiently developed. At a future decision point, ownership of the Social Media Analytics Regional Team concept and the training requirements will be spun-off to a more appropriate agency, such as the 5th Battalion, USAJFKSWCS. The spin-off of concepts serves two critical functions. First, the concept will ultimately reside where it best fits. Second, spinning off developed concepts allows the MEG to stay on focus as an experimental think-tank rather than becoming an executing staff element.

It is critical to understand that while the CONUS base is being energized in support of the deployed mission, mission command of forward deployed ARSOF typically resides with the appropriate TSOC. Thus, while the MISOC may communicate informally with deployed ARSOF elements, any formal MISOC support — whether from organic resources or from the Community of Interest to a deployed element — must be coordinated and ultimately controlled through the TSOC assigned operational control over that element. A firm understanding of the difference between chains of command and lines of coordination or communication is necessary

so that the support provided by the CONUS base does not disrupt mission command. The MEG internalizes this command relationship in its charter by emphasizing that the MEG does not act independently of the geographic combatant commanders and the TSOCs; rather, the MEG works to support the objectives of the combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors.⁵

Operationalization of the CONUS base represents a critical line of effort within the ARSOF 2022 concept. In a complex, uncertain environment, the ARSOF community must utilize every appropriate resource and capability resident in the CONUS base in support of operational missions. The MISOC, through the MEG, works continually to achieve this end. In the long term, operationalizing the CONUS base demands the MEG become the focal point for the integration and synchronization of an ARSOF approach to strategic- and operational-level influence efforts in support of geographic combatant commanders' objectives.⁶ This requirement is reinforced by Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland's guidance: "Today, the Army must consider the possibility that military success in modern 'wars among the people' will require ever increasing interdependence among the military services and inter-agency partners."⁷ The MEG, through the community of interest, is how the MISOC will actualize this obligation. **SW**

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Notes

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2. USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 17.
3. LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris, "Toward Strategic Landpower," *Army* 63, no. 5 (2013): 22.
4. LTC Robert Cody, "MISOC Effects Group (MEG) Gen II," (Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, 2013), slide presentation.
5. LTC Cody, "MISOC Effects Group (MEG) Gen II."
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7. LTG Cleveland, "Toward Strategic Landpower," 21.

MISOC EFFECTS GROUP (MEG) – GEN II CHARTER

What it is:

The MISOC Effects Group is a collaborative forum/working group — set in an interagency space with the objective of connecting and harnessing CONUS-based influence entities/networks in support of the forward effort.

What it is not:

- It is not meant or designed to act independent of GCCs/TSOCs.
- It is not a force allocation or resourcing board.

What it will do:

- It will function as an enabler for the interagency / GCCs and TSOCs and paces off their OAAs.
- It will harness the intellectual/human capacity of CONUS-based Inform and Influence Activities and Information Related Capabilities.
- It will work in concert with a broad range of Joint and Interagency partners to support combatant commander and ambassador objectives.

MEG Gen II enhances and enables USASOC Future Operational Concepts for 2022 and beyond:


- Integrates influence capabilities for CSC/CSU Operationalized CONUS based entities — U.S. Army Special Forces Command's Office of Special Warfare.
- Serves as a coordination point between TSOCs and MISTF 2022 Force Packages and the MISOC Global Web Initiative.
- Serves as a synchronization/coordination point between interagency / intergovernmental entities and the MISOC Tool Kit.
- Leads the MISOC CVE Ideology LOE — and augments MISTF 2022 Force Packages as required.

End State:

The MEG is one of USASOC's platforms to operationalize the CONUS base — to increase the operational reach of the TSOCs and by extension the GCCs by better connecting and harnessing the CONUS strategic/operational level Inform and Influence interagency/intergovernmental entities to better support Interagency/GCC and TSOC OAAs in achieving psychological effects and behavior change in select foreign audiences in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy.



ARIS: Assessing Revolutionary and



"History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon"

— Napoleon Bonaparte

MONTANGNARDS Bracelet ceremony - Vietnam, 1973. U.S. Army photo.

While Napoleon Bonaparte likely referred to his own accounting of events, there is truth to his statement; without a baseline consensus of history, it becomes impossible to frame arguments, develop doctrine, identify trends, learn lessons or draw conclusions. Today, the students, planners and Soldiers who study examples of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense often face varying and scattered interpretations of critical historic events. Essentially, the Army special operations forces inventory lacks a thorough historic compendium, a multi-disciplined and neutral body of work, from which to draw lessons, build doctrine and develop training.

In medicine, practitioners develop treatment plans that are based on a foundational

body of knowledge and an assessment of the anatomy of their patient. They depend upon professional experience, a patient's symptoms and a commonly accepted standard of care gained by intense scholarship and applied research. Likewise, SOF planners and writers develop techniques, tactics and procedures, force-structure modifications and doctrinal guidelines based on professional experiences, political sensitivities and operational realities. While such components contribute to an understanding of how insurgencies and resistances are established, grow and operate, SOF's foundational body of knowledge must also be accompanied by serious analysis and operational research.

The original rationale for conducting operations research came about after World War II as a method of "...making scientific

cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. Operations research techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy"² Experience demonstrated that combat development, equipment procurement and doctrine proved more costly without detailed research, development and analysis. In essence; research provided the bedrock upon which all other functions were anchored, saving time, money and people. Specifically, research and study allowed U.S. forces to maintain a technological and analytical edge over its opponents.³

With respect to the special operations community specifically, The Special Operations Research Office completed the last

Insurgent Strategies

BY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 4 BRUCE E. DEFEYTER
AND CHRISTINA PHILLIPS

detailed insurgency analysis, publishing the *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1: 1933-1962, in 1962*. In 2011, in an effort to address the nearly 50 year gap of directed analysis, the United States Army Special Operations Command, G3 Special Programs Division, in partnership with The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, developed the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgency Strategies project. This work provides planners and practitioners with foundational resources for the study of insurgencies. In this way, the ARIS products and analyses are to insurgencies as Grey's Anatomy is to medicine.

The ARIS project provides irregular warfare practitioners a value neutral, academically rigorous, standardized and fundamental framework for analysis and an impartial view of evidence and key topics relating to resistances and insurgencies. The body of work encompasses detailed case books, texts and studies, as well as professional websites that provide direct support to IW instructors through instructional materials, libraries and guided discussion lessons.⁴ All ARIS products are peer reviewed by recognized military strategists, social scientists and IW experts. Such unbiased information is necessary for those planning and conducting foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. It provides a foundation for the emerging doctrine that guides IW plans and operations.

The first academic text in the new ARIS series essentially centers on two objectives. First, it provides a common frame of reference from which to discuss, contrast and compare how SOF students and Soldiers might support or oppose a broad range of political struggles. Second, it updates the 1962 Special Operations Research Office study, moving beyond a template focused on politically-based struggles to include resistances centered on ethnic cleavages, identity discrepancies, modernization, reform and other factors. Across 23 cases, the text as-

sesses a spectrum of insurgents, government forces, and external actors.

The 2012 casebook serves as a companion compilation to the original 1962 edition. It utilizes a standardized framework to "introduce the reader to modern-style insurgencies and revolutionary strategies, as well as to act as an information resource on these particular cases."⁵ Each chapter approaches a unique case which can be classified into one of five categories:

- **Revolution to Modify the Type of Government;** New People's Army (NPA), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 1979 Iranian Revolution, Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).
- **Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues;** Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 1964–2009, Hutu–Tutsi Genocides, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996–1999 and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): 1969–2001.
- **Revolution to Drive out a Foreign Power;** Afghan Mujahidin: 1979–1989, Viet Cong: 1954–1976, Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002, Hizbollah: 1982–2009 and Hizbul Mujahideen.
- **Revolution Based on Religious Fundamentalism;** Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Taliban: 1994–2009 and al-Qaeda: 1988–2001.
- **Revolution for Modernization or Reform;** Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—Sierra Leone, Orange Revolution of Ukraine: 2004–2005 and Solidarity.

Each case incorporates a synopsis, general timeline, maps and background on the relevant physical, cultural, social, economic and political factors for each movement.

The form and characteristics of each study is assessed through an examination of the insurgency's objectives or goals, the leadership and organizational structure, methods of action, recruitment, sustainment, methods of obtaining legitimacy and external support. The report incorporates a scrutiny of government countermeasures, short- and long-term effects and how these decisions affect the population and the insurgency itself. Each case concludes with an analysis of the changes to the environment, policy and to the revolutionary movement itself. The end result is a comprehensive study that gives students, instructors and scholars the ability to contrast and compare individual revolutions. This approach also provides the readers the ability to design strategies to support the resistance (UW) or oppose the insurgency (FID); skills needed by every SOF student, instructor and planner.

In addition to the *Casebook on Insurgencies and Revolutionary Warfare*, the ARIS project digitized and reprinted the original SORO *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1: 1933-1962* and published an updated edition of *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies and Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare*, and an updated *Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography. The Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies and Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare* were designed as a modernization to the SORO studies of the same name. While the basic nature of an insurgency or revolution did not change, the tactics, techniques and procedures required significant updates due to the impact of modern technology. Additionally, the components of a modern insurgency must be expanded to include four aspects, the underground, auxiliary, guerrilla force or armed component and the public component. The public component is often represented by a political entity as exemplified by Lebanese Hezbollah.

ARIS Available and Upcoming Products

- Casebooks on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1: 1927-1962 and Vol. II: 1962-2009
- Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography
- Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies
- Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare
- The Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance
- Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare – Colombia (1964-2009) and Sri Lanka (1976-2009)



Visit the ARIS page on the USASOC website for products and more information:
<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html>

In order to support the Department of Defense IW instructor and facilitate the use of the ARIS products in the IW classroom the ARIS project recently unveiled the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgencies Guide web portal (<https://dnnpro.outher.jhuapl.edu/aris/Login.aspx>). This professionally hosted site is designed to provide IW instructors with a bibliography of IW related published articles, books and videos, access to a forum where instructors can share ideas for the classroom and features guided discussion lessons on key topics related to IW. In order to maintain academic rigor, the lessons are reviewed by both master educators and IW experts. The portal is designed to be a living support system for instructors, and the project is currently working with centers of influence to identify topics for additional lessons.

Current ARIS Study projects, expected to be available in the coming months, include *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, *Proxy Support to Resistances and Insurgency*, and *Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance*. The two *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare* examine Sri Lanka (1976-2009) and Columbia. These highly detailed analyses provide a holistic deep dive into multiple insurgencies and revolutions occurring within state boundaries. Both studies employ modern social science theories and follow a stan-

dardized framework, examining the historical, political and socio-economic context within which these insurgencies developed. *Proxy Support to Resistances and Insurgency* examines the use of proxy forces by foreign governments to achieve strategic ends. The groundbreaking *Legal Status of Personnel in*

Resistance scrutinizes and develops an understanding of how and to what extent laws might apply to an insurgent, host-nation personnel and U.S. forces as they support or defeat a resistance. The study also developed a legal continuum, demonstrating how a resistance can grow in intensity or be defeated by lawful or political means.

Projected product are:

- *Case Study on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare* — Palestine and Israel, 2 volumes (1870-1948/ 1949-2010).
- Unconventional Warfare Case Studies — topics to be determined
- Case Study on Narratives and Competing Messages in Revolutions, Insurgencies and Rebellions.
- Special Studies Collections — short studies in specific topics such as: insurgency phases of development, process of mobilization, thresholds of violence, economic effects of external support, etc.

ARIS reaches a broad audience, both internal and external to USASOC. Specifically, ARIS materials are used to support the Special Forces Qualification Course, the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Managers Course, the Network Development Course, the Warrant Officer Basic, Advanced and Staff courses and the Special Forces Intelligence Course. External to USASOC, ARIS materials are used in Pro-

fessional Military Education at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, The School of Advance Military Studies, the Command and General Staff School, the Naval Postgraduate School and each of the service academies. Finally the products are provided to the ARSOF student, planner and instructor in a variety of formats, ranging from traditional print and hardbound materials, to electronic bulletin boards, to “soft copy” versions appropriate for e-readers.

These professional materials provide multiple commands and institutions with baseline, peer-reviewed documents and the basis for discussions at the strategic-, operational- and tactical-level of influence. ARIS provides foundational materials that are incorporated in virtually every course from the Special Forces Qualification Course, to Advanced Professional Military Education, to material taught by interagency partners. These documents and lessons provide a synchronized, coordinated and exhaustive analysis that can be utilized to either support or defeat a resistance. Finally, ARIS provides the USASOC command a platform from which to develop doctrine, devise new TTPs and train and equip the force, for years to come. **SW**


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7. *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated* 2010.

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The definitions of UW, FID, COIN and an insurgency are easily defined and found in numerous ARIS publications. However, too often, even educated Soldiers misuse these terms, such as suggesting that U.S. forces are conducting COIN or UW in Afghanistan today; to be clear, the U.S. military is conducting FID. The model below, conceptualized by Mr. Paul Tompkins, USASOC G3X division chief, provides a pictorial model clearly identifying the roles and missions of forces involved in any conflict.



In this fictitious model, the country of "Square" Land, shaded green, finds itself embroiled in a political struggle turning violent. The square-headed people, colored red, are the insurgents, hence they conduct an insurgency. The blue colored square-headed people, represent the government forces fighting the insurgency, consequently conducting counterinsurgency.

In this scenario, the neighboring country to the east, "Tri" Land, shaded purple, enters the conflict by supporting the government of "Square" Land. By definition that support is defined as foreign internal defense because "Tri" Land is trying to protect "Square" Land's "...society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency...and other threats to its security." On the other hand, and to the west, "Circle" Land, shaded tan, enters the conflict on the insurgent's side in order to enable the insurgency the ability "...to coerce, resist or overthrow..." the government of "Square" Land.

This model is particularly useful because it accurately and graphically depicts actors, roles and missions in simplistic manner by defining the party's relation to the insurgency. It is understood that at the operational or tactical level, particularly in long-running disputes, the insurgents might well constitute the "de facto" government in limited areas, consequently torturing a strictly nuanced definition. However, the Tompkins model provides a clear understanding that at the strategic level, allowing multiple organizations, agencies, and more importantly, the Special Forces Soldier to understand their roles, missions and authorities in the ensuing conflict.

I³M

INTEREST.

IDENTIFICATION.

INDOCTRINATION.

MOBILIZATION.

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO A NEW MODEL OF INSURGENT INVOLVEMENT¹

BY JESSE KIRKPATRICK AND MARY KATE SCHNEIDER



Introduction

Recruitment propaganda is one of the main ways through which insurgencies and other extremist movements spread their message and recruit and indoctrinate new members. Insurgent movements have long used recruitment videos, capitalizing on the Internet's ability to reach audiences far and wide at minimal cost. Sites such as YouTube are littered with manifestos and training footage, broadcasting the ideologies of these groups to people around the world in places as diverse as Nigeria, Syria and the United States. This is not to suggest, however, that mere exposure to such messages will always yield active followers; not all consumers of revolutionary messages will act on them. What we do not yet fully understand is the panoply of factors leading up to an individual's decision to join an insurgency and mobilize to violence.

In support of the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies project, researchers from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab and United States Army Special Operations Command, G3 Special Programs Division attempted to fill this gap in knowledge. As part of this contribution, the research team developed a new model of insurgent participation and involvement that focuses on four critical areas: interest, identification, indoctrination and mobilization.² Dubbed "I³M," the model attempts to streamline previous efforts within the literature and delineate the factors leading up to and including insurgent mobilization. Both easily taught and learned, the model is also objective, normatively neutral and may be applied across a range of insurgency cases.

This article serves as a short introduction to the I³M model and will proceed in three parts. First, it unpacks the I³M model, defining and explicating its components. It then explains the framework's importance and notes its advantages over other models. Finally, it concludes with a suggestion for future research.

I³M: Explaining the Model

I³M is a two-part model. The first part encapsulates four key behavioral processes




DIAGRAM 1 I³M model part one encapsulates the four key behavioral processes of insurgency involvement.

of insurgency involvement. These include: interest (What piques the curiosity of new recruits?); identification (What leads new recruits to associate themselves with the movement?); indoctrination (What causes new recruits to take the leap and actually join the movement?); and mobilization (The point at which individuals take action in support of the movement). Interest, identification and indoctrination are the three factors leading up to mobilization.

As Diagram 1 indicates, while the components of I³M are interconnected, the processes are not linear — there is no simple, universal path by which individuals decide to mobilize.³ More importantly, although some individuals may be susceptible to the message of an insurgency, the vast majority will not adopt that insurgency's ideology to such an extent that they take action on its behalf. For those who do take an interest or identify with an insurgency, few will actually undergo indoctrination and mobilization. This characteristic raises an interesting question: What, then, motivates or incentivizes individuals to engage multiple aspects of I³M and become involved in an insurgency?

Here one can turn to the second part of the I³M model. Where the first part of I³M lays out four key factors of individual involvement in insurgencies, the second part of the model identifies some general

motivations and incentives for why individuals embark on and take steps in the I³M process. In identifying these motivations and incentives, the team drew from the empirical work of numerous insurgency scholars who have developed typologies and models that outline contributing factors to insurgent motivation — these factors assist in explaining why certain individuals might take an interest in an insurgency's ideology and why those individuals might identify with an insurgency.⁴ Further, these factors can be used to explain the process through which individuals become indoctrinated and eventually mobilized.⁵

Diagram 2 depicts the division of motivations and incentives into three categories: emotional, physical and ideological. It further demonstrates how we have delineated the motivations and incentives for I³M within each of these categories.⁶ We should note that while it is a useful heuristic to theorize and treat these categories and their attendant motivators as discrete and separable, in reality, the motivations and incentives influencing interest, identification, indoctrination and mobilization that we have identified can be cross-categorized. For example, a necessary condition of relative deprivation is that not only must external physical conditions of deprivation be present, but there must also be internal feelings, perceptions or ob-




DIAGRAM 2 I³M model part two depicts the division of motivations and incentives into three categories.

servations of the deprivation. In this sense, although we categorize relative deprivation as a physical motivation and incentive, it is both physical *and* emotional; it is in this way that the categorizations are, admittedly, not entirely separable.

In addition to defying discrete categorization, just like incentives and motivations for life's other activities, individuals' motivations and incentives for I³M are pluralistic. An individual may be interested in an insurgency for a variety of reasons, perhaps because of religious and political beliefs and also because of social pressure. Motivations and incentives are complex drivers of and contributors to behavior; individuals are typically influenced by numerous motives, which are further impacted by additional factors such as environment, social conditions, life history and so forth. Not only can one be influenced by a multiplicity of motivators and incentives, these attributes vary in strength and intensity from individual to individual.

While there is no magic formula that will predict what will motivate and incentivize a person to engage in I³M, once the interest of an individual has been piqued, it becomes possible for the individual to identify with the insurgency, become receptive to indoctrination and ultimately mobilize. By isolating the factors that contribute to

I³M, we can begin to operationalize the concept in a way that capitalizes on the model's explanatory and analytic power. Through querying a given case for the presence of the above listed factors, we are able to better understand the reasons why an insurgency is able to grow in membership and succeed (or fail) in its actions.

Moving the Model Forward: The Merits of I³M

The I³M model offers numerous advantages over other models. It is important to note that while I³M builds upon existing research on insurgencies and revolutions, it also departs from this scholarship in important and productive ways. While much of the existing scholarship on insurgency tends to focus on radicalization, especially radicalization to violence, our model seeks to explicate the steps leading up to and encompassing the act of insurgent mobilization, while also focusing on the broader incentives and motivations for why individuals take steps in the process of I³M.⁷ As a result, our operative research questions focus upon the more expansive issues of interest, identification, indoctrination and mobilization in an insurgency and are, therefore, not limited to inquiries solely focusing on radicalization.

In addition to creating a broader base for research and inquiry, the I³M model has

the obvious advantage of being applicable to insurgents and insurgencies that are not radical.⁸ This applicability results from an obvious but striking fact: involvement in an insurgency need not require radicalization — one can become an insurgent without being radicalized. Insurgents may be motivated by factors that have little or nothing to do with root or fundamental change — a key component of radicalization.⁹ For example, insurgents may fight to maintain the status quo or for material benefits. We have seen this latter motivation in the case of groups like the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia whose members were motivated by material incentives, the acquisition of wealth and greater shares of Colombia's illicit drug market, and not in radical, fundamental change. Because I³M casts a comparatively wider net, it offers a model that is applicable to numerous types of insurgents and insurgencies, and can help identify and explain the motivations and interests of actors ranging from the radical jihadist to the right-wing neo-Nazi to the insurgent fighting to preserve the status quo.

A second advantage of I³M results from the fact that it was developed to be of use to both scholars and students of insurgencies alike. As part of the ARIS Project, the I³M model will constitute the core component of an ARIS Instructors' Portal lesson plan, a resource for instructors who are teaching about insurgency recruitment and indoctrination. This is one reason why the team strove to develop an intuitive and easily understandable model, attributes essential to teaching and learning the complexities of insurgencies.

Third, I³M presents a set of four stages that are straightforward and, frankly, easier to recall and remember than existing insurgency recruitment and indoctrination models.¹⁰ We can think of the model as akin to a chest of drawers, a clothing bureau, where each of the "drawers" (i.e., processes in the model) can be opened and expanded as needed. From a teaching and learning perspective, it is far easier to remember and think about a general category (say, a sock drawer) that can be expanded and further specified, than it is to recall all of the various things that fall under that category. Which



MEETING NEEDS Often insurgents will fight to maintain the status quo or for material benefits. When those material benefits are not forthcoming, insurgents may put down their arms, like these Taliban insurgents turned who themselves in to Afghan National Security Forces. Their defections came in the midst of an Afghan-led operation designed to defeat the insurgency, provide humanitarian supplies and enable development projects in the area. DoD photo.

is easier to remember, four general categories of drawers or all of their constituent contents? By using four steps, I³M offers a heuristic that is advantageous for teaching and learning; it enables quick conceptual fluency for today's student of insurgency.

While the I³M model provides a good teaching heuristic, it also retains complexity and nuance — the model is simplified

insurgencies can only be defeated or supported when we understand the factors that motivate and incentivize insurgents.

Perhaps most importantly, I³M lays a strong foundation for further research. It signals that while there is good existing scholarship on the topic, there remains much work to be done. In the end, I³M remains a preliminary model that is need

do not sacrifice nuance at the cost of being straightforward. The four steps in the I³M model, coupled with the motivations and incentives that help explain why individuals take part in I³M, cast a comparatively wider net than existing insurgency scholarship which tends to focus upon radicalization. As educators and research scholars ourselves, we have worked to create a model

“Involvement in an insurgency need not require radicalization — one can become an insurgent without being radicalized.”

but not simplistic. In this respect, I³M has significant explanatory power. Just like the chest of drawers, each of I³M's categories can be expanded or “opened” to display a more complex set of variables that we have identified in the insurgency process. The identification of root motivations and incentives that impel individuals to become insurgents is advantageous not only for teachers and students, but also for today's war planner and fighter. Just like in medicine, where illness can only be cured with a proper diag-

of further exploration and study, a task that researchers on the ARIS Project are committed to fulfilling.

Conclusion

In summary, I³M is a novel model that offers several advantages over existing models of insurgent activity. Whereas other models rely on numerous steps and sub-steps to help explain behavior, our model is condensed into four stages that can be expanded or collapsed as needed. Thus, we

that is of use to students, teachers, academics and practitioners. As a result, because the I³M model is straightforward and easily comprehensible (factors that are critical to teaching, learning and operationalizing), it provides an improved basis for teaching about insurgency without compromising complexity. It is in this way that I³M provides a good heuristic for inquiring about a more nuanced and complex set of variables that can help inform the tactics and strategies of today's warfighter.

In closing, it is important to note that we do not wish to pretend that developing a general model of insurgent interest, identification, indoctrination and mobilization is an easy task; it is not. Nor do we claim that the I³M model provides an exhaustive, reductive account of insurgent motivation; to do so would be disingenuous. But it is possible to make headway by establishing a conceptual framework based upon the best empirical data available; this is what I³M strives to achieve. And while I³M helps us peel back the complexities of the study of insurgencies, it also reminds us how far this scholarship has to go. I³M not only underscores the need for conducting further research, it also provides a critical path to do so. **SW**

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Notes

1. The authors wish to thank Bruce DeFeyer, Christina Phillips, Max Crownover, and Maegen Nix for their instructive comments, criticisms, and contributions. Any errors are the authors' own. Special thanks to Magda Saina, Art Director at Johns Hopkins University--Applied Physics Laboratory, for creating Diagram One.
2. The original developers of the I³M model are Bruce DeFeyer and Christina Phillips, with subsequent developmental contributions made by this article's authors.
3. In fact, we agree with critics who argue against models that purport "contrary to empirical social science studies, that the path to terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that each step of the process has specific, identifiable markers," especially those that focus on attempting to identify markers based upon religious affiliation. Patel, Faiza. 2011. "Rethinking Radicalization," Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law. p.1.
4. See Crenshaw, Martha. July 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 379-399.; Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.; Berman, Eli. 2009. *Radical, Religious, and Right: The New Economics of Terrorism*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.; Hegghammer, Thomas. Winter 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 39-60.; Jones, James W. 2008. *Blood That Cries Out From the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2011. *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2008. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 415-433.; Patel, Faiza. 2011. "Rethinking Radicalization," Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law.; Wintrobe, Ronald. 2006. *Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. For those individuals who do mobilize, some may do so in ways in which they do not themselves directly participate in violent activity. Here it is helpful to distinguish between passive and active mobilization. Passive mobilization can be characterized by activity that falls short of the taking up of arms but includes actions on behalf or in support of an insurgency. Some representative activities of passive mobilization include charitable contributions to insurgent organizations or allowing armed individuals to take shelter on one's property. Conversely, active mobilization is when one takes direct part in the armed activities of the insurgency, when one is, in effect, an actively armed insurgent. Thanks to Bruce DeFeyer for pushing us on this distinction. For a discussion of the elements of an insurgency and the various kinds of mobilization and participation see Chuck Crossett, (ed.) *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Vol. II: 1962-2009*, United States Army Special Operations Command and the Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis Department. *passim*.
6. Some scholars of radicalization have disaggregated "mechanisms" of political radicalization based upon the amount of individuals involved. These authors distinguish between the individual, group, and mass levels, identifying mechanisms such as polarization (typically a result of discussion or exchange of ideas in closed environments, this occurs when there is a collective shift to more and more extreme directions as a byproduct of groupthink); competition (with other groups and/or with the state); isolation (when a movement 'goes underground,' either by choice or because it is forced); jiu jitsu politics (a strategy that aims to use an opponent's strength against him). McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2011. *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. *passim*. While some of these mechanisms may overlap with our model's individual motivations and incentives, I³M generally applies to the individual level. For a defense of this individual-oriented approach see Hegghammer, Thomas. Winter 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 39-60. It is our belief that further I³M research should examine motivations and incentives at these larger, macro-levels.
7. See note 4 for a representative sample of this scholarship on radicalization.
8. Radical is here defined as "associated with political views, practices, and policies of extreme change." "Radical" as defined by Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed August 5, 2013. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical>. Others define radicalization as "beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict." McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2011. *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 4. While the latter definition removes the association with extreme change, such radicalization models require the three parts of "belief, feelings, and actions," whereas, the I³M model has the advantage of encompassing a wider range of individual steps toward involvement in an insurgency. *Ibid*.
9. Thanks to Ted Plettner for pressing us on this point and providing the example of some *Salafi* Muslims who may engage in insurgent activity, yet remain uninterested in political change. For a similar example see McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. 2011. *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.
10. While the number of "chunks" that most people can remember is a matter of dispute, research in experimental psychology indicates that short term memory has a capacity limit. See Miller, G. A. (1956). "The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information". *Psychological Review* 63 (2): 81-97. For a critique of Miller see, Cowan, Nelson (2000). "The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity". *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 24 (1): 87-185.

ORDER FROM CHAOS

RESTRUCTURING

ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK W. "FRITZ" LITTLE

The last 12 years of war have increased the size of Civil Affairs and the reliance of commanders on its ability to accomplish difficult population-centric missions around the world. However, the resulting increased demands, along with the impacts of bifurcating the CA forces, have negatively impacted the Army Civil Affairs capabilities.

The stress on active-duty special operations forces CA units is illustrated by PERSTEMPO rates that are much greater than those directed by the Secretary of Defense and the commander of the United States Special Operations Command. Moreover, while the active-component Civil Affairs Force has increased 10-fold, there has been a significant decrease in CA staff presence within most SOF and joint commands, affecting not only the ability to support commanders, but also the CA officer-development model. Much of this has occurred as the result of seemingly short-term fixes to a long-term problem. As we prepare to support a new focus within the Defense Strategic Guidance,¹ and the inevitable budgetary constraints, it is time to restructure the Army's Civil Affairs forces with an emphasis on both efficiencies and maximum support to commanders.

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, with regard to Civil Affairs, was established as both the CA-generating force provider and operational headquarters for the CA function within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Since its inception, USACAPOC has been forced to balance these two very different requirements. As a force provider supporting ground combatant commanders and their maneuver units, USACAPOC often lost the ability to control deployed units since the operational control of these units rests with the supported commanders. This left USACAPOC's deployed CA battalion and brigade headquarters with only an administrative control relation-



ship with their deployed CA units. They continued to maintain this ADCON relationship in an effort to fulfill the operational headquarters responsibilities, which resulted in confusion not only for the CA Soldiers, who have two masters, but also for the supported brigade combat team commanders, working with a CA unit that was organizationally different from the rest of their assigned units.

In addition, to the duality created by being a force provider as well as an operational headquarters, the high demand for CA forces resulted in USACAPOC filling the majority of their requirements with adhoc organizations, often built during the mobilization process. This left units stripped of their own trained Soldiers and unable to man their own upcoming deployments, triggering a cycle of restructuring units with each new set of mission requirements.

These problems were even more severe for CA Functional Specialist with the added challenge of providing properly trained and educated specialists in a way never before envisioned.

For years, USACAPOC has been limited in its ability to provide qualified Functional Specialists.² It was not provided sufficient resources and authorities to recruit, train, credential and professionally develop Functional Specialists, forcing USACAPOC to work with what it had within its own ranks. While this concept that later became the basis for today's Functional Specialists was manageable when it was developed during World War II and could leverage a force of millions, the pool of "experts" is much smaller within the current all-volunteer force. This is further exacerbated by a validation process that does not discriminate between a high-school economics teacher and a senior-development executive at the World Bank, as long as they are both educationally qualified. This has resulted in the deployment of many unqualified Functional

Specialists. For example, a third grade teacher with only classroom experience could be deployed as a validated public education specialist to develop a province-wide literacy program in a contested region in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The command and control and manning issues plaguing USACAPOC were further complicated by the lack of effective and experienced GCC and Army Service Component Commands staff. Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, the 352nd Civil Affairs Command commander and his staff were to augment the Central Command staff to provide senior-level CA representation and to integrate Civil Affairs operations within the staff. However, over the past decade this has degraded to a Civil Affairs planning team, manned from disparate units, that is often distributed throughout the CENTCOM staff, performing many duties that have little, if anything, to do with Civil Affairs. While this staff augmentation is presumably valuable, it does little to support the commander with an efficient and effectively leveraged CA capability. This lack of CA planning capacity has resulted in CA forces being one of the first units withdrawn during Operation New Dawn and in the current draw down in Afghanistan. In reality, the commanders' Civil Capacity expertise should be one of the last to leave during these critical transitions.

How we got here

The growth of the CA force, the concurrent restructuring of CA organizations and the reassignment of USACAPOC to the U.S. Army Reserve Command have created unintended consequences³ With the 10-fold expansion of the active CA force, and the designation of 95th CA Brigade (A) as the only SOF CA organization, the community quickly split into two distinct groups: SOF (active) and conventional (USAR). The creation of the 85th CA Brigade further exacerbated the problem by creating a split between active and reserve components seeking resources within the conventional CA forces. The resulting operational territorialism is further aggravated by a reduction of CA staff representation within the commands that the CA forces support. For example, there are no AC CA colonel positions on any of the GCC staffs, with the exception of United States Africa Command. The reserve staff available to commanders is often transitory and limited in experience with the varied CA capabilities throughout the force. While the CACOMs have worked diligently to compensate, they are limited by the fact that many of the most experienced and capable of officers and NCOs are deployed or unable to be recalled to active duty, leaving them unable to fill this critical gap.

Prior to USACAPOC losing its SOF designation, Active Guard Reserve soldiers manned the majority of theater special operations command CA staff positions. Afterwards, the AGR personnel were

pulled from the TSOCs (and other SOF positions) since there was no longer a justification for AGR positions in formations without RC CA personnel. The TSOCs attempted to compensate for the loss of personnel but failed, since it could not recode USAR billets as AC billets, and an inability or unwillingness to either grow those billets or designate existing AC billets as CA.


The 95th CA Brigade (A) continues to support a demand for forces that results in a dwell rate consistently below its goal. Both active CA Brigades are sourced from a single active-duty CA pipeline at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, producing one pool of Soldiers leveraged by both units. This limited ability to fill its ranks, coupled with the consistently high operational tempo, has resulted in the inability of the 95th to resource some missions requirements. Furthermore, the 85th CA Brigade has had to restructure its forecasted growth by the loss of one company per battalion. With the commencement of FORSCOM directed deployments, the 85th CA commander and his staff are continually balancing growth against mission requirements.

Efforts to identify these and other capability gaps have been ongoing for the past few years. The two most significant efforts are the Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Recommendation (JROCM) 162-11⁴ and the TRADOC Analysis Center - Fort Lee (TRAC-LEE) CA Capabilities Based Assessment.⁵ In December, 2011 JROCM 162-11 was signed, identifying 23 tasks addressing Civil Affairs issues. In February 2013 TRAC-LEE CA released the CBA.

What Right Looks Like

The Civil Affairs Regiment must develop a common goal for providing support to commanders of joint, special operations and conventional forces that includes both CA Generalists and Functional Specialists to support unified land operations in every environment across the range of military operations.⁶ To reach this goal several factors must be incorporated into potential solutions. These include uniting the various tribes within the CA community, ensuring that there is no degradation of support to SOF or conventional missions while maintaining a manageable dwell rate and a well-managed Functional Specialty structure. Further, commanders must be supported by an organic CA staff capable of maximizing these capabilities. All of this should be applied in a no-growth, phased approach. Additionally, there should be one standard for tactical CA forces, regardless of component, based upon required capabilities.

CA is a unique function that is often not fully understood, even within the SOF community. Active component CA is an Army-



specific branch and comprised of SOF Soldiers with unique skills and abilities. However, since 2006 there is an ever widening divide in defining what it is to be a Civil Affairs Soldier. Active-duty CA Soldiers have an assessment and selection process and are trained in an intensive pipeline which includes regional and language studies and a rigorous branch-related curriculum. The USACAPOC Soldier receives a much more abbreviated curriculum. This has created an environment of two separate communities within CA, and a convoluted understanding of what a CA Soldier brings to the fight.

A unified CA Command would not only serve to mitigate this divide, but would result in operationally relevant improvements, to include: unifying CA C2 as well as training and education by applying unified proponent and doctrinal standards; the ability to meet requirements by leveraging all units within the force; the ability to form multicomponent teams and task forces to meet specific GCC and TSOC requirements; and a focus on capabilities, rather than component. This would allow the CA Regiment to better support maneuver units (both SOF and conventional) and persistent engagements, primarily Civil-Military Engagement and Theater Security Cooperation. Furthermore, this unified structure should include a global rapid response capability, with the ability to quickly deploy in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. As the U.S. military is always in a supporting role in these missions, it is critical to integrate military activities early with other humanitarian and relief organizations and their efforts. CA is uniquely structured to be a commander's conduit for this integration, if it has a timely capability to do so.

This unified tactical CA organization should fall under USASOC, and would require a mechanism to represent the equities of both the U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Forces Command and the ability to assign missions to meet the requirements of both conventional and special operations forces. Furthermore, this would allow these forces to leverage MFP-11 funds to maintain a standing capability to support both conventional and SOF missions.

For this to be effective, it will likely require a further revision to the Joint Staff Business Rules for allocation of forces and Guidance for the Employment of the Force. This would ensure fair and equitable distribution among operational headquarters requesting CA forces for named operations, contingency response, participation in exercises supporting war plans and episodic or persistent theater engagement. This revised guidance would address the procedures for Army Commands, Army Service Components, Sub-unified Commands and direct reporting units when requesting forces within the Force Allocation Decision Model.



A unified CA force could achieve the goal of a 1:2 dwell rate for active-duty Soldiers and a 1:5 dwell rate for USAR Soldiers. The current PERSTEMPO dwell rate for Soldiers in the 95th is consistently well below this goal. Any reunification plan must not only be able to support current demand, but be structured to survive the demands of future conflicts. Within recent years the demand for a persistent CA presence has increased. The USSOCOM Civil Military Support Elements have proven valuable assets to both commanders and ambassadors throughout the world. Any future plan should be structured to provide this critical presence, even as operational demands increase during conflicts.

The current system of managing Functional Specialists is not effective. At its birth during World War II, the expertise of the government team specialists came from their civilian professions. Since that time the importance of this critical niche capability within the Army has been continually recognized. However, without the millions of Soldiers of varied backgrounds available 70 years ago, CA should have a viable method to recruit, assess, validate and leverage the expertise of its citizen Soldiers as CA Functional Specialists.

Functional Specialists should be organized separately from the tactical force, creating a focused and dedicated force-provider organization for these Soldiers. This will allow appropriate integration of the right specialists in support of specific operational requirements, as well as Functional Specialist staff support to commanders.

Additionally, Functional Specialist standards should be tiered and quantifiable, drawn from the professional and academic communities in each discipline. This would identify the experience level of each specialty from novice to journeyman to master. Once this is complete, the Army must develop the authorities to allow the recruitment of experts at each level, through innovative means including direct commissioning. Such a system should be applied to current Functional Specialists with a mechanism to allow for professional and educational development, as well. This hierarchy would result in a separate Officer Professional Development model tied specifically to the Functional Specialists.⁷

In order to effectively employ this improved tactical and functional CA capability, there must be an associated Increase in the CA staff of the GCC, TSOC and ASCC. CACOMs play a critical role in providing theater-level CAO planning, coordination, policies and programs to support the GCC's regional CMO strategy as well as stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts. This is usually accomplished by deploying a theater-level operations or planning team. These teams develop and manage the strategic-level civil inputs to the commander's common operational picture and

provide the commander with the critical civil considerations for planning and executing operations. However, this rotational and often episodic presence does not provide commanders with a consistent capability. This can be mitigated by aligning an organic CA staff within the staffs of the GCC, TSOC and ASCC. This staff can be multi-component and capable of developing the CA and CAO plans to support these headquarters' theater specific plans.

The fiscal realities of waning resources and the associated reductions within the military ranks require that any solution attempt to achieve either no growth or negative growth in manning. Civil Affairs is a multi-component branch, with the majority of the force residing within the reserve forces. It is therefore appropriate to develop a multi-component structure, particularly in echelons above battalion, to achieve solutions with little or no growth of forces.

It is critical that any structural change to CA have a phased approach. As the regiment moves towards a single operation headquarters, each phase of the process should be capable of standing on its own. This will allow forward progress even if resource constraints prohibit transitioning to the next phase. It is critical to the process that deliberate assessments of progress are conducted prior to advancing to the next phase. Below is an example to illustrate this process.

Phase I. This proposal starts with the creation of a Civil Affairs Special Operations Command, constructed from existing assets from within the two active-component CA brigades. This would be a very small, lean organization with the primary duty of managing the USASOC force-provider functions for CA forces supporting conventional and SOF missions. The new command will essentially perform the operational tasks currently performed by FORSCOM and USASOC as they relate to CA. The next step within the phase is the transfer of the 85th CA Brigade to USASOC.

Phase II. Two USAR CA brigades, ultimately trained to the SOF CA standards, transfer to the CASOC which, at this point, would grow into a more traditional headquarters structure assuming the operational duties now performed within the CACOMs and USACAPOC.

While this is occurring, USACAPOC transitions to a Civil Affairs Governance Command. First, the CACOMs are transitioned into a staff organization integrated into the staffs of the GCC, TSOC and the ASCC. The brigades within the CAGCOM transform into a Functional Specialist organization, organized around functional teams with capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

At the end of this phase, the tactical force is fully established and there is a singular standard for all Functional Specialists within CA, resulting in a standing, relevant and able functional specialty capability.

The tactical force has an increased capability to support SOF and conventional missions with a reduced dwell time ratio for all active CA units, as a result of the efficiencies of combining of training, support and the quick response force responsibilities of the two brigades.

Phase III. The final phase reintegrates the disparate CA organizations. This involves Civil Affairs Command with a subordinate CAGCOM and the reintegration of the CASOC and the separate USAR brigades in Europe and Hawaii. All of this is subordinate to USASOC as all of the CA force, once again, becomes a SOF asset with the mission to support both SOF and conventional CA missions.



The Hurdles on the Road

Of course, any solution will require a deliberative approach that addresses inevitable issues which will result from any AC/RC force modification. These include such challenges as: grade-plate issues; developing a singular training standard for tactical CA that is appropriate for USAR Soldiers; establishment of a professional development model for the Governance Specialists; the authorities required for direct commissioning of civilian experts; acceptance of increased CA staff presence by the GCC commanders; and USSOCOM Force Cap issues.

However, none of these are, in and of themselves, prohibitive of progress. There is a need to adapt the CA force to more efficiently and effectively support commanders and their operations. Now is the time to start formulating this adaptation. **SW**

Lt. Col. Frederick W. "Fritz" Little is the Civil Affairs Branch at the U.S. Special Operations Command J33-CA.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of Defense, 5 January, 2012, Defense Strategic Guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for a 21st Century Defense", accessed 28 March, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
2. Mark Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs" Army, March 2005, Vol. 55, p. 18
3. Hugh C. Van Roosen, Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2009), 1.
4. Joint Staff, 1 December, 2011, Memorandum, "Civil Affairs DOTMLPF Change Recommendation"
5. Office of the Chief Army Reserve, 4 February, 2013, OCAR Memorandum, "Official release of the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) AR 5-55 Study: Civil Affairs Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), conducted by the U.S."
6. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center - Fort Lee (TRAC-LEE)"
7. Department of the Army, 31 October, 2011, Field Manual 3-57, "Civil Affairs Operation", accessed 28 March, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-57.pdf>
8. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD September 2005 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140, P. 1-55.

THE DRY SPONGE THEORY:

Maximizing the use of 'Money as a Weapon System' in COIN

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH LONG

Introduction

As a profession largely dedicated to the application of unconventional warfare to “enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power,” it is important that our commitment to “life-long learning and transformation” fully captures lessons of the past in order to best prepare us for the future. At a glance, tactical training in special operations forces has successfully captured tactical and operational lessons learned from our 50-year history and incorporated them into our training. However, it is also important that our profession quickly capture lessons learned from our most recent conflicts to better prepare for our uncertain future.

Although not a new concept, it wasn't until 2009 that the Army officially published a handbook on “Money as a Weapon System”. Based on a quote from then Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, then commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division, the term is used to describe how “Warfighters at brigade, battalion and company level in a counterinsurgency environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous populations to facilitate defeating the insurgents.” Unfortunately, the proper application of MAWS extends far beyond the tactical and operational levels of warfare and should be considered as part of the overall strategic nature of modern COIN operations.

In the 1958 political novel *The Ugly American*, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer set the setting for the strategic nature of effective MAWS. Set in the fictitious country of Sarkhan near Thailand and Myanmar, the book describes the conflict between the United States and Russia over Southeast Asia as part of the Cold War. In the story, a newly appointed U.S. Ambassador struggles to understand why political support leans more toward Russia than the U.S., despite grossly outspending their rivals. In prophetic fashion, the authors reveal that most of the money spent in Sarkhan does little to help the Sarkhan people. The Ambassador grows to realize that building expensive modern highways is good for American businesses, yet has little effect on rural citizens of Sarkhan. In contrast, the Russians continually employ a less expensive methodology that directly benefits

simple farmers. In reality, the Cold War ended with an American victory following the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet the strategic nature of spending money in COIN environments has not been fully articulated in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With this in mind, two characteristics are likely true for the U.S. in the post-conflict future: military budgets will continue to decrease and threats to America will require the continued application of UW. Therefore, with shrinking budgets and increasing threats facing our military future, the U.S. strategic imperative must quickly shift from how much money do we spend to how well do we spend it?

Money as a Weapon System

Survival in battle requires Soldiers who are proficient in the employment of multiple weapons systems and most tactical training time is devoted to honing skills of lethality. To do this requires Soldiers who understand both the strengths and weaknesses of each weapon and how they are best employed on the battlefield. Not surprisingly, the same requirements must be maintained when utilizing MAWS.

Effective weapons application requires training at multiple levels. Flat ranges and shoot houses prepare Soldiers to fire weapons at multiple targets utilizing various marksmanship techniques. Field training requires Soldiers to be trained in the use of range cards and sector sketches to help units maximize the effects of their weapons and to sustain these effects for as long as possible. Even rules of engagement exist to help warfighters determine when and how their weapons can be employed in various combat situations. However, when we consider training for the use of MAWS, similar methods of training are difficult to determine.

To bridge the gap between training and practical uses of MAWS, the Center for Army Lessons Learned developed the Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System. However, as with any training manual for other weapons, handbooks aren't enough. Likewise, the MAWS Handbook is oriented to “company-, battalion- and brigade-level officers and noncommissioned officers” yet fails to provide the detailed guidance necessary for the strategic employ-

ment of MAWS. In fact, the guidance below is as specific as it gets:


While warfighters receive training on most weapons systems they will use, most receive little if any training on MAWS prior to deployment. Use the acronym WEAPONS to remember the seven steps in funding warfighters:

- Work to identify the requirement and appropriate funding authority.
- Estimate the cost and ensure funding is available.
- Attain required approval(s).
- Purchase the goods of services.
- Oversee the requirement to receipt or completion.
- Notify the appropriate authorized U.S. government agency (USG) disbursement agency when the goods/services are received or project is complete.
- Secure the appropriate documentation.

Although the MAWS Handbook provides valuable tactical and operational aspects to the spending of money in a COIN environment, the WEAPONS acronym does little to assist senior leaders and policy makers with understanding the strategic nature of how we spend money on the battlefield.

Additionally, the MAWS Handbook, as a training manual, fails to adequately consider the hazards of improperly employing weapon systems. For most weapons used by our Soldiers, poor employment can have severe short- and long-term consequences. Examples include wasted ammunition, melted barrels and increased collateral damage. Not to mention, these negative consequences contribute to unsustainable budget requirements, ammunition shortages, loss of morale for our Soldiers, reduced domestic support (typically resulting from increased casualty rates) and reduced international or coalition support.

When considering money as a strategic weapon, the comparison between the German bombing campaigns



of the Battle of Britain in 1940 compared to the Allied bombing of Germany from 1942-1945 portrays harsh contrasts. Although both operations involved long-range bombing of enemy cities, the “allied attacks against [German] oil and ball bearing production” succeeded in “almost bringing the Germans to their knees.” On the other hand, Germany’s air campaign failed to bring about Britain’s surrender and was a strategic failure. Similar negative consequences for the improper use of money have an even greater impact when considering the strategic framework of insurgent warfare.

The Strategic Framework of Insurgent Warfare

Multiple theories and models have been developed to understand insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. The theory most useful to understanding the strategic framework involved in insurgency and COIN operations is the “Diamond” model developed by Professor Gordon McCormick. According to Colonel Greg Wilson, who utilized the “Diamond” model to describe the U.S. approach in the Southern Philippines, “[the diamond] model provides a useful framework in developing a holistic approach to separate insurgent or terrorist organizations...from their base of popular support so they can be isolated, captured or killed.” In McCormick’s model, the government and insurgents are competing against each other for the support of the people utilizing unique strengths and weaknesses that makes popular support either sides’ center of gravity. According to the model, military forces have the advantage of strength while the insurgents have the information advantage. This results in a government which cannot directly attack the insurgents (can’t



SCHOOL FUNDING Afghan elders inventory a recent influx of supplies donated by members of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan to a school in Shah Wali Kot district, northern Kandahar province. *U.S. Army photo.*

find them), and insurgents who can't directly attack the government (too weak).

As the competition for the support of the people under McCormick's model continues, everything that is done by the government or the insurgents will either increase or decrease popular support. The employment of MAWS, like any other weapons system, must be employed to enhance rather than diminish the government's relationship with the people.

The Dry Sponge Theory

The dry sponge analogy is intended to be a tool that strategic leaders can use, in addition to McCormick's "Diamond" model, to maximize the strategic application of MAWS in COIN environments. Understanding the dry sponge provides strategic guidance for the proper application of MAWS while showcasing the consequences of the ineffective use of money.

The sponge used in this metaphor starts out dry and rigid. When water is poured onto the sponge, some water is absorbed while the rest becomes run-off. If a glass of water is poured onto the sponge too quickly, only a small amount is absorbed and the majority of the water is wasted. However, if water is poured slowly, the sponge absorbs most of the water thus achieving full-saturation. When this happens, wasted water is limited to mere drops and the glass of water does not empty quickly. Most importantly the sponge absorbs the water more completely so that the entire object is uniformly wet. As the sponge dries over time, the filled glass is still available to keep the sponge moist.

Using this metaphor, the sponge represents the host nation prior to U.S. involvement and the water represents money. When money is introduced into a foreign economy too quickly, only high-level government representatives benefit from the money. The rest of the wasted money is funneled to support areas of corruption and quite possibly the insurgency itself. Most importantly, the center of gravity as identified by McCormick's "Diamond" model receives none of the benefits.

With the application of water to a dry sponge in mind, the real-world cash equivalents will tend to produce one of two outcomes that help determine if the application of MAWS will be effective or ineffective. When the U.S. is involved in an operation that benefits high-level government personnel, yet provides little if any benefit to the general population, the opposite of the intended effect is achieved. Instead of pulling the population closer to the government, the population is actually pushed closer to the insurgency:

However, if money is introduced into the economy slowly and absorbed uniformly by the people, the population receives the benefits of U.S. support and will tend to gravitate closer to the government:

Finally, the rate at which money is spent during an insurgency or COIN environment has strategic implications for the enemy as well as for the supporting population at home. For example, as wasted money is used to support the insurgent and other corrupt organizations, the enemy becomes better funded and more accepted by the people. This strategic error not only emboldens the enemy, but facilitates recruiting, finances equipment procurement and increases the capacity to garner international support. As the enemy's support structures and morale improves, government support declines proportionately.

Case Study – Afghanistan

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan greatly resemble the dry sponge. Since the initial invasion in 2001, the U.S. has spent an estimated \$3 trillion fighting the Taliban, creating an effective Afghan government and building an Afghan military capable of providing protection. According to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the U.S. is obligated to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan because of their connection to the al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. on 9/11. In fact, Secretary Clinton reminded Americans in 2009 that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is “to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies,” and that “to eliminate al-Qaeda, we must also fight the Taliban.” However, like water over a sponge, military resources and money must be carefully introduced into host-nation countries to avoid waste. With cost estimates in the trillions of dollars, the question remains “Is Afghanistan \$3 trillion better off?”

Of the resources being wasted in Afghanistan, arguably none is more precious than the lives of American Soldiers who are physically engaged in our fight with the Taliban. However, the incomplete understanding of the effect of outside resources on an indigenous population encouraged our strategic leaders until recently to ‘pour’ military and financial resources into the Afghan conflict with results opposite of the intended effect. Since 2009, the number of troops fighting in Afghanistan has “nearly doubled,” while injuries to troops increased by 178 percent the following year.

Unfortunately, the military effects on the Taliban may not be commensurate with the resources lost in the process. According to the Army News Service, from December 2010 to January 2011, “ISAF and Afghan forces have detained more than 100 high-value targets,” consisting of “primarily Taliban...mid- to high-level leaders” who “filled major roles in the insurgency.” However, according to reports from military personnel in other news sources, the published drawdown of U.S. forces in 2014 has given the Taliban “hidden power” consisting of networks of “spies everywhere,” and “a quasi government and the military arm that empowers it.” When the cost estimates are boiled down to simple numbers, the true cost estimate of fighting the Taliban is staggering: “the best estimate of Taliban killed per year (2,000) divided by a portion of the direct costs that the Pentagon is spending each year in Afghanistan (\$100 billion). The resulting statistic suggests that it costs \$50 million to kill each Taliban soldier.”

Despite the mixed reviews concerning the effects of increased Soldiers in Afghanistan, recent COIN history in the U.S. tends to look favorably on such surges of American troops. Although it was initially met with criticism, the troop surge of 15,000 Soldiers to Iraq in 2007 was regarded by most news sources as successful. At first glance, the surge looked to have produced two positive effects: “Violence is down, and the Iraqi forces are rapidly growing [grew] in size and ability.” However, academic review of the post-surge strategy reveals that “the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.” Not surprisingly, the magic bullet of “surge warfare” has not translated well from Iraq to Afghanistan as troops continue to be ‘poured’ directly onto the Afghan sponge.

By placing more Soldiers into harm’s way in Afghanistan, it seems that, to the Taliban, the U.S. has merely provided more targets and created an opportunity for the popularity of this conflict to plummet. From a dry sponge perspective, these strategic results are expected. Not only has most of the money spent failed to be absorbed into Afghanistan’s rural villages, but the Taliban insurgency has become emboldened while domestic support for the conflict continually declines.

Conclusion

As an organization that focuses exclusively on UW, it remains in our collective best interest to continually study the strategy of COIN operations and to capitalize on lessons learned. Likewise, if we expect to be engaged in increasingly more COIN operations over time, then we must gain mastery of all the weapons required of our craft, to include the use of MAWS.

Just as an infantry squad leader is expected to use range cards and sector sketches to protect his troops in the field, we must develop additional training aides and tools that improve our Soldiers strategic understanding of the COIN environment. Additionally, the dry sponge analogy and “Diamond” model serve as simple and useful tools that help communicate our strategic vision for the employment of resources in the next conflict.

As previously mentioned in the comparison between the Allied bombing of Germany and the Battle of Britain, the strategic differences between two similar operations can produce wildly different outcomes. Although German commanders probably measured their success against Britain in terms of sorties flown, numbers of bombs dropped, casualty rates or estimated battle damage assessments, the operation nonetheless failed. The strategic failure lay not in how the operation was measured but in the intent of the operation itself. Allied air campaigns targeted industrial targets that damaged the German capacity to sustain war, while German bombs were directed at destroying the British will to fight.

When it comes to measuring the effectiveness of MAWS, similar problems are likely to surface. In a COIN environment, the only real measurement of MAWS effectiveness will be in the direction of shift of the population either toward the government or toward the insurgency. One direction is a success and the other is clearly a failure and no spending checklist or handbook can change the outcome. Like the Battle of Britain, our strategic leaders must seek to ensure that the strategic goals of our money in a COIN environment successfully make the argument that we deserve the support of the people; anything less becomes a wasteful bureaucratic exercise.

In bridging the gap between what we have done in the past and what we will do in the future, our military will be better suited to not only enhance our introduction of money into the COIN environment, but will better shape our policy makers’ opinions on the subject. By improving on our strategic fiscal policies in the future, U.S. forces will be in a better position to spend money wisely and in a manner that best shifts popular support in our favor. **SW**

Lt. Col. Joseph Long is a Special Forces officer and is currently enrolled in a doctoral program at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

GOOD LEADERS, FROM CAPTAIN TO COLONEL

Identifying solutions to problems identified in “General Failure” by Thomas Ricks

BY CAPTAIN ANDREW PENDERSEN-KEEL

The central premise of Thomas Ricks’ article “General Failure” is that “a culture of mediocrity has taken hold” within the American general officer corps. To make this point, Ricks endeavors to analyze the Army’s personnel management practices of general officers (including ascension and termination) from World War II to present. Ricks effectively demonstrates a growing reticence to decisive management practices during the 20th century (and spilling over into the first conflicts of the 21st century). In large measure, Ricks is correct in his assessment and compelling in his analysis. And yet, some expansion on the idea is necessary. This assessment is not unique to senior officer ranks, and is systemic throughout the greater officer corps. In order to fix personnel management at the General Officer corps level, personnel management at junior levels, the future General Officers, must be addressed first. This paper intends to proffer solutions at the captain to colonel levels to prevent the “mediocrity” identified by Ricks at the general-officer level. Identifying and retaining good leaders, from captain to colonel, promotes the concentration of effective leaders in the Army, from which General Officers arise.

Ricks’ comment “success goes unrewarded” approaches the nail. To strike it on its head, it’s necessary to analyze what causes unrewarded success. Fundamentally, the problem lies in the blind struggle of personnel managers to weigh officer performance against career progression. The two concepts are approached as diametric opposites, where they should be embraced as complementary concepts. In current practice, officers are pigeon-holed into a model of career progression (depending on branch and assignment) built around command-time wickets (two years (maybe) for platoon leadership, two years (maybe) for company command (or equivalent key-developmental assign-

ments, i.e. detachment command), two years for battalion command, two years for brigade or regimental command, etc.). This lockstep approach keeps the officer pool churning through the wickets of career progression with little to no consideration for retention of stellar human capital or the organizational welfare of the units being led. Mediocre leaders receive equal command time to stellar performers. This standardization of assignment timelines is the central flaw in officer personnel management. Though, this paradigm makes sense at the junior-officer levels, its implementation at commands above company grade remains ill-conceived and archaic. Why should a stellar division commander be mandatorily replaced after two or three years by someone with weaker bona fides? Viewing this practice through the aperture of a corporate culture, mandatory roll-over of an effective CEO seems ludicrous. It’s worth noting too, that large scale, institutional change takes time. With regular, uncontrolled leadership turnover, the ability of a commander (or CEO for that matter) to execute and manage the implementation of an institutional change is severely restricted. Change (read: improvement) becomes incremental and stagnant. The problem is further exacerbated, if replacement commanders possess divergent visions of the future. Efforts to improve or change or innovate flounder and eventually perish.

This problem has a simple solution, though. Officers, at some point during commands above company-grade (after effective leadership is demonstrated to superiors), should be asked whether they would prefer elongated command time or rank progression. In essence, does the competent commander want tenure at his present position? The question, however, is never raised (and indeed the concept, or anything like it, does not exist). Asking this question, and imple-

menting a plan to execute it, would, in effect, alleviate many of the personnel issues with which the Army struggles in the officer corps. The innate quality of self-determination over one’s career, achieved through offering preferential elongated command time, effectively rewards success as well. Officers demonstrating exemplary command qualities would thereby retain their commands longer, while officers desirous of career progression would be eligible to do so.

In practice, the two-year cap for command positions makes sense at the junior officer level. Junior officers should, and indeed need, the experience of leadership. Making room for the new crop of officers to get their chance is practical and a necessary for their development. However, with regard to senior officer positions, including everything above the rank of captain, the implementation of preferential elongated command time would be an invaluable and feasible solution to restoring an element of self-determination in one’s own career, as well as retention of valuable, effective human capital.

In order to compensate for the inevitable ballooning of officer strength at certain ranks, the officer corps and the personnel managers overseeing the macroscopic human resourcing of the Army would have to embrace the hitherto taboo practice of enthusiastic termination of ineffectual officers. Termination would not necessarily result in a career coda, but perhaps forced entry to the “Functional Area” program. Essentially, the two-year cap for command positions should be regarded more as a guiding rule, than a hard and fast regulation. Officers demonstrating an inability to effectively execute their command responsibilities should be quickly removed, as the risk to Soldiers should far outweigh the damage to an individual’s career.

PROMOTION/COMMAND BOARDS

Second-quarter FY14 Boards

DATE	BOARD
7 Jan 14	Colonel MFE Command
8 Jan 14	Reserve Component Colonel Promotion
13 Jan 14	Reserve Component Lieutenant Colonel Promotion
22 Jan 14	Lieutenant Colonel Army Promotion
4 Feb 14	Army Reserve AGR Sergeant First Class Promotion
4 Feb 14	Active Component Sergeant First Class Promotion

Soldiers whose records are pending review by a selection board need to validate their OMPF, ERB or ORB to make sure the documentation is current and up-to-date. Also, make sure your DA Photo is not older than two years old. You can review/update your records by going to HRC Tools for Soldiers, <https://www.hrc.army.mil/PERSINSD/Tools%20and%20Applications%20Directory>.

Enlisted Board Trends

Recent SGM board after action report comments highlight three board file problem areas: DA Photo, ERB and NCOER.

DA Photo

- Many files still had a Sergeant First Class photo.
- Photo was not updated and did not match the individual's ERB or comply with AR 670-1 compliance.
- There was not a photo on file.

ERB

- The duty assignment history on a NCO's ERB did not coincide with the NCOER Principal Duty Title.
- The Soldier's height reflected on the NCOER was not consistent.
- Files lacking a current photo and having a discrepancy regarding height on the NCOER gave the impression of a drastic weight gain and lack of compliance with the Army's height and weight policy.

NCOER

- Lack of consistency with rating and supporting bullets coinciding with one another.
- NCO received an Article 15 within the rating period yet the NCO was rated among the best.

In summary it is the individual's responsibility to ensure their promotion file is current, accurate and represents the best image of that NCO possible before the published deadline for any promotion board. By not taking the time to ensure this happens, the board members can only assume the NCO is not serious about wanting to be considered for promotion to the next grade. As Senior Leaders, it is your responsibility to not only mentor and teach those junior to you, but also set the example.

Good Leaders, From Captain to Colonel continued from page 36

Coupled with the concept of "tenured" command time, the military can help itself prevent investing in ineffectual officers at senior levels through a renewed appreciation for the first significant wicket in career progression. Though not given much attention, the promotion from company-grade to field-grade level is an extremely important piece of the personnel management model. It remains a mystifying quality to the Army that senior leaders can arrive at their positions without having experienced sufficient or quality time in command positions. It remains a universal truth that officers are products of their environment. In the absence of effective command time during junior-officer assignments, how can an individual be suited to assume the mantle of leading junior officers and their platoons and companies? The promotion to major should not be taken lightly. Those promoted to that position are passing through the first important wicket of

advancement. Especially in war-time, promotion of individuals to major who lack combat experience as successful platoon and/or company level leaders is a great risk. Upon promotion to major, individuals enter a cadre of officers being primed for battalion commands. This promotion should not be made haphazardly and should generally not occur in the absence of successful platoon and/or company commands. Unfortunately, many sub-standard officers attain the promotion due to the macroscopic need of the Army to maintain a certain number of majors in order to fill relevant billets. The absence of successful platoon and company commands should immediately disqualify an officer for promotion to field-grade level.

The Army's decision to implement the "Functional Areas" program was a step in the right direction. Allowing individuals the ability to career designate in sub-fields within the military construct provides individuals some modicum of

self-determination, and clears the field of what would be officers impartial to command opportunities. This initiative could be further amplified by permitting officers to elect for extended command time. Coupled with a renewed scrutiny for field-grade promotions and rehabilitated culture of potentially imminent termination (or forced career designation), the Army would substantially improve its quality of commanders at all levels above company-grade. Addressing these problems at levels below the general-officer level would thereby create a field of future general officers far better suited to assume that great responsibility and would thereby ameliorate the potential for the "mediocre" generals Ricks discusses in his article. **SW**

Captain Andrew Pendersen-Keel was a Special Forces detachment commander. He was killed in action in Afghanistan in March 2013. This article is reprinted from The Atlantic at the request of his unit.

RECRUITING

Every ARSOF Soldier is a Recruiter

Being a member of a Special Forces, Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations formation is the direct result of a Soldier making the choice to volunteer and undergo a rigorous assessment to complete a regimental qualification course. Our Soldiers embody the core attributes of integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, adaptability, capability and being a team player. As you engage with Soldiers outside of our formations, seek out those Soldiers who also possess these same core attributes and encourage them to consider volunteering for one of our regiments. All of us have a vested interest to have only the very best Soldiers as members of our regiments and you are in the best position to determine who is well suited for service in ARSOF.

FY14 ARSOF Officer Accession Board MILPER

Human Resource Command MILPER 13-175, FY14 Army Special Operations Forces Board Announcement (Regular Army) announced the Year Group 2011 (YG11) ARSOF Officer Accession Board. YG11 officers interested in applying for Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations must have a date of rank to first lieutenant between April 1 12 through March 31, 2013 to apply. This board is open to active component officers only. Eligibility requirements are as follows:

- Possess a baccalaureate degree or enrolled in degree completion. Degree must be secured by start of regimental qualification course.
- Airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
- Medically cleared for world-wide deployment.
- All male candidates must possess a valid SF physical to apply for CA, PO or SF. No physical can be older than April 14, 2013.
- All female candidates must possess a valid SERE-C physical to apply for CA or PO. No physical can be older than April 14, 2013.

- Eligible to obtain and maintain a top-secret clearance.

All application forms can be found on the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion website, www.sorbrecruiting.com Required forms for completion by the applicant are the Volunteer Statement, Resume and Statement of Intent. Additionally the application packet must include:

- Current copy of Officer Record Brief.
- Current DA Photo (Promotion to first lieutenant) reflected on ORB.
- DA Form 873 or a statement from Unit S2 if security clearance is not annotated on the ORB.
- Physical – SF for all males and SERE-C for all females – Original DD Form 2808 and 2807-1 and all supporting documentation.
- DA Form 705 within six months of application date with a minimum score of 240 with no less than 60 points in each category in the applicant's age group. Height and weight screening must be submitted if candidate does not meet height and weight standards.
- Defense Language Aptitude Battery -

CMF 38 Recruiting

Individuals, who wish to become a 38A Civil Affairs Officer or 38B Civil Affairs Specialist, should submit an application through the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion <http://www.sorbrecruiting.com/CA.htm> or contact (910) 432-9697 to speak with a SORB recruiter.

Candidate must score a minimum of 85 on the DLAB. If a candidate does not attain a minimum score of 85, the DLAB can be retaken or submit the current DLAB score with the packet and it will be considered and required by the board.

- In lieu of documents that are unattainable due to operational situations such as OEF, a memorandum stating, the reasons for the missing documents will be accepted, i.e., DLAB, "Unable to take the test due to deployment in OEF."

Special Forces

- Only male officers may apply.
- Must meet requirements for eyes and vision in accordance with AR 40-501, paragraph 5-6G.1-4 or be willing to undergo PRK or LASEK surgery for correction.

Officers must submit their completed applications by March 14, 2014 to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion. Officers are highly encouraged to read MILPER 13-175 for additional information and go to www.sorbrecruiting.com to see samples of application packets and information for uploading their completed applications.

Prior Service Accessions (PSA)

CMF 18 PSAs

Former enlisted Special Forces Soldiers have an opportunity to rejoin the SF Regiment in an active-duty status through the PSA program.

The PSA is open to CMF 18-qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active component or the National Guard Component. The Soldier must volunteer for active-component Special Forces service. NGC Soldiers are required to obtain a conditional release from the National Guard Bureau prior to applying for AC service.

GENERAL INFORMATION: All Special Forces-qualified enlisted Soldiers not currently serving on active duty in Special Forces require screening, assessment and revalidation prior to acceptance into active-duty SF. This includes prior service personnel, personnel currently serving in the NGC and SF-qualified personnel on active duty who are not serving in a CMF 18 skill. This screening and revalidation is conducted at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. Revalidation training focuses on military occupational specialty and language proficiency. *For more information contact Master Sgt. Pope at popeb@soc.mil or commercial 910-432-7359, DSN 239-7359.*

CMF 37 PSA

The PSA program is open to Psychological Operations CMF 37-qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active or reserve components or are currently serving in the reserve component and want to return to active duty.

GENERAL INFORMATION: The program applies to all PSYOP Soldiers who previously served in the AC, Active Guard and Reserve or Reserve Component and desire active duty service in CMF 37, or active duty Soldiers requesting reclassification back to CMF 37. The screening and revalidation is conducted at Fort Bragg. CMF 37 Soldiers are not required to repeat Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection.

For more information contact, Master Sgt. Hutson, at (910) 396-4349, DSN 236 or hutsonk@soc.mil.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Army Career Tracker (ACT)

The Army has established the Army Career Tracker as the primary leader development tool to provide its Soldiers a way to manage their professional development and monitor their progress in achieving training, education and career goals. Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers need to register their ACT account in NCOES. ACT pulls information from training, education and experiential learning sources and presents a common training picture as well as a consolidated course catalog for all cohorts. ACTs provides a personalized consolidated history of all recorded education, training (institutional and unit training) and assignments in a simple to use interface. The system allows users to search, see, understand and act on personalized information provided to them. Users will be required to select their first line leaders, who in turn, will be able to view critical data, make recommendations and provide effective mentoring. The Professional Development Model is personalized to the Soldier by matching the Soldier's history to proponent-approved career maps. ACT uses the PDM information to make targeted recommendations for future assignments, training, education and self-development. ACT integrates data from 17 different source systems. The overall concept of ACT is to bring together a view of these various source systems into a single-user interface.

The ACT provides the framework to create Individual Development Plans combining experiences, training, education and individualized interests. Creating an IDP allows users to track all aspects of their career using a standard template. Using the ACT IDP gives users the ability to map out events, decision points and outcomes. A pathway to success is to establish short- and long-term goals. ACT also provides users the ability to measure their progress against known benchmarks. To activate your ACT account go to <https://actnow.army.mil/>

Use the USAJFKSWCS NCOA website to access the latest information on Army Career Tracker, NCO Professional Development, the new NCOER and more NCO resources at <https://arsocportal.soc.mil/swcs/ncoa/NCO%20Professional%20Development/Forms/AllItems.aspx>.

Naval Postgraduate School

There is a new program at Naval Postgraduate School focusing on political intelligence overlaps in both special warfare and information warfare. The new Intel Program starts in January 2014. The three-part program includes intelligence courses, social network/geospatial analyses courses and an opportunity for in-depth case study research. The courses in the Intel core are Intelligence and National Security Decision-making, Intelligence in the Information Age, Human Intelligence in Irregular Warfare, The Reality and Prospects for Technical Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Liaison and The American Way of Covert Action. The DA CORE Lab Courses are Visual Analysis, Geographic and Temporal Dimensions of Dark Networks, Tacking and Disrupting Dark Networks, Dynamic Network Analysis and Network Design. In the third part, the students analyze case studies such as Networks for Crisis Response, Networks for Activism and Revolution and Networks for Development, Reconstruction and Stabilization. Interested students can contact Dr. Hy Rothstein at hsrothst@nps.edu or (831) 656.2203.

Voluntary Transfer Incentive Plan

The VTIP provides an opportunity for selected Special Forces officers to become subject-matter experts in another career field or functional area. Three times a year Human Resources Command convenes a board to consider eligible officer volunteers (post-detachment command captains and majors) for VTIP selection. USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC and Theater SOC Headquarters have critical billets within these career fields and functional areas, several of which require Advanced Civilian Schooling or specialized military education. An experienced Special Forces officer serving in one of these functional areas assigned to a special operations headquarters benefits both the command and the officer.

The following Functional Areas have positions assigned in a SOF unit.

- Public Affairs (FA 46)
- Strategic Intelligence (FA 34)
- Space Operations (FA 40)
- Foreign Area Officer (FA 48)
- Strategic Plans and Policy (FA 59)
- Force Management (FA 50)
- Operations Research/Systems Analysis (FA 49)
- Army Acquisition Corps (FA 51)
- Electronic Warfare (FA 29)
- Information Operations (FA 30)
- Information Systems Management (FA 53)

For more information on the program, contact the HRC VTIP manager at www.usarmy.knox.hrc.mbx.opmd-retention@mail.mil

School of Advanced Military Studies

The Advanced Military Studies Program at SAMS is a great professional opportunity for field-grade officers whether their next assignment is Intermediate Level Education, are enrolled in ILE or are coming out of a key and developmental assignment. To support SOF capabilities at the operational level, the regiments have a priority on utilizing and building SAMS capability within the ARSOF community. This capability is also critically important to the ARSOF 2022 plan. SAMS confers a master's degree in military art and science upon graduation and is a one-year program that focuses on military leadership, conceptual and detailed planning, critical thinking and staff support to decision making at the operational level. For more information about SAMS, visit the Special Forces Branch website (regardless of your branch) at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/MFE/SpecialForces/MAJs-Assignments-Ofcer.htm>

1. Apply while attending CGSC (including sister-service ILE schools, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, NPS and foreign staff colleges). Officers applying during ILE can do so in two windows, corresponding with the two AMSP classes: Applications to Class-01 occur in September-October each year, while applications to Class-02 occur in February-March each year. Announcement of application periods and requirements are made by MILPER message, posted to the SAMS website and disseminated through Command and General Staff College. Each officer must coordinate with his HRC branch before applying to AMSP.

2. Post-Key and Developmental Qualification Field Nomination. Officers applying from the field, who are Post-KD-qualified, are eligible and must complete all AMSP selection requirements, including examination and submission of a supervisor assessment and recommendation from a lieutenant colonel or colonel-level supervisor, using the supervisor evaluation form from the SAMS website. All officers who graduate from AMSP owe an AMSP utilization tour. ARSOF officers will be utilized in accordance with manning priorities and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's AMSP Program Management Policy.

If you have any questions about SAMS and the AMSP program, contact LTC Michael Kenny, the SOF adviser to SAMS, via email at michael.kenny@us.army.mil, or by phone at 913-758-3193.

MOVEMENT SKILLS

BY STEPHEN MANNINO, Med, CSCS

The common theme throughout life is *movement*. Movement is the foundation on which all task-specific skills are built. The purpose of movement-skill drills is to increase movement vocabulary and improve the efficiency in which these movements are performed thus improving the proficiency of task-specific skills and decreasing risk of injury. General movement skills can be broken down into two parts, linear and lateral/multi-directional.

Linear Movements Skills – Training For Speed/Acceleration

The focus of many Soldiers on “speed” is, for the most part, not a productive use of time. Yes, you read that correctly. Unless you are a track athlete, top-speed is of secondary importance when compared to acceleration. It is a tactical athletes’ ability to accelerate that really counts. This is the difference between “track speed” and “tactical speed”. To further illustrate this point let’s use the analogy of automobiles. All cars can go 60 miles per hour. What separates a Ferrari from a Smart Electric Car is how fast it can get from 0 to 60 miles per hour. Therefore, track-based speed programs may help your 40- or 100-meter sprint time, but in reality that speed is not applicable to the tactical athlete.

While a speed-development program should help to improve your overall speed, it should focus primarily on improving your acceleration skills, which will ultimately improve your tactical performance.

Lateral/Multi-directional Movement Skills– Training for Agility

Agility, by definition, is the ability accelerate, decelerate and change direction quickly while maintaining good body control, without sacrificing speed. Agility can be classified in two categories; 1) closed or programmed or 2) open or non-programmed. Examples of closed agility would be the pro agility drill, 3-cone drill, T-test, etc. An example of open agility would be recognizing and reacting to an unknown audio or visual cue. Agility training should take place in all planes of motion utilizing various movement patterns. The purpose of agility training is to develop a large movement vocabulary. The larger your vocabulary becomes the more efficient and proficient you will function in a tactical situation. The potential benefits of agility training include improved:

- Power, balance, speed and muscle contraction
- Reaction time
- Inter and intramuscular coordination
- Explosiveness of the major muscle groups
- Quickness
- Coordination

Combat does not take place in a straight line. Therefore, the agile Soldier possesses a distinct advantage over the Soldier who lacks good movement skills. The agility drills that follow consist of both open-and-closed agility drills. When performing agility drills be sure to make crisp, sharp cuts and changes of direction. Also, try to accelerate and decelerate quickly. Be sure to *take full-length strides when possible* and avoid stutter-steps and choppy steps, these may look fast but in fact they just add unnecessary steps and slow you down.

1. Get-ups

Set-up: Set a distance between 10 and 30 yards.

Focus: Starting speed, acceleration, sprinting form, reaction time.

Procedure:

Step 1: Have the Soldier lie facing forward at the starting line.

Step 2: On coach’s signal the athlete gets up and sprints to the finish line.

Step 3: Soldier walks back to starting line and repeats.

Variations: Coach may use an audio or visual response. Vary the number of reps and distance depending on training goal.

2. Flying Sprints

Set-up: Set up a 40-yard course with the 30-yard point marked.

Focus: Acceleration.

Procedure:


Step 1: Start running at half speed and begin increasing speed with each stride.

Step 2: By the time you hit the 30-yard marker you should have reached full speed.

Step 3: Continue running at full speed through the end of the course

Step 4: Walk back to the start line and repeat.

Variations: Use different full-speed distances to achieve the proper training effect.



3. Hollow Sprints

Set-up: Mark a 100-yard course, separated into 20-yard intervals.

Focus: Acceleration.

Procedure:

Step 1: Begin running at half speed for the first 20 yards.

Step 2: At the 20-yard marker sprint at full speed for 20 yards.

Step 3: At the 40-yard marker return to running at half speed.

Step 4: Repeat pattern until course is complete.

Variations: Change the length of the course and/or the length of the intervals in order to achieve the desired training effect.

4. Box Drill

Set-up: Place cones in order to form a 10 yard x 10 yard square.

Focus: Change of direction, body control.


Procedure:

Step 1: Sprint from cone A to cone B.

Step 2: Reverse pivot around cone B, slide step facing inward to cone C.

Step 3: Reverse pivot around cone C, backpedal to cone D.

Step 4: Reverse pivot around cone D, slide step facing outward through cone A.



Variations: Use carioca instead of slide step. Eliminate reverse pivot for easier transition.

Coaching tips: Have the Soldier keep a low center of gravity on reverse pivot.

5. Four Corner Square In

Set-up: Place cones in order to form a 10 yard x 10 yard square, plus 1 cone 5 yards to the right of the bottom right cone.

Focus: Change of direction, body control.


Procedure:

Step 1: Backpedal from cone A to cone B.

Step 2: Sprint from cone B to cone C.

Step 3: Backpedal from cone C to cone D.

Step 4: Sprint from cone D through cone E.



Coaching tips:

Keep a low center of gravity, quick change of direction.

6. Three Hurdle Drill - Acceleration

Set-up: Place 3 obstacles (6 inch hurdles or cones) in a line on the ground about 3 feet apart.

Focus: Change of direction, body control.

Procedure:

Step 1: Standing beside the hurdles quickly step laterally over the hurdles.

Step 2: After stepping over the 3rd hurdle and without putting the inside foot down, immediately repeat in the opposite direction.

Step 3: On a command or after a specified number of reps, accelerate forward 10 yards.

Step 4: Repeat until required reps are completed.

7. Three Hurdle Drill - Crossover

Set-up: Place 3 obstacles (6 inch hurdles or cones) in a line on the ground about 3 feet apart.

Focus: Change of direction, body control.

Procedure:

Step 1: Standing beside the hurdles quickly step laterally over the hurdles.

Step 2: After stepping over the 3rd hurdle and without putting the inside foot down, immediately repeat in the opposite direction.

Step 3: On a command or after a specified number of reps, crossover step and sprint 10 yards.

Step 4: Repeat until required reps are completed.

8. Three Hurdle Drill - Dropstep

Set-up: Place 3 obstacles (6 inch hurdles or cones) in a line on the ground about 3 feet apart.

Focus: Change of direction, body control.

Procedure:

Step 1: Standing beside the hurdles quickly step laterally over the hurdles.

Step 2: After stepping over the 3rd hurdle and without putting the inside foot down, immediately repeat in the opposite direction.

Step 3: On a command or after a specified number of reps, dropstep and sprint 10 yards.

Step 4: Repeat until required reps are completed. **SW**



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Czech Republic, A History of Valor: “General Moravec” – the 601st Special Forces Group From Operation Anthropoid to Afghanistan

The 601st Special Forces Group traces its formal origins to 1952 when the 22nd Paratroop Brigade was created. The Soldiers of the 22nd Brigade were initially trained in accordance with Warsaw Pact doctrine which called for strategic airborne assaults on key targets to set the conditions for follow-on forces. Starting in 1969, the unit was restructured for a greater agility, with a shift in focus to special reconnaissance and diversionary activities.

In 1995, the 22nd Brigade was transformed into the 6th Special Brigade, a special operations force designed for interoperability with the NATO SOF framework. Following the entry of the Czech Republic into NATO in 2001, the unit became the 6th Special Forces Group, later becoming the 601st Special Forces Group in 2003.

The national mission force of the Czech Republic, the 601st conducts special reconnaissance, assault actions and other directed tasks of national importance as directed by the minister of defense through the chief of military intelligence.

On an operational level, the 601st has an extremely robust logistics and support element in comparison to the size of the overall unit strength in order to free their operators to focus on mission-essential tasks.

Relying on a rigorous multi-phased selection and training system, the mental rigors of the training program are probably best exemplified by the fact that the unit is comprised of almost one third university graduates. The high level of human capital available allows the 601st to be task organized on an “as-needed” basis for operational deployment. Members of the unit are trained as combat divers and military-freefall parachutists, with both HALO and HAHO as infiltration options. A true plug-and-play organization, enablers such as snipers, explosive ordinance device and joint terminal attack controllers are allocated as missions require.

The unit insignia of the 6th SFG is comprised of a red shield with superimposed daggers, arrow and parachute. The arrow points down symbolizing the ability to strike by air. The swords represent the ability to target with precision and efficiency. The shield itself is reminiscent of the shoulder sleeve insignia of the Czech Legionnaires who fought against the Germans in Russia in World War I.

Today, the unit holds the honorary name of one these Czechs, Franitsek (General) Moravec, who later escaped from his nation hours ahead of Nazi occupation and coordinated Czechoslovakian efforts to assist the British Special Operations Executive. One of those efforts, Operation Anthropoid, exemplifies the courage and daring of the forefathers of the 601st SFG.



BLENDING IN A member of the 601st Special Forces Group conducts a mission in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan.

At 10:30 on the morning of May 27, 1942, SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich began his daily commute to Prague Castle. Heydrich arrogantly ignored personal security precautions in an attempt to overawe the Czechs by conveying his own feeling of invulnerability to them.

As the shiny Mercedes 320 convertible approached the tram stop near Bulovka hospital, Jan Kubis (a Czech) and Jozef Gabcik (a Slovak) began their ambush. A week later Heydrich died of the wounds he received in the ensuing fight. Evading capture for a month despite Hitler’s desire that the SS should “wade in blood” throughout the region, Kubis and Gabcik were killed during their last stand at the Church of Saint Cyril and Methodius. Today, the church is known as The Church of the Paratroopers. A monument to the Czech and Slovak SOE operatives who fought to the death there stands over the bullet holes which mark the location of their last stand.

Since World War II, the 601st has deployed to Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the 601st serves as part of International Security Assistance Force SOF, providing a true SOF capability to NATO’s continuing mission in Afghanistan. Operating independently, TF 601 is a true force multiplier, partnering with the Provincial Response Companies in the ongoing effort to establish the rule of law in Afghanistan.

The 601st motto “Dum Spiro Spero” (where there is life there is hope) exemplifies the indomitable spirit of the Czech people as embodied by their premier force. **SW**

THE OSS IN BURMA JUNGLE WAR AGAINST THE JAPANESE

In this book, Troy J. Sacquety undertakes an examination of the operations and organization of one of the most storied units in the Office of Strategic Services during World II: Detachment 101 in Burma. As he states at the outset: “While veterans’ memoirs detail what the unit did, this is the first to describe how they accomplished their task.” He succeeds admirably in telling this story.

The author is adept in describing the formidable terrain and operational environment in Burma, as well as the broad scope of Detachment 101’s organization and activities. Activated in mid-1942 with an original contingent of 21 officers and enlisted men, the unit conducted intelligence-gathering, guerrilla warfare, and quasi-conventional warfare operations against the Japanese until its deactivation in July 1945 — one of the longest periods of service of any OSS group. Indeed, this was a significantly longer period than the better known OSS Jedburgh and Operations Groups teams that operated in the European theater. At the end of its active service, Detachment 101 had 1,000 OSS personnel and 10,000 indigenous troops — mostly Kachin tribesmen — organized in seven battalions.

Under the command of Major Carl Eifler, Detachment 101’s beginning was less than auspicious. With few personnel who had jungle-warfare experience and none with parachute training, its initial long-range penetration operations were disastrous, with high casualties. That situation improved after Eifler’s replacement by Lt. Col. Ray Peers, whose reforms and professionalism gradually transformed the unit from basically an intelligence-gathering organization to one that conducted guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. Peers’ contribution to 101’s success is an important part of the story. (He retired from the Army as a lieutenant general and was the lead investigator on the My Lai incident in Vietnam.)


Detachment 101 became particularly adept at establishing liaison with a veritable who’s who of special operations organizations: Orde Wingate’s Chindits, Frank

Merrill’s Marauders, the British Special Operations Executive and the U.S. Army Air Force First Air Commando Group. This reviewer can readily identify with the last organization, because a tactical helicopter squadron from the Air Commandos supported my MACVSOG unit in Vietnam in 1967-68 for the insertion, support and extraction of recon teams in Laos and Cambodia. Peers came to understand the necessity of having this type of organic transportation for his teams.

The author describes well the variety of OSS branches that joined 101 and helped its operations: Research & Analysis, Special Intelligence, Special Operations, Research & Development, Operational Groups and Morale Operations. His portrayal of MO (black propaganda) in its transition from a virtual nonentity to a section that ultimately played a significant role in supporting 101’s operations is well done. He uses as an analog for 101’s breadth of capabilities the Special Action Force concept developed in the 1960s with the 8th SAF in Panama and the 1st SAF in Okinawa. This reviewer served in the latter organization, in which the 1st Special Forces Group was the nucleus of an organization that also contained Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and support personnel.

I can also relate to Sacquety’s emphasis on the importance of the hidden strength, or near autonomy, that Peers enjoyed with the lack of oversight of his operations, having had a similar experience working as a lieutenant and captain with the CIA during my Special Forces tours in Laos and Vietnam in the early 1960s. Broad mission directives and minimal interference with operations spoils one for the rest of his career.

The author’s explanation of 101’s increasing casualties as it moved to the final phase of performing more conventional operations is important in understanding the limitations of an indigenous force. As a Kachin officer explained after his unit suffered many casualties in an engagement, “the Kachins were good in ambushes and small unit raids, but not in



DETAILS

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frontal attacks.” Some U.S. Army Special Forces teams during the latter part of the Vietnam conflict discovered this lesson the hard way when directed to employ their indigenous personnel in support of conventional force operations.

Notwithstanding, the OSS credited Detachment 101 with approximately 10,500 enemy killed or seriously wounded, and another 12,000 killed or wounded as a result of targets designated for air attack. Perhaps most impressive, as Sacquety states, “Detachment 101...holds the distinction of being the only OSS unit whose operations were a key component and integral to the conduct of its theater’s overall campaign.”

To sum up, this is a well-written, solidly researched study and a valuable contribution to the literature on this subject. I recommend it for the general reader, serious scholars and special operations personnel. **SW**

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