

Special Warfare

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CF-SOF
INTERDEPENDENCE



On the Cover

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Interdependence

Cover and Left: Conventional and special operations forces collaborate during a joint training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. U.S. Army photos.

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FROM THE COMMANDANT



For more than three years, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Special Operations Center of Excellence, has worked diligently on drafting and socializing the 7th Warfighting Function. With the publication of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-8-5, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, which expanded on the ideas presented in TP 525-3-0, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept* and TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept* a new warfighting function was introduced.

Engagement is what Army special operations forces do best. But, we cannot do it alone. As Maj. Gen. Bennet S. Sacolick and Brig. Gen. Wayne W. Grigsby Jr. noted in an article in *Mission Command*, “The ability to work among diverse cultures to win population-centric conflicts is not a skill that can only reside within SOF.” The ability to fight on these battlefields of the future must be shared by SOF and their brothers in the conventional force. That can only be done by true interdependence between the forces. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Lt. Col. Lawrence “Hank” Henry, the commander of the Special Operations Training Detachment at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La., takes a look at the obstacles that are impeding the creation of a “deliberate and mutual reliance by conventional forces, special operations forces and elements within the joint interagency/intergovernmental/ multinational community to conduct operations in an interdependent manner.”

By assessing the ongoing training at JRTC, and the role SOF plays, Henry has implemented changes within the Special Operations Training Detachment designed to maximize opportunities to build interdependence into training scenarios, which not only builds personal relationships but also builds professional understanding and creates common operating practices. If the force trains together, then their actions will be second nature when together in actual combat.

By approving the 7th Warfighting Function and including Engagement in The U.S. Army Operating conception, the Army has now given SOF a seat at the table, allowing for SOF involvement before conflict begins. It also creates the time and space for the synchronization of SOF and conventional force capabilities.

Lt. Gen. Keith C. Walker, Director, Army Capabilities and Integration Center, summed up the need for interdependence pretty succinctly in the forward to the Army Functional Concept of Engagement:

“The Army also must possess a broad range of capabilities to shape future operational environments, maintain its lethality on the battlefield and be able to leverage unified action partners to reduce demands, prevent and end conflict. The engagement warfighting function will institutionalize into Army doctrine, training, education, and leader development, the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that allows bridging language barriers, opening lines of communication and connections with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting. It enhances interdependence between special operations forces, conventional forces and unified action partners while incorporating the tenets of the emerging idea of the human domain. As a result, this warfighting function will contribute to mission accomplishment by providing better, more synchronized lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter and influence the decisions and behavior of a nation’s security forces, government and people.”

Further, the building of interdependence between SOF/CF/ JIIM partners will establish a common framework for operations in the complex and uncertain future operational environment.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'D. G. Fox'.

Brigadier General David G. Fox

Seven Civil Affairs Soldiers honored in valor ceremony

While conducting a civil reconnaissance patrol the afternoon of Nov. 1, 2012, Civil Affairs Team 611 started on what was a routine mission, but in a matter of a few minutes, the mission turned into anything but routine. The patrol came under small arms and automatic weapons fire in an ambush east of the village of Sardar Kala, Afghanistan.

The trail man in the element carried the heavy weapon system, but was critically wounded when a bullet from the initial ambush struck him in the back and he went down. Seeing this, Staff Sgt. Michael P. Pate, the medical sergeant on the team, realized the necessity to immediately neutralize the enemy threat and render aid to his wounded teammate.

Disregarding his own safety, Pate ran more than 50 meters back toward the enemy fighting positions to provide aid. Pate and his team leader, Capt. Jacob A. Allen, ran through the heavy enemy fire, and dragged the wounded warrior more than 25 meters to the only cover available in the form of a 6-inch retaining berm, and continued to return fire on the enemy position.

For his actions, Pate was awarded the Silver Star Medal by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commanding general, United States Army Special Operations Command, at a Valorous Awards ceremony at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Auditorium, Jan. 23.

"I was struck by the phrase used to describe CAT 611's mission. The phrase was, while on a routine civil-reconnaissance patrol," Cleveland said. "It certainly didn't turn out routine, it instead proved the point that our Army special operations Soldiers and leaders are assessed, selected and trained to perform as this team did on patrol."

Pate was one of seven Soldiers from Co. A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), recognized for valorous actions spanning over four battles against the enemy while deployed to Afghanistan in 2012.

Allen received the Bronze Star Medal with "V" device for his actions during the fire fight on Nov. 1, 2012.

Sgt. 1st Class Kevin L. Hargrove and Sgt. 1st Class Kevin W. Oakes received the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device for their actions during the same mission with Pate and Allen.

"In the face of danger, the common person would seek cover and protect themselves," said Lt. Col. Basil J. Catanzaro, commander, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne). "Staff Sgt. Pate and the other team members are not common, they are trained Soldiers and duty bound to take care of each other."

Also recognized during the Valor Award ceremony:

Staff Sgt. Philip A. Aubrey was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his actions during a combat reconnaissance patrol on Nov. 5, 2012. While under enemy fire, Aubrey, the lead medic of his team, preformed triage to a critically wounded casualty until safely aboard a medevac helicopter.

First Sgt. Jamie T. Mullinax received the Army Commendation medal with "V" device for his actions



ACTS OF VALOR At a Valorous Awards Ceremony on Jan. 23, seven Soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), Co. A, were awarded medals for their actions during a 2012 deployment to Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Left to right- Sgt. 1st Class Donovan S. Johnson, Army Commendation with Valor; 1st Sgt. Jamie T. Mullinax, Army Commendation with Valor; Capt. Jacob A. Allen, Bronze Star with Valor; Sgt. 1st Class Kevin L. Hargrove, Army Commendation with Valor; Sgt. 1st Class Kevin W. Oakes, Army Commendation with Valor; Staff Sgt. Philip A. Aubrey, Bronze Star with Valor and Staff Sgt. Michael P. Pate, Silver Star. *U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Dan Carter.*

on September 27, 2012. While conducting village stability operations at a remote operating base, Mullinax displayed impressive courage and relentless tactical tenacity while responding to a highly organized enemy automatic weapons, rocket, and mortar base attack from seven elevated fighting positions.

Sgt. 1st Class Donovan S. Johnson received the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device for his actions on April 26, 2012. Johnson and his CA team executed a daylight combat reconnaissance patrol in highly contested battle space. After entering the objective and experiencing relentless fire, Johnson selflessly exposed himself to the enemy at least a half dozen times, as rounds passed

overhead and impacted the walls around him while providing protection to the patrol's tactical communicator and ground force commander.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, Cleveland commented that what is routine for our special operators is perhaps extraordinary for others.

"The country will continue to call on Civil Affairs and their ARSOF brothers and sisters," said Cleveland. "The actions we honor today declare to everyone that you are equal to the challenge. Don't look back, seize the future and make it yours. Be proud of who you are, what you do and who you do it with, for you are without equal." — *By Jerry Green, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, PAO.*

— SOF officers receive assignments —

The Chief of Staff of the Army, announced the following assignments:

Maj. Gen. Christopher K. Haas, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., to director, force management and development, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Brig. Grn. Kurt L. Sonntag, who has been selected for the rank of brigadier general, commander, Inter-Agency Military Advisory Detachment, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., to deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg.

Brig. Gen. Mark C. Schwartz, deputy commander, Joint Task Force-Bragg, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., to deputy commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan.

Brig. Gen. Eric P. Wendt, commander, Special Operations Command-Korea to Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He will take command on May 30.

SYRIA:

THE EVOLUTION REVOLUTION

BY PETER POLACK

There is some bewilderment among laymen and military experts as to the military achievements of the rebel movement in Syria. The answer lies in a cocktail of religion, regime errors and a benchmark change in modern military strategy. Long ago, lines of ruffians, led by a few gentlemen on horseback, faced off whereupon they politely picked off each other. Silly as this now seems today, there are many still steeped in the military tactics of the past. Warfare is an evolutionary science sometimes changing on an annual basis. Guerrilla wars, over the years, have been

Youth, who were once denied opportunity now have a clear but limited choice: war or refugee camps. Nearly all have selected combat, what was only previously exposed to them in the unconscionable recesses of violent video games, but has now come home to roost. They now roam deserted structures in armed bands pausing often to marvel at the riches previously denied them. The poor and powerless have overnight become street, section, neighborhood or area commanders. Housing previously denied them has become mere corridors

military assets that became contests of stamina not strength. This was apparent from the capture of airbases like Taftanaz and Minnagh.

The rebel success in Syria has silenced seasoned experts and pundits alike. No one anticipated in the early days of demonstrations and pleas for change that the man on the street would form the basis of a new force whose main strength would be religion. Not since the Crusades has the world seen such an effective fighting force fuelled not by a caravan of supplies but daily prayers.

“Youth who were once denied opportunity now have a clear but limited choice: War or refugee camp.”

contested with massive outside aid and increasing technology. This approach failed in Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan and now Syria. The underlying weakness certainly in the case of the Western powers is a fear of large body counts. The Vietcong and now Islamist insurgents have no such hesitation.

As the Syrian struggle for freedom descended into conflict and armed struggle, the country began to depopulate at an exponential pace now measured in the millions. These refugees are for the most part women, children and the elderly, while young men remain — most of whom are unskilled or unemployed in the rebel sectors. That is not to say a policy of maximum employment by President Bashar al-Assad would have prevented this abyss. This war is about empowerment. These young adults have provided a ready and steady supply to throw at the brutal weapons of the regime.

to the front line while providing a daily reminder of oppression.

In this vacuum of power on the street corner entered Islamist forces such as the Al Nusra Front with its world caliphate agenda. Syria has provided a verdant field of opportunity. A country in conflict with little overall central government control as the regime busied itself in matters of defense reminiscent of pre-Taliban Afghanistan. This extreme religious ideology has defeated armor, drone, air power and disciplined troops from the best armies in the world. Sheer ferocious bravery with a modicum of wily guerrilla tactics has provided a recipe for growth and battlefield success.

The early Islamist units were the most disciplined with some command and control. They were often led or directed by experienced guerrilla fighters, many from outside Syria. Carefully crafted small assaults led to extended sieges of regime

The Syrian rebel movement is unique at many levels:

- There is no unified command and control. Rebel groups divided by extremity of Islamic belief, family, tribal and geographical factors do occasionally come together and disperse for offensives. The plans and implementation are fluid. A Syrian army officer who defected to the Free Syrian Army early in the uprising put adherence at 5 percent.
- The rebels have no formal logistical support chain. Experienced generals at the Pentagon can only marvel at this when compared to the heavy burden they endure. Perhaps the lesson is a lighter more independent force in country. The rebels have been ably assisted by the chaos of the conflict and the persistence of the Assad regime to leave lightly defended compounds or

those under threat with vast stores of ammunition, assorted weaponry and tanks for rebel resupply.

- The majority of the successful rebel forces are conjoined by religious ties not political or military.
- The fractured rebel force has created a nightmare for regime intelligence assessment configured for a single opposing command structure. Random attacks by numerous independent groups unknown in planning to affiliate or nearby rebel units avoid prevention or battlefield interpretation. Generals are reduced to firemen.

Much hope was originally placed on the Free Syrian Army as an umbrella organization to effect the military removal of the Assad regime. In this, the FSA mimicked the failed Iraqi National Congress of the disgraced Ahmed Chalabi another U.S. intervention that followed a long line of fallen puppet regimes and interventionists. In the fullness of time, the FSA failed to achieve popular recognition on the ground and lost relevance on a daily basis to the daring exploits of the Islamist forces. These small initial successes fed upon themselves to larger achievements that drew many new supporters.

The average Islamist fighter disciplined by his beliefs is given training sufficient to function be it a Kalashnikov or rocket-propelled grenade. There is no expectation of medical care or battlefield evacuation. These are the purest guerrillas since the Long March of China. These are everyday young men many unemployed from a disenfranchised class, who have been given a stark choice: The boredom of a refugee camp or the heady intoxication of a weapon, regard from peers and often

control of areas and opulent villas once the exclusive purview of regime supplicants.

The rebels have been ably assisted by the failures of the regime military apparatus. Seeking to maintain the role of government and engage in a bitter civil war while obsessing about public relations has led to a string of defeats from schizophrenic policies. The Syrian government has cornered itself in an endgame of static protection of assets and territory while economic ruin looms large on the horizon. Their depleting

eventual detriment. As the cities, towns and villages empty, the Syrian army has been able to deploy its strengths in technology but may have overreached with the sarin attack. The urge to join Salhuiddin on horseback will be overwhelming on the road to Damascus. Martyrs seeking the narcotic of death will face a wall of uncompromising cold steel if they rush from the shadows to open battle.

Assad knows he is losing ground and it is only a matter of time before the hawks around him are unleashed. This will be the true test of the new crusaders who will have no cover from civilians or intermixed neighborhoods or mountainous territory adjoining a friendly nation.

Self-sustaining ammunition and weapons from captures can only last so long and the decline will accelerate as the Islamist rebels become over confident to the point of overt confrontation.

Many FSA officers were defectors from the Assad regime and were not only viewed with suspicion but tried to militarize the man in the street. The Islamists radicalized the man in the street and created an untrained inexperienced fighter whose religious fervor and fearlessness of death turned the battlefield dynamic upside down. It was not the best equipped and most well trained force that would win. Afghanistan should have been the new benchmark but entrenched policy advisers persist; some still trading on the archaic Cold War dynamic. New military thought advocated by David Petraeus should not be dismissed or discontinued by a single peccadillo. **SW**

*Peter Polack is the author of **The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War** to be published by Casemate and co-author of **Encyclopedia of Warfare** published by Amber Books.*



military personnel and resources cannot be sufficiently bolstered by Iran and Russia who both face their own problems. Hezbollah is surrounded by enemies and repercussions from the Al-Qusayr siege have left them with a bitter aftertaste.

If the Angolan Civil War is any example, the Syrian conflict could last decades. Realistically it is in the interest of many that it is prolonged even among those who underestimate that it will be to their

UNDERSTANDING

THE ENEMY

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article is based upon a lecture made to the students and cadre of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The views herein expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. government agency.

BY DR. SEBASTIAN L. GORKA

The four key points of my article are simple: First, if you want to understand the enemy, read what they say.

Second, we must understand al-Qaeda, not as something that was created by Osama bin Laden simply on the foundations of the Arab mujahedeen movement. Rather, it is the product of decades of ideological evolution that started with the Muslim Brotherhood. You could even argue that it is, in fact, the product of centuries

I *am* afraid of al-Qaeda's *soft jihadi* colleagues, those who will not use violence — organizations such as The Muslim Brotherhood — that use legal tools, economic tools and lawfare as a weapon to undermine our constitutional order. That is by far the more difficult threat for us to deal with because our national-security establishment does not date back to the founding of Islam by Mohammed.

Jahiliyyah simply means a state of pagan dis-

“If you want to understand the

of ideological and conceptual distillation, going back 1,000 years, to ideologues such as Ibn Taymiyyah. But this discussion will focus on 20th-century developments. The point is that you must be able to place al-Qaeda in the context of that larger ideological flow.

Third, and this is hard for the special operations community and for people who like the lethal stuff — hunting people down, chasing high-value targets — we must stop obsessing over violent jihad, which is al-Qaeda's lethal form of warfare. I have built my career on studying this foe, on understanding and explaining it.

Finally, AQ does not keep me awake at night any longer. I am not afraid of another 9/11.

belief. The term was originally used to describe the tribes living around Mecca that worshipped many gods. Mohammed's mission was to remove *Jahiliyyah*, the lack of knowledge of the oneness of God, from the Arabian peninsula.

Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, took the ancient concept of *Jahiliyyah* and redefined it noting, “Today, 20th Century Islam suffers from *Jahiliyyah*, from confusion, from not understanding the oneness of Allah — that he is supreme — and it is the job of true Muslims to remove that state of pagan ignorance from not only the Middle East but the whole world.” Why?

Because for Qutb, it is not simply a question of unfaithful Arab leaders in the Middle East but also a



MINDSET Former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (left) and current al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri (center). FBI photos. Sayyid Qutb (right) an Egyptian writer and educator whose writings are the theoretical basis for many radical Islamic groups of today. Library of Congress photo.

question of the West culturally and politically invading the Middle East, putting what he saw as puppets onto the thrones of Arab nations. What Islam needs, according to Qutb, is an enlightened vanguard. This is interesting, because he clearly took concepts such as the vanguard from communist ideology. It is that ironic absorption of Western concepts — that otherwise would be deemed heretical and anathema — into the jihadists' new religiously-framed ideology, that makes Islamism a *hybrid totalitarianism*.

Muslim Lands, which was approved by the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia. His key ideas include the mythical theme of failure and rebirth in Islam. Failure happens in Islam because Muslims have lost their way. Muslims have strayed from the path of true Islam, and Allah's recompense is that they will be unsuccessful as long as they remain untrue, according to Azzam. In order to be powerful again, they must return to the true path; they must return to the essence of Islam.

enemy, read what they say.”

Concepts key to Qutb's dozens of books include the idea of global social justice being possible only through Islam. The books suggest Islam's mission is to free all men from the tyranny of other men. It is a global and universal mission. What does that mean? It means that humankind must be “liberated” from political systems run by human beings and from laws created by human beings.

In other words, Qutb believes human kind must be liberated from systems such as our own here in the United States, with its man-made laws. Democracy is run, as Abraham Lincoln told us, “by the people, for the people.” Democracy therefore cannot be *sharia*-compliant.

Dr. Abdullah Zaam took Qutb's ideas further in his monograph-length fatwa: *The Defense of*

In *The Defense of Muslim Lands*, Azzam defines jihad as a devotional act that is obligatory. That is the last and most important aspect of Azzam's work. Azzam says jihad does not have to be declared by a *caliph*, or head of state to give the faithful permission to fight the enemy. Azzam goes even further to say that jihad is an individual obligation. Azzam added that it is not necessary to ask your father or your husband. Waging jihad is a right and a necessity.

You do not need clerical approval; you do not need a leader to say, “Now I declare holy war.” You must do it even if you are a slave and your master forbids it.



You must do it if you are poor or if you are rich. It is a universal and individual obligation.

BOOKS IN THIS ARTICLE

» *Defense of the Muslim Lands* by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Original publication shown left, English translation shown center-left. English translation by Brothers in Ribatt. A PDF version of the translation is available for download at various websites online. *Editor's note: Always use caution when downloading material off the internet, be sure to check website for authenticity and safety.*

» *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* by Ayman al-Zawahiri; English translation by Laura Mansfield, shown on center-right, Published by LULU, July 17, 2006, 362 pages. ISBN-10: 1847288804. Used books are available online from various sellers.

» *The Quranic Concept of War* by Brigadier S.K. Malik; 1979 version shown on far right, republished in 1986 by Himalayan Books. ISBN-10: 8170020204. Used books are available online from various sellers.



Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*

The most well-known jihadist thinker among the ones we are discussing is the head of al-Qaeda — Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose formative years in Egypt were shaped by the Muslim Brotherhood's fight against the secularist Egyptian system, against leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the book, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, which is less of a fatwa and more of a memoir, Al-Zawahiri explains that it does not matter how one becomes radicalized or how one was influenced. He goes on to add that whether an individual is living comfortably in London, Berlin or Minnesota — as a Muslim, he is responsible to conduct jihad. Without a caliphate or Muslim super-state, there cannot be victory. At the end of his book, al-Zawahiri states, "In our means, methods and resources we must combine patience with infliction of mass casualties and the best method to do this is suicide attacks" ... "This confrontation with Islam's enemies must be to the last drop of blood."

Brigadier S.K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*

We now move from the most famous jihadi thinker to a person most people have never heard of: S.K. Malik, a general officer in the Pakistani

Army, wrote a very important book, *The Quranic Concept of War*.

Let me summarize why this man's importance to anyone fighting al-Qaeda. Imagine walking into a bookstore and seeing a book written by a U.S. general with a foreword by a member of the Supreme Court of the United States and the preface by none other than President Obama. It's probably an important book, correct? Well, that is *The Quranic Concept of War*. It was written by a serving general, with a foreword by the advocate general of Pakistan and a preface by none other than General Zia Haq, who was not only the commander of the Pakistani army but also Pakistan's president from 1977 to 1988. You may not have heard of Malik, but just think about the people who endorsed his book: a person who represents supreme justice in Pakistan and the individual who is the head of state and supreme commander. So it is an important book. The preface by the advocate general is 13 pages long and is almost as important as the rest of the book. Let us look at some of the concepts in the preface and the concepts of Gen. Malik.

This is the only modern book authored by a Muslim that deals with war at the strategic level and combines military theory with divine theological explanation. This is not von Clausewitz.

His Own Words

A Translation of the Writings
of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri



by Laura Mansfield

The Quranic Concept of War



Brigadier S. K. MALIK

1979

WAJIDALIS LAHORE PAKISTAN

This is not the “art of war” in any Western sense. It is non-Western and very Sun Tzu. He observes that peace is simply the preparation for war and is vastly more important than the activity of fighting. What you do in peacetime to prepare is more important than the lethal, violent actions of shooting people and blowing things up.

For Gen. Malik, his patrons and his acolytes, jihad is clearly a holy war for both sides of the engagement. When jihadist say they are fighting a holy war, the conventional wisdom in the West is just to say that is their distortion. But if our enemy is aiming at our faith system, if they are aiming at our souls, it is a de facto a holy war on our side, as well, because our faith is what the enemy has chosen to destroy.

Conclusion

What are we to conclude from all of this? Why are these four jihadi strategists so important? Here is the take home: *Al-Qaeda is just a small part of a much larger and older movement.*

That movement has a plan to destroy our system using *all* means from the list given by Malik, not just violence. That includes political and economic warfare and very sophisticated and fast information operations. The conflict that we are in now is potentially more deadly and more danger-

ous than the Cold War. Not only is the enemy totalitarian, he is not a secular, godless totalitarian like Hitler or Stalin, because this totalitarian ideology believes it has god on its side.

The sad truth is that we seem to be going backward. Take just these three quotes from the 9/11 Commission report published more than seven years ago:

Our enemy “is sophisticated, patient, disciplined and lethal.”

“[T]he institutions charged with protecting our national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans and practices to deter or defeat it.”

*“In short, the United States has to help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people.” **SW***

Notes

1. For more details, see the author’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Sub-Committee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 22 June 2011, concerning the first 10 years of the war on terror and the way ahead. at www.cengnet/index.php?option=com_k2&view=:item&id=483:ten-years-on-theevolution-of-the-terrorist-threat&Itemid=150 (The video of the hearing is available at <http://www.youtubc.com/watch?v=gfmN86S1QKY>).

INTERROGATION

THEME SELECTION



FOR JIHADIST COMBATANTS

BY PHILIP A. MULLENIX

U.S. special operations forces operating in the Middle East, Africa or any theater of engagement with jihadist combatants may face the prospect of interrogating suspected terrorists. What approach should they take?

The interrogator's success will be determined largely by his selection of an interrogation *theme*, i.e., the argument (presented in monologue fashion by the interrogator to the suspect) that provides explanations and excuses that psychologically (not legally) justify the suspect's behavior. By justifying a suspect's behavior within the framework of that suspect's own mentality and beliefs, an interrogator facilitates the task of self incrimination.¹ Themes are carefully chosen by the interrogator after assessing a suspect's motives for engaging in the conduct under investigation as well as the suspect's education, personal traits, and background.²

It should be noted at the outset that interrogation themes for jihadist enemy combatants or terrorists are not universally applicable. For example, the choice of theme for a *Salafist* (a member of one of Islam's most radical sects in which jihad is obligatory) will be entirely different than the theme presented to an unemployed Moroccan engineer who has been taught by fundamentalist handlers that his economic opportunities have been stunted by Western capitalism. Both suspects are in the battle zone; both suspects have their hands on cell phones to trigger improvised explosive devices upon the American military; both are jihadist combatants; but each has a distinctively separate motive for engaging in the same conduct. As a result, themes that will succeed during the interrogation of the *Saiafisl* will fail to resonate with a disaffected unemployed engineer. Similarly, themes that will induce an economically despondent combatant to confess will be rejected with derision by the Islamic radical.

Therefore, effective choices among possible themes for the interrogation of jihadist combatants will be influenced by two factors. *First* is the Soldier's ability to size up the suspect for motivations, ideologies (including Islamic affiliation), education, personal traits and background. The *second* factor is the soldier's own military occu-

pational specialty, which may predetermine parameters such as interrogation location and the amount of time available for questioning.

Sizing up the suspect's motives, ideologies, education and background

Jihadist combatants fall into three broad categories for determination of underlying motives: a) fundamentalists; b) nationalists; and c) common criminals.

A: Fundamentalists

Islamic Fundamentalists are unconditionally committed to the political/religious doctrine mandated within *The Al Qaeda Jihad Training Manual*, namely "to do the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth" in fulfillment of the belief "that governing the peoples' affairs is one of the greatest religious obligations."³ Tactically, *The Jihad Training Manual* advocates that a world-wide Islamic government could never be established except through violence. "Islam does not coincide or make truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun."⁴

Since its inception in 1928 and throughout the rule during the 1950's and 1960's of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Muslim Brotherhood set as its goal the creation of a theocratic Islamic state.⁵ That mantra surfaced again during the 1970's in the teachings of "The Blind Cleric," Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rachman, who not only advocated the creation of an Islamic state through a massive armed struggle, but he formed the Egyptian Islamic Jihad from among The Muslim Brotherhood, all in response to the 1979 Israeli peace agreement which had been forged in Washington, D.C., with Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, and the United States President

Editor's note: Notwithstanding the citations to authority, the information and opinions contained herein are based upon the author's independent research and experience and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. government agency.

Jimmy Carter. Two years after the agreement, Sadat was assassinated by followers of Rachman who subsequently emigrated to the United States where he provided inspiration to Ramzi Yousef (Khalid Sheikh Muhammad's nephew) to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993.

Rachman is now serving a life sentence at the Colorado federal supermax prison, ADX Florence, after being convicted of conspiring to blow up the Statue of Liberty, the UN and the Holland Tunnel.

In the immediate aftermath of Sadat's assassination, al-Qaeda's current leader, Egyptian Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, again repeated the call for the creation of an Islamic state, even while detained in prison for his suspected role in Sadat's killing.⁶ Al Qaeda, The Muslim Brotherhood, and splinter groups from both organizations remain viable today and advance these same causes to which their fundamentalist leaders have been committed for decades.

Why are these historical perspectives relevant to SOF interrogators today? Because they provide accurate insight into the reasons *why* Islamic militant terrorists want to kill Americans; and from those *motives* come the interrogation themes which appeal to the mentality and beliefs of the fundamentalist combatant. Consider three examples that appeal to the fundamentalists, in abbreviated format.

1. *Shift blame to America's support of Israel:* Islamic fundamentalists disdain America for its role in brokering the 1979 Egyptian

mentality and beliefs of the Islamic Fundamentalist, are viewed as the root cause of militant terrorism against Americans.

2) *Argue to the jihadist the 'moral superiority' of Islam:* Ahmed Sattar, who was an ideological follower and confidant of the previously discussed Omar Abdel-Rachman, was sentenced in October 2006 to serve 28 years in the same federal supermax prison in Colorado for assisting Rachman execute terrorist activities from jail during Rachman's trial. During a 1999 interview with journalist Lowell Bergman, Sattar stated: "The western mentality does not understand that your measurement of good and bad is different than the measurement of the people of the East." This thought is pervasive among Islamic fundamentalists, as their mindset reflects a belief that acts that are deemed criminal to Judeo-Christians are deemed moral by the jihadist terrorist. Against that background, Sattar concluded that it was moral to assassinate Sadat for what he did — entering into a peace treaty with Israel.⁷

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad adopted similar logic while admitting his role as operational director for Osama Bin Laden in 31 terrorist attacks around the world, including the 9/11 attack upon the United States. During his March 10, 2007 Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Muhammad invokes Allah as the sole arbiter of his conduct and the righteousness of his terrorist cause in furtherance of Allah's justice:

"So be an actor! Put aside anger, revenge and even conventional logic. Think outside the box to appeal to your audience."

Israeli peace agreement and for the United States' active assistance to Arab nations that have impeded the creation of an Islamic state. The interrogator should use that fact to craft a theme that will appeal to the fundamentalist's ideological frame of reference.

Understand that as an interrogator, the SOF operator must be an *actor*. Regardless of one's emotions in response to seeing the remnants of a Humvee and its occupants after a roadside bomb blast, the mission shifts to extracting information from a suspect who may have detonated the device. So be an actor! Put aside anger, revenge, and even conventional logic. Think outside the box to appeal to your audience. Focus now on establishing rapport with your enemy to gain information, even if it means showing insane empathy for the jihadist's "justifiable" and "understandable" conduct against Americans for our politicians' undying "support of Israel" and the "suppression of Islamists' rights to a Muslim state." Suggest that you "understand" that if the United States had "stayed out of the dispute between Israel and Egypt back in 1979" and had not supported the corrupt and anti-Islamic regimes" of Egyptian President Sadat and his successor Hosni Mubarak, the suspect wouldn't have had any dispute with Americans today. In so doing, the interrogator shifts blame from the suspect himself, depersonalizes the carnage against the interrogator's fellow Soldiers, and projects fault upon others who, within the

"If any fail to judge by the light, Allah *has revealed, they are no better than wrong doers, unbelievers and the unjust.*"⁸ As we know from the al-Qaeda Jihad Training Manual, the "light Allah has revealed" is the goal of "*establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth*", at whatever cost to the infidels.⁹

How does the special operations field interrogator use this knowledge? He should develop a theme in which he suggests that what the suspect did "was morally justified to fulfill Allah's goal of establishing Islam on earth, just as Allah taught you." Show that you're willing to try to understand his perspective if he tells you the truth and accepts its consequences, because you know that "the jihadist's moral compass is beyond the comprehension of the Western mentality." Challenge the suspect to show you "the strength of their moral conviction and the superiority of Islam" by not only telling the truth but by "outwardly adopting their conduct to everyone as an act of faith in Allah."

In so doing, the interrogator's theme appeals to the fundamentalist's own frame of reference by drawing a distinction between indiscriminate killing of Americans versus the higher moral purpose of spreading Islam which, through the death of infidels, is a deification of Allah rather than a desecration of human life.

3. *Argue ideological 'maximization' of responsibility for jihadist attacks:* Fundamentalists willingly accept martyrdom for their cause, so

the fear of failure eclipses their fear of consequences such as death or incarceration at the hands of Western infidels.

In fact, their greater glory for Allah is derived by attribution to them of acts which we consider criminal. They believe that the more they are individually acknowledged for causing the death of Western infidels, the greater their reward from Allah.

Indeed, KSM proudly admitted his terrorist exploits during his Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as he showed no reluctance to maximize his role in spreading Islam through terrorism. At the same time, he sought martyrdom via a potential death sentence for his admitted crimes. When warned by the military judge of the prospect of execution if convicted for his confessed terrorist attacks, KSM responded: "Yes, *this is what I wish, to be a martyr for a long time. I will, God willing, have this by you.*"¹⁰

The special operations interrogator should integrate such logic into his themes. Argue that to achieve martyrdom, the suspect should accept blame in furtherance of the goal of establishing an Islamic state and to receive Allah's greatest rewards. It is certainly legitimate to use KSM's own expression of maximization of his role as the standard for all other fundamentalist jihadists to follow when challenged to accept responsibility in fulfillment of Allah's goals rather than to hide behind the denials of a weak infidel.

B: Nationalists

Nationalists are motivated less by Islamic fervor than by: 1) their resentment toward the presence of Western military forces in Muslim countries; and 2) the perception that Western capitalism unfairly impedes economic achievement among highly educated, yet unemployed, Muslims.

Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago studied attacks by 462 terrorists and concluded that "suicide terrorists attacks are not primarily an outgrowth of Islamic fundamentalism and are, almost always, part of an organized campaign to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider home."¹¹

During his Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing at Guantanamo Bay, KSM confessed that he engaged in terrorist attacks as a legitimate means of attaining nationalist independence from Western occupation of Arab territory. In support of that argument, KSM drew an analogy between Islamic terrorism and the American Revolutionary War, and he compared Osama bin Laden to George Washington.¹² In making these statements, KSM relied upon that theme as a face saving device to justify his conduct. It is reasonable to infer that this same nationalistic theme will appeal to the mentality and beliefs of other jihadist combatants during interrogation.

Economic considerations motivate jihadist combatants as well. Capitalism is viewed as a force that represses achievement among educated Muslims who have little opportunity to develop professionally within the depressed economic environments in which they live.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged during 2009 into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — based in Yemen where more than 40 percent of the people live in poverty and the population is expected to double to more than 40 million by 2030. In addition, Yemen's 2.8 billion barrels of oil reserves, which fund approximately 70 percent of the

UK/BM-3 TRANSLATION

[E] 19/220

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate

PRESENTATION

To those champions who avowed the truth day and night ...
... And wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases ...

-- The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates ..., Platonic ideals ..., nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been

by pen and gun

by word and bullet

by tongue and teeth

UK/BM-7 TRANSLATION

Introduction

Martyrs were killed, women were widowed, children were orphaned, men were handcuffed, chaste women's heads were shaved, harlots' heads were crowned, atrocities were inflicted on the innocent, gifts were given to the wicked, virgins were raped on the prostitution alter ...

After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nation. These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the colonialists themselves. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and torture at their hands.

Those apostate rulers threw thousands of the Haraka Al-Islamyia (Islamic Movement) youth in gloomy jails and detention centers that were equipped with the most modern torture devices and [manned with] experts in oppression and torture. Those youth had refused to move in the rulers' orbit, obscure matters to the youth, and oppose the idea of rebelling against the rulers. But they [the rulers] did not stop there; they started to fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity. Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found some that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the [religious] council, and the prophet - God bless and keep him - propagandized communism.

Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then started to openly erect crusader centers, societies, and organizations like Masonic Lodges, Lions and Rotary clubs, and foreign schools. They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists. [Koranic verse:] "And Allah's enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah."

INSIGHT Two pages from the translated version of the Al Qaeda Jihad Training Manual which was located by the Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during a search of an Al Qaeda member's home in 2000. The manual was found in a computer file described as "the military series" related to the "Declaration of Jihad" and was introduced that year as evidence in the trial of the East African embassy bombers in New York. Documents like this can be helpful to interrogators seeking to understand the mindset of jihadist combatants. The full translated manual can be downloaded at http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf.

JIHADIST COMBATANT CATEGORIES

QUICK REFERENCE

Interrogation themes help provide explanations and excuses that psychologically (not legally) justify the suspect's behavior. By justifying a suspect's behavior within the framework of that suspect's own mentality and beliefs, an interrogator facilitates the task of self incrimination. Themes are carefully chosen by the interrogator after assessing a suspect's motives for engaging in the conduct under investigation as well as the suspect's education, personal traits and background. Typically, jihadist combatants fall into three broad categories:

A. Fundamentalists

Motivation: Martyrdom for the purpose of establishing the religion of Allah on earth and in fulfillment of the belief that governing peoples' affairs is one of the greatest religious obligations.

Commitment: Political/Religious.

Vulnerability: Fear of Failure.

Theme: Argue that to achieve martyrdom, the suspect should accept blame in furtherance of the goal of establishing an Islamic state and to receive Allah's greatest rewards. Utilize ideological "maximization" of his role as the standard for all other Fundamentalist jihadists to follow when challenged to accept responsibility in fulfillment of Allah's goals rather than to hide behind the denials of a weak infidel.

B. Nationalists

Motivation: Resentment toward the presence of Western military forces in Muslim countries and/or the perception that Western capitalism unfairly impedes economic achievement for Muslims.

Commitment: Country/Economics.

Vulnerability: Independence. Economic necessity.

Theme: Suggest that you understand that by committing the act of violence the suspect was doing nothing more than trying to *fight for his rights*. Contrast that with the intent to indiscriminately murder and justify the conduct of the combatant within the framework of his own mentality and beliefs.

C. Common Criminals

Motivation: Same as domestic criminals, greed, revenge or simple gang mentality.

Commitment: Only to self.

Vulnerability: Self preservation and the consequences of their conduct. These actors will make an admission if they believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate.

Theme: Display your belief in the idea that the suspect is just trying to make it in a tough world where he has to do what everyone else is doing just to belong and survive.

national budget, will run dry in the next decade.¹³ Snowballing poverty and an exploding population create a dangerous crucible within which fundamentalists can cultivate jihadists by fomenting anti-capitalism and hatred of American "economic repression."

Marc Sageman, a former member of the CIA's Afghan task force, observed that many educated professionals in the Muslim world suffer social frustration as a result of a lack of employment opportunities in the region.¹⁴ Steffen Hertog, professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris, said during a 2009 presentation to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "There is a positive correlation between the degree of education and the level of extremism." He noted that engineers and engineering students make up nearly half of Islamic militants involved in high profile attacks, including more than a third of those involved in the 9/11 attack upon the United States.

What does this mean to a special operations interrogator? It means that if he first seeks information from the suspect about his background, education and profession, the interrogator may accurately discern that economic necessity, rather than Islamic radicalism, motivated the suspect to jihad. If the suspect's mentality and beliefs have been formed through inculcation by Islamic handlers that America's economic bullies prevented the suspect, despite education or advanced engineering degrees, from practicing his profession and earning a living for his family, then the interrogation theme becomes obvious. Suggest to the suspect you understand that by triggering the roadside bomb the suspect was doing nothing more than trying to *fight for the right* to support his family, to educate his children, to practice the profession that he spent so many years studying to achieve and to live with dignity. By contrasting that with the intent to indiscriminately murder Americans, the interrogator justifies the conduct of the jihadist combatant within the framework of the nationalist's own mentality and beliefs, thereby opening the door to an admission.

C: Common Criminals

Common criminals are motivated by the same incentives as domestic criminals, such as greed, revenge or simple gang mentality. Their commitment is not to religion, culture or nation; it is to themselves. Unlike fundamentalists, who only fear failure, the common criminal's instinct is self preservation; and the consequences of their conduct remain their vulnerability. They will make admissions if they believe it to be in their best interests to cooperate, including providing intelligence on their colleagues if it means possible freedom, perks or other forms of favorable treatment.

For the special operations interrogator, a brief background interview with this category of jihadist will reveal their motivations. Themes can be adapted to minimize their conduct, blame others for drawing them into the 'gang' or for forcing them to do what they did.

Display your belief that the suspect is just trying to make it in a tough world where he has to do what everyone else is doing just to belong to their group and to survive — no different than a kid on the mean streets of any city in America.

Remember, it's the interrogator's obligation to 'play the part' despite what he really feels toward the suspect or the suspect's conduct.

This is a key component to successful development of the interrogation theme, regardless of which theme is chosen.

The Soldier's MOS

The special operator's MOS will affect theme selection for an interrogation, including where an interrogation may take place, the amount of time available for the interrogation, identification of the Islamic sect to which a suspect belongs, recognition of interrogation countermeasures and the protocol for use of an interpreter when necessary.

Time is an asset to an interrogator — the more he has, the greater the likelihood of success. If one's MOS provides *only* brief encounters in the field, the strategy (including choice of theme) may differ from the circumstance of interrogation over many months within the controlled environment of a detention facility.

Simplicity is preferred during a field interrogation in which the window of opportunity is mere minutes. Choices among themes should be limited only to those with which the interrogator is most comfortable. But when the interrogation opportunity expands to hours or days, creativity in theme selection broadens. Either way, however, a nonaccusatory interview should precede any interrogation to provide an opportunity to assess behavior symptoms, inquire into the suspect's background, education, ideology, and motivations as well as obtain the suspect's version of any facts which may be in dispute.

Identification of jihadist affiliation is useful in understanding the motives of the disparate groups and, therefore, accurately selecting themes to fit the suspect or witness being interrogated. Reference was made earlier within this article to the Saudi-based radical Islamic sect 'Salafism' (an extreme form of Sunni Islam that rejects democracy and Shia rule) as well as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is likely to soon merge with al-Shabab in Somalia. Al-Qaeda itself had its origins in Afghanistan during the early 1980s when Osama bin Laden compiled literally a 'black book' list of Mujadeen fighters (which bin Laden named "the base", i.e., a literal translation of the Arabic "al-Qaeda") upon whom bin Laden could call for support in the war against the Soviet Union. Its Taliban counterpart today in Afghanistan is the Pakistan based 'Haqqani Network' which presently represents the most formidable threat to American military operations even as The Muslim Brotherhood is re-emerging in Egypt. While not within America's current theater of military engagement, Nigeria's Boko Haram has violently moved against UN facilities in its opposition to Western culture and in pursuit of its imposition of a strict Islamic state. It is not unreasonable to foresee the use of American military forces within a multinational effort to defend the UN abroad against terrorist attacks.

Each such group has its separate origins, but all share a commitment to wage jihad against "enemies of Islam," including the United States. The informed special operations interrogator needs to become familiar with these groups, their respective ideologies, priorities, and motivations as a prelude to effective theme development during future interrogations of their members.

Interpreters pose challenges which must be accommodated. Direct communication with the suspect is preferred to assure clarity of the

words being exchanged and to maximize the effectiveness of verbal, paralinguistic, and non-verbal behavioral cues during the interrogation. When an interpreter is necessary, the interpreter should be briefed in advance regarding protocol so that the interpreter knows to precisely translate *only* that which is actually said without paraphrasing or editing. If logistics permit, the interpreter should remain outside the suspect's field of vision. Alternatively, if the suspect sustains eye contact and hand gestures with the interpreter alone, then the interrogator should physically interject himself into the suspect's field of vision and indicate to the suspect to speak directly to the interrogator.

Finally, cognizance should be given at the military operations level to the interrogation countermeasures that are taught to jihadists within the al-Qaeda Training Manual, including *preparation of disinformation, noncompliance, monitoring behavior symptoms, defiance and sheer denial*.¹⁵ Tactically, the special operations interrogator should be aware not only that such countermeasures are taught to jihadist combatants but also to recognize them when applied and how to patiently overcome them.

Conclusion

Theme selection, like interrogation itself, is an art. The challenge presented by jihadist motivations can tax the creative imagination of even the most experienced interrogator. Essential to the process is an understanding of the mentality and beliefs of the jihadist as well as extraordinary self control by the SOF interrogator in maintaining his poise and presence of mind while face to face with an irrational enemy who may literally have American blood on his hands. **SW**

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Notes

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INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERDEPENDENCE:

The Mindset Change for the Future Operational Environment

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWRENCE W. "HANK" HENRY

As a force, Army special operations must continuously learn, anticipate and evolve in order to defeat an adaptive enemy and the uncertain threat of the 21st century.¹

In *ARSOF 2022*, Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, speaks of an adaptive adversary who leverages a myriad of capabilities ranging from the employment of mass, firepower and maneuver of a conventional force, to illicit tracking methods of criminal cartels and gangs, to the utilization of information and terror to incite fear, locally, nationally and internationally. The spectrum of capabilities demonstrated by this adaptive adversary is characterized by Training Circular 7-100 as a hybrid threat. Hybrid threats are the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.²

The ability to defeat these diverse and complicated adversaries cannot be understood through a line-and-block charts, special skills possessed by special operations forces or the unique characteristics within a country team. The ability to defeat this hybrid threat demands a "hybrid response." Given the characteristics of the threat mentioned above, the response must "optimize the force multiplying potential of partnerships with the Army and interagency to provide the nation with seamless combat power."³

The response that this article advocates is a deliberate and mutual reliance by conventional forces, special operations forces and elements within the joint-interagency-intergovernmental-multinational community to conduct operations in an interdependent manner.

"The ultimate goal of CF-SOF interdependence is to increase operations by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to our enemies and a unified face to our friends and partners."⁴ Additionally, operations conducted in an interdependent manner provide senior leaders the ability to reduce the risk to the force, to the mission and reduce redundancies to address the current and future operational environments. Although CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence, throughout planning and execution, supports the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision to "prevent, shape and win," the question is how do units and/or elements of the JIIM environment train to counter the hybrid threat of the future?

I advocate a change of mindset by institutionalizing best practices/lessons learned that support CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence. The purpose of institutionalizing interdependent training is to facilitate a common understanding and doctrinal approach to CF-SOF-JIIM interdependency. To further create a common understanding and



MEET AND GREET Col. Michael R. Fenzel, commander for 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division and Lt. Col. Joseph Lock, commander for 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, greet one another prior to a meeting at the Joint Readiness Training Center in August 2013. U.S. Army photo by Maj. Loren Bymer.

doctrinal approach between CF-SOF-JIIM elements, TRADOC Pam 525-X-7 characterizes interdependency as the following:

- The deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner on another's inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects.
- The ultimate goal of conventional forces and special operations interdependence is to increase operational effectiveness by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to adversaries and a unified face to friends and partners throughout the phases of operations.
- To dominate any operational environment and provide decisive results across the range of military operations, the Army requires SOF and CF to blend their capabilities, working together to achieve effectiveness and unity of effort.⁵
- Although TRADOC's definition does not address the JIIM environment, the capability that unified action partners possess within this environment cannot be overshadowed by CF and



SOF contributions to interdependency. An example of an additional mindset change that must take place is the role of the JIIM environment in support of the future operating environment. The role of interdependency becomes increasingly more important as the U.S. finds itself conducting operations in a sovereign nation where the country team is the supported command not the geographic combatant commander.

The Joint Readiness Training Center's Approach to Interdependency

Understanding the nature of the hybrid threat within a constantly changing physical and political environment, coupled with the nuanced environment of a country team, the Joint Readiness Training Center developed an approach to enable a shared vision for interdependence in operations. The JRTC approach is designed to provide training units

a programmed (versus ad hoc) method to resource, plan and execute operations at the combat training center and for real-world operations. In the absence of doctrine, this approach was derived from a multitude of observations from previous rotations, senior leader feedback and with the characterization of interdependence within this article. This approach considers critical seams and gaps that reside in the unit's ability to plan and direct operations in an interdependent manner. These gaps and seams affect the unit or agency ability to:

- Acknowledge inherent capabilities
- Communicate through nodes, systems and functions
- Plan identifying gaps and seams/leveraging capabilities;
- Execute synchronizing inherent capabilities in a mutually supportive manner
- Analyze the ability to maintain the momentum to win

This approach uses inherent capabilities to gain and maintain a seamless front to our adversaries and partners. In efforts to “insti-



COLLABORATION Conventional and special operations forces conduct a joint planning meeting at the Joint Readiness Training Center. *U.S. Army photo.*

tutionalize” the ability to observe, coach and teach throughout the planning and execution of operations focused on interdependency, the CTC examines key functions that drive its approach in five steps.

Step 1: Acknowledge

Leaders must first articulate the inherent capabilities possessed by CF-SOF- JIIM and consider factors such as access, placement, mass, firepower, movement and maneuver, unique authorities and assets. The intent is to provide clear understanding of unit and country team limitations and capabilities. Stakeholder articulation of goals and objectives will facilitate a shared vision and identify divergence. Finally, stakeholders must identify unique environments/conditions where it would demand unilateral action in order to achieve specific strategic goals and objectives.

Step 2: Communicate

Establish a seamless flow of communication through the integration of nodes such as the Command Post of the Future, systems such as joint and combined targeting boards and functions such as liaison. The integration of select nodes, systems and functions will create the environment to gain and maintain a common operational and intelligence picture when conducting mission analysis for operations conducted in an interdependent manner. Maintaining of the common intelligence picture and common operating picture is essential to interoperability, which is the foundation of interdependence in operations.

Although preexisting relationships can facilitate a more interpersonal environment between units and country-team elements, these preexisting relationships cannot be a substitute for the integration and employment of node, functions and systems. When the “fog and

friction of war” is the thickest, it has been observed during decisive action training environment and unconventional warfare exercises that an element will revert to what it knows best. In some cases, that is not conducting operations in an interdependent manner. If systems, nodes and functions are relied upon vs. preexisting relationships, the possibility for interdependence to occur, despite the environment, is greater.

In most cases, the country team will already have established its “nodes, systems and functions.” Within this environment, CF-SOF must prepare to “tie-in” with a view towards full interdependence.

Step 3: Plan

Maintain the free flow of information to inform the COP and CIP through deliberate maintenance of integrated nodes, systems and functions, coupled with an understanding of the capabilities and limitations set by the unified action partners for planning. The establishment and sustainment of a integrated unified action partner planning group is critical as it functions to identify operational gaps and seams. Further, understanding these gaps and seams, the planning group leverages inherent capabilities of CF-SOF-JIIM assets to set the conditions for follow-on activities.

Further, what makes the CF-SOF-JIIM interdependent relationship unique is that each element within this community of interest possesses its own unique skill sets. By acknowledging these skill sets, the representatives of the CF-SOF-JIIM planning work group must not only leverage the inherent capability, but protect it was well. For example, SOF can be leveraged to support CF-JIIM operations; however, the special operations mission criteria must be met for employment. The following is the Special Operations Operational Mission Criteria:

- It must be an appropriate SOF mission or task
- The mission or task should support the JFC’s campaign or

- operational plan
 - The mission or task must be operationally feasible
 - The resources must be available to execute and support the SOF mission
 - The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risk.⁶
 - The development of an interdependent plan is to create opportunities for CF-SOF-JIIM to exploit efficiencies, reduce risk (to the force and mission) and reduce redundancy. During some training exercises it has been observed that the acknowledgment, communication, and planning to support CF-SOF-JIIM interdependent operations is fairly easy.
- Step 4 Execute and Step 5 Analyze generally prove more challenging.

Step 4: Execute

The planning work group must constantly revisit Steps 1-3 throughout the execution of the plan through select nodes, functions and systems. Synchronizing assets, clearing of fires and other lethal/non-lethal activities are not just a brigade combat team's responsibility; but a responsibility shared by all elements within the community of interest.

Remaining cognizant that some CF-SOF-JIIM goals are divergent, unit and/or agency leaders must direct actions to not only form a seamless front to the enemy, but direct operations that are reciprocal in nature as well. This will enable all unified action partners to achieve their goals in a mutually supportive manner to accomplish the mission.

“Simply integrating CF and SOF elements, at the tactical level, is not CF-SOF interdependence. At the operational level, integration is needed to gain and maintain a shared vision and increase interoperability among unified action partners.”

Step 5: Analyze

Revisit Steps 1-4 and modify plans to maximize the impact on the enemy, targeted population and select segments of the physical environment. Modify plans to maximize the inherent capabilities possessed by select unified action partners for follow-on operations. The consistent utilization of systems, nodes and functions by the planning work group will create the environment needed to maintain the momentum throughout the battlespace. These drills are not episodic in nature and are strongly recommended to increase efficiencies and the possibility of mission accomplishment.

In the absence of doctrine, the above approach to CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence provides units an institutionalized approach as it prepares for the hybrid threats of the future operating environment. Although the proceeding passage provided a “road map” for the conduct of operations in an interdependent manner, the following are common misunderstandings when planning, resourcing and conducting operations to achieve a unified front.

Interdependence versus Integration versus Interoperability

Previous observations suggest, CF and SOF elements integrate at the tactical level in an effort to conduct operations in an interdependent manner. In most cases, this integration was conducted

without considering a “...*mutual reliance* of one unified action partner on another's *inherent capabilities* to provide *complementary and reinforcing effects*...”⁷

Simply integrating CF and SOF elements, at the tactical level, is not CF-SOF interdependence. At the operational level, integration is needed to gain and maintain a shared vision and increase interoperability among unified action partners; however, at the tactical level, interdependence relies on the exploitation of inherent capabilities of these partners to create a favorable environment for another unit or agency to capitalize on, forming a unified front. Further, many senior CF and SOF leaders use the phrase “CF-SOF integration” or “CF-SOF interoperability” when they really mean CF-SOF interdependence. The terms are not interchangeable; words have meaning. The “interchangeable” uses of interoperability or integration, when one really means interdependence, has caused confusion at the operational and tactical levels. A change in use of terminology could be the mind set change needed to execute deliberate actions in support of interdependence.

LNOs

The quality of liaison officers exchanged between CF, SOF and the interagency is a major factor in gaining and sustaining trust, faith and confidence in a unit's or agency's leadership. Historically LNOs are often junior officers or noncommissioned officers who do not clearly understand what their headquarters is trying to accomplish, let alone

“the host headquarters” objectives. The LNOs' lack of understanding is not due to a lack of motivation, rather it is due to a lack of experience that would allow them to confidently and competently engage the “host” commander and staff to support that unit's goals and objectives, while simultaneously ensuring there is a mutually supportive environment leading to reciprocating activities. To achieve this degree of competence and confidence, LNOs must be a former commander, operations officer, etc. They must have a “graduate level” understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the “losing and host units” assets. Further, the LNO must possess an uncanny understanding of how these assets fit in the greater picture to support the combatant commands or the chief of mission's end state.

Relationships versus Nodes, Functions and Systems

Observations suggested that unit commanders and country team leaders feel that the interpersonal relationships shared between partners would be enough to facilitate interdependence. That assumption proved false. These relationships, though solid, were not “formalized interdependent relationships.” The relationship between the unified action partners, before hostilities, created an interpersonal and candid environment between partners. The interpersonal relationship, though extremely important in establishing rapport, tended to deteriorate once the fog and friction of war was present. The aforementioned relationship should be “formalized” through the addition

of unique nodes, functions and systems to facilitate interdependency.

Nevertheless, a common observation is the unintended reluctance to expand an interdependent relationship established between two units (or agencies) to another unified action partner when the operational environment demands it. The “standing” unit may know that it needs to gain and maintain an interdependent relationship with the “new” element; however, the absence of systems, nodes and functions and established doctrine may “force” the standing unit to revert to its “former partner” in efforts to achieve interdependence. Reverting back to the relationship developed by the former unified action partners can not only undercut the new unit’s ability to act, but also counterproductive in achieving a mutual supportive environment.

These are common misunderstandings that reinforce the idea that an institutional solution must be in place to support a mindset change. Having doctrine is not enough, the units’ home station training and command training centers must provide the venues to support the mindset change needed to facilitate a greater understanding of operations conducted in an interdependent manner.

The Mindset Change

Integration that relies on personnel relationships forged on the battlefield; however, is transient unless made operational and institutionalized in our forces from the very beginning of professional military education and throughout planning and training.⁷

In order for interdependence to properly be understood and applied by the force, senior commanders must allocate the time, funding and resources for training. This training must take place at home station, at the institution and combat training centers. A forcing function that can enable training is to direct interdependence training in annual or quarterly training guidance. Examples of interdependent training taking place at home station are the Joint Operational Access Exercise hosted by the 18th Airborne Corps and the *Silent Quest* Exercise hosted by the United States Army Special Operations Command. Although the JOAX is primarily an exercise focused on tactical and operational activities in support of the Global Response Force and *Silent Quest* is focused at combating the future operating environment on a strategic level; both exercises place heavy emphasis on CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence. During SOF Theater Security Cooperation Programs, SOF commanders could direct, in addition to building the partner nation capability/capacity, the execution of select training activities with the country team. These activities would not only increase SOF understanding of the nuanced culture of the interagency, but also identify the nodes, systems and functions that SOF elements can establish, tie into or re-enforce to create a more mutually supportive environment.

Although preexisting relationships are important, these relationships can be overcome by events and the unit of action reverts back to what is most comfortable. In an article written by Maj. Gen. Bennet S. Sacolick and Brig. Gen. Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., “Special Operations/ Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in ‘Prevent, Shape, Win,’ – it was suggested that there needs to be an institutional approach to interdependence. In support of this assertion, it is believed that training for interdependence should start at the officers basic and the advanced noncommissioned officers courses. The appropriate place to “weave” interdependence training is in the mission analysis/ military decision making process block of training.

Further along the institutional “lines of effort,” select members of the JRTC host post-rotational after action review to capture signifi-

cant lessons learned and best practices with the intent to distribute to the findings to CF and SOF headquarters. In the midst of several discussion points, interdependence, and the ability to plan, resource and execute more effectively and efficiently will continue be a persistent topic of discussion in every post-rotational after action report. Support to the Campaign of Learning⁸ mentioned above, has the potential to provide CF/SOF and select elements within the JIIM environment a common “point of departure” when planning, resourcing and executing future training and real-world operations. The CTCs and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command are campaigning to ensure the SOF-CF interdependence lessons learned in combat are carried forward into future training and leader development.⁶

In effort to provide the venue to further hone the SOF-CF Interdependence lessons learned in combat, the JRTC currently replicates through DATE/UW EX the operating environment of the future. Future DATE/ UW EXs will replicate a more volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous adversary who not only utilizes the methods earlier in this article, but has a greater focus on weapons of mass destruction. Further the JRTC will place greater emphasis on the integrated nodes, systems and functions that facilitate interdependence. To create a more conducive environment for SOF training, the CTC is examining ways to provide increased opportunities for ARSOF surgical strike elements, joint special operations specialized elements and allied special operations forces to train with ARSOF special warfare elements. The CTC’s near term goal is to provide the venue where Joint Special Operations Forces, in a habitual manner, look to refine specialized skills and their ability to conduct operations in a interdependent manner against a replicated hybrid threat.

The blend of a series of home station, CTCs, institutional opportunities and activities focused on critical factors of interdependence is the change in mindset mandated to create the hybrid response to counter the hybrid threat. This mindset change, institutionalizing interdependence, is the manner in which CF, SOF and elements within the JIIM environment “shape, prevent and win” within the operating environment of the future.

“The world as we have created it is a process of thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking.”- Albert Einstein. SW

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3. MG Bennet S. Sacolick and BG Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in ‘Prevent, Shape, Win’ *Army*, June 2012, 39-42.
- 4, 5. TRADOC Pam 525-X-7, USA Functional Concept for the 7th WFF (DRAFT Version 0.8), 14 March 2013.
6. ADRP 3.05, *Special Operations*, August 2012, 1-13.
7. TRADOC Pam 525-X-7, USA Functional Concept for the 7th WFF (DRAFT Version 0.8), 14 March 2013.
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RELATIONSHIP BUILDING Members of the Civil Military Operations Center meet with a country team during an exercise at JRTC. U.S. Army photo.

The Future of Interdependence: Conventional Forces Will Look More Like SOF; SOF Will Look More Like the CIA

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD B. DAVENPORT

“While old-school socialism was an arm of the state, digital socialism is socialism without the state. This new brand of socialism currently operates in the realm of culture and economics, rather than government.”

— Kevin Kelly, *Wired Magazine*

The world social environment is changing through a myriad of revolutionary changes that are increasingly more prevalent and visible. These changes are primarily political in nature and are influenced through social media; a powerful shift in the control of information that has never been seen in any point in history. Many sociologists, such as Clay Shirky, Manuel Castells, Lee Rainie, Barry Wellman and Brian Solis, have compared these revolutionary changes to the industrial revolution, a significant change to society in the 18th and 19th centuries. Great historical and revolutionary shifts in societies have more often than not, caught militaries off guard while they were simultaneously moving through those changes only to figure out at a later date their significance.

This article will highlight some of these revolutionary changes to centralized power and how social media is a key aspect of it, and one that will need to be better embraced and exploited by the U.S. military in the future. Additionally, some of the decentralized revolutionary effects that are occurring in the world have led to the creation of Mission Command, a conceptual approach primarily based off of the autonomous successes of squad, platoon and companies operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹ However, to fully implement a Mission Command future, more is required, such as the development of new authorities to fully operate in a decentralized manner in countries where information and political power are decentralizing to large populations, as well as various nefarious groups and non-state ac-

tors who are operating in and among them. This future approach, through enhanced authorities, will be described in the context of interdependence not only between special operations forces and conventional forces, but joint and interagency as well. Both interdependent approaches must be strengthened to fully leverage each other effectively. Finally, the article will focus on what a decentralized military might look like if it were to enter into a country like Mexico. Mexico, an unstable, poverty-stricken country on the border, continues to pose major problems for the U.S., such as increased drug trafficking and the continuous flow of illegal immigration. If these situations continue to persist, the U.S. military could intervene in order to stabilize the U.S. Southern border.

The aforementioned sociologists have all compared the modern day networked society to the Industrial Revolution.² Those within the military community who understand the nature of war or revolutions in military affairs should take note when a comparison is made to the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution not only changed the structure of society but also the way the military was equipped, organized and prepared for war. Unfortunately, the realities of how the nature of war had changed through the realities of the Industrial revolution did not become apparent until World War I, which surprised many nations that were initially involved, specifically highlighting just how rapidly and markedly the face of war had changed. Its main contribution was the specific demonstration of just how



PREVENT AND SHAPE In the future, a traditional JCET like this one in the Philippines, may not be enough to disrupt a complex political awakening in numerous countries where power is shifting more to the people, and less from centralized government. *U.S. Army photo.*

lethal war had become through the use of the machine gun and explosive artillery.³ The failure to recognize the revolutionary changes that are occurring with the decentralized networked characteristics from states to their respective populations, and to iniquitous groups and non-state actors has the potential to visit a similar tragedy on military forces in the future.

There is no hierarchy within the Internet, nor are there any borders, and social media has a leaderless quality to its nature. The networked society is a combination of all digitized realities of society and how it communicates. The most recent major change in the application of digitized networked characteristics to everyday life is social media. In the past, communication was restricted to one-to-one through the use of the telegraph or the telephone. With the invention of radio and television, the capability grew to allow for the means of one-to-many types of communication that were typically controlled by centralized governments or powerful elites. Today, social media has taken all forms of digitized communication and allowed consumers to become information producers. These powerful communication and influential tools are now in the hands of the average citizen. Just as the Gutenberg Press changed reality for scribes, so too is social media changing the reality of the professional journalist, giving rise to the “citizen journalist”, blogging and posting at a rate, volume and reach never before possible. Social media tied to the networked society has decentralizing effects.⁴

There are many examples of how various nations are struggling with this decentralized nature of power. Some of these shifting realities are found in Moises Naim’s book, *The End of Power*. Naim describes the concept of “the state” as being “fractured”, when governments like “Mexico and Venezuela to Pakistan and the Philippines have lost control of swathes of national territory used by armed groups...” Ad-

ditionally, he describes the current changes to guerrilla warfare, where the age-old truth about popular support being critical to their success is now becoming less important, and the “increasingly borderless” guerrilla is becoming more important.⁵ The recent Boston Marathon terror attack is just one example of how decentralized, and borderless, these modern guerrillas without local popular support are becoming.⁶ Another example of decentralizing power has been highlighted in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s recent book, *Strategic Vision*, where he highlights the phenomenon of a globalized political awakening that is taking place. He describes it as, “...an interactive and interdependent world connected by visual communications and of the demographic youth bulge in the less advanced societies composed of the easy-to-mobilize and politically restless university students and the socially deprived unemployed.”⁶ Although Brzezinski highlights Central and Eastern Europe in his book, as well as the Arab world as examples for political awakenings, the U.S. has its own example with *Kony 2012*.

Kony 2012 is one example of a political awakening taking place through social media. *Kony 2012* is an online film that was created by Jason Russell through his non-government organization called Invisible Children, Inc. He created the social movement when he was frustrated by the war crimes committed by Joseph Kony, an African rebel leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Russell believed that the U.S. government was not doing enough to bring Kony to justice for his war crimes. Due to this perceived lack of effort on the part of the U.S. government, Russell created his own domestic and international movement to have Kony arrested. Russell was able to garner support generating donations to disrupt Kony’s operations.⁷ Although the movement had difficulty in getting support from the Internet to the streets of Uganda, the movement still showed the im-

pact social media has on political gain. The centralized, bureaucratic nature of industrialized, hierarchical governments, is being challenged by the decentralized nature of social media, and the empowerment of populations for political awareness and action.

Kony 2012, the 2006 Belarus protests and the Arab Spring uprisings of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are all examples of how power is becoming more and more decentralized throughout the world.⁸ Add to these events the realities of the U.S. economic debt, the case could be made that more of these events will take place because the U.S. will be less effective in influencing centralized governments through the economic aspect of diplomatic, information, military and economic efforts. From a strategic standpoint, our inability to help other countries through various monetary aid will have an impact on our ability to influence certain decision makers around the world. With less of an impact through monetary support, those internal economic conditions that foster various forms of coercion, through certain political groups who are vying for political power, will more than likely increase. There could be certain, low-level situations, in which the U.S. military might find itself. When it does, it will be in a decentralized, Mission Command-type construct.

The philosophical concept of Mission Command is nebulous to some students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. When asked to describe it, some field grade officers have responded that it is an idea taken from the German Staff during World War II, others have stated that it was created in order to deter the micromanaging toxic leader and Lt. Gen. David Perkins, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, has said that the idea came from the autonomous successes of squad, platoon and companies operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet, the idea can also be found in retired Gen. Stanley McCrystal's "decentralized decision-making" concept for attacking a decentralized network where "you have to allow your subordinate elements to operate very quickly."⁹ In ADP 6-0 *Mission Command* is described as "disciplined initiative...to empower agile and adaptive leaders" to conduct operations that "...defy orderly, efficient and precise control."¹⁰ Mission Command creates the necessary, decentralized, regionally aligned thinking force that can meet the decentralized future. However, there are some radical changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities that must be made in order to fully execute a Mission Command-type of military that can leverage conventional forces and special operations forces through interdependence, and also leverage other interagencies.

When Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom wrote *The Starfish and the Spider*, it sparked the interest of the U.S. Army, specifically Gen. Martin Dempsey who was then the commander of TRADOC.¹¹ Currently, some leadership implementation of a "Starfish" approach to greater adaptability is taking place at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Select majors are chosen for a two week course on how to foster a positive, trusted network where the free-flow of ideas takes place. Retired Colonels Gregory Fontenot, Mark Monroe and Steven Rotkoff describe the idea of a thinking Army that produces "people within organizations capable of developing useful ideas within the context of a trusted network underwritten and supported within a successful and adaptive hierarchy such as the Army."¹² However, is the Army an adaptive hierarchy that can change to meet the future of a decentralized world? Change is hard to do, especially when most of the Army force is conventional by nature, thinking within a land-domain

construct where "overwhelming force" is the over arching objective. Throw in the political realities of selfish ambition, and the multifarious special interest, "military industrial complex" groups, the realities needed for change become that much more convoluted. We need to change the rules, the legislative, Title authorities, to allow more applicable change within doctrine. The current Title 10 rules for war are very restrictive to creative thinking for the future demands that the U.S. Army will more than likely face. No matter how adaptive we may become, we still have legal restrictions placed over us that force us to be less creative. That is a paradigm that needs to be modified within reason, calculating necessary risks, and only a strong narrative at the strategic level can do it. In the meantime more interdependence training will be needed in the future.

Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick and Brig. Gen. Wayne Gribbsy Jr. were accurate when they said, "The scope and scale of challenges anticipated in the future security environment demand the institutionalization of interdependence."¹³ This idea of SOF/CF interdependence was executed during the October 2012 Joint Readiness Training Center rotation where an 82nd Airborne Brigade Combat Team and a SOF Operational Detachment Bravo executed an exercise exploiting each other's capabilities to achieve optimal results. Essentially the exercise scenario was designed around a normal, shaping type of joint combined exchange training event, which then morphed into an unconventional warfare setting. This JRTC rotation is definitely something to build upon for future interdependence of SOF and CF operations. However, the future will more than likely be more joint, more interagency and more than likely more unconventional, which the Army is just not ready for. More interdependence training leveraging not only Army SOF and CF, but other services and interagencies is needed as well.

If the future is going to look more unconventional than the rules to conduct UW may be too restrictive. The SF Qualification Course does an excellent job at preparing SOF for UW. However, it is extremely rare that SOF has ever executed a true Phase 0 UW type of mission. In many cases, relationships were already established by the CIA. For instance when SOF linked up with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2002, relationships were already established by the CIA, and Task Force Viking in Iraq in 2003, where relationships with the Kurds were already established by the CIA again. In both cases, these operations were also followed by substantial stability, or nation building missions.¹⁴ True UW operations are not necessarily followed by overt types of missions, they may not need to be if they are effective in the first place. Although we can tie UW with a JCET, which falls in line with shaping and prevention, there may be opportunities to think around them and become more involved.

"Prevent, shape, win" is a novel concept. The reality of only executing JCS exercises, and JCETs will more than likely not be enough to disrupt a complex political awakening in numerous countries where power is shifting more to the people, and less from centralized governments. If this happens, and there are many cases where it has, it is not too farfetched that the use of proxies, surrogates and "occupying powers" may become more the norm. Case in point, on Feb. 12, 2013, Lt. Gen. George Flynn, the Director of the Joint Staff J7, came to the CGSC to give a brief on the Joint Force 2020. In the brief he highlighted the state use of surrogates and proxies as emerging threats. Cold War types of realities are at the forefront again. Yet, to meet these realities some serious considerations need to be taken in order to be

more flexible, and more adaptable to do it. Some of these include not only changing our doctrine, but the rules which restrict us as well.

When the Office of Strategic Services was created in World War II, it was an Army directed entity conducting espionage, and covert operations. However, after World War II, the OSS became the modern day CIA which is less Army, and more civilian authority dominated with Presidential and U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee oversight. It has become the de facto covert, UW type of go-to organization. The U.S. government has created a reality where the CIA will do practically all of the legwork when it comes to dealing with surrogates or proxies in countries X, Y and Z in a covert type of setting. Title 50 gives the CIA not only the authority to do UW, but it also provides them with the freedom to think, and be as creative as they need to be in order to be successful before and while in a UW setting. Creating a new strategic narrative for changing Title 10, and relooking the U.S. Special Operation Command's definition of UW are the type of approaches that are needed in order to properly meet the future demands of warfare.

In Col.(R) David Maxwell's paper, "Why does Special Operations Train and Educate for Unconventional War", he brings up some very valid points about the definition of UW. He specifically hones in on the words "occupying force." Maxwell states, "While this narrowly describes traditional state-on-state military conflict with one state occupying another with its military, this does not adequately describe the reality of the 21st Century. Today there are 'occupying powers' that take on state like characteristics and responsibilities...such as Hezbollah and Hamas or the FARC."¹⁵ Some senior level consideration needs to take place in order to update our current definitions, our doctrine, and more importantly Title 10 in order to properly meet the current and emerging threats of surrogates, proxies and other modern day "occupying powers" who are hostile to existing governments and U.S. strategic interests. If these changes are eventually made, there are certain situations for which the U.S. military and interagencies could find themselves working together through interdependence. One of these situations could be with the ongoing issues that have plagued Mexico. There are some potential unique possibilities that could come to fruition.

One of the realities of the U.S. having incurred \$17 trillion dollars in debt, is that it will more than likely restrict some of its force projection overseas. The U.S. will have to focus more internally to those strategic interests that are closer to home, for example with Mexico, where you have a near failed state reality on the border. Even though the previous Mexican President, Felipe Calderon, deflected any idea that Mexico was a failed state, the country still has some relevant issues that are typical of failed states.¹⁶ Some of these include massive corruption within its government structure to include its security forces, drug cartels trying to establish a state within a state, uncontrolled violence, rampant poverty, a deflating economy, weak educational infrastructure, human trafficking and refugees in the form of illegal immigrants fleeing to the U.S. To put the Mexico realities into greater context, Carlos Spector, an El Paso lawyer who has handled 200 requests for U.S. asylum from Mexican citizens has stated, "This will go down as the worst human rights and humanitarian crisis in Latin America since the dirty wars of Chile and Argentina in the 1970s,...It is also the worst violence the country has seen since the 1910 Mexican Revolution."¹⁷ Currently the U.S. is involved in Mexico trying to aid the Mexican government to disrupt and contain some of these issues but the issues continue to

escalate.¹⁸ Some U.S. military options could be called upon in order to get a better handle on stabilizing some the prevalent problems.

With a revamped Title 10 interdependent of the realities of Title 50, the U.S. Military will be in a better position for dealing with surrogates, proxies, gangs and various drug cartels in Mexico. The U.S. civil authorities could leverage SOF working through a myriad of hybrid interdependence realities with other interagencies in a UW type of setting. These activities would be the initial stages of Phase 0, linking up with Mexican organizations that are anti-drug cartels that are undermining the weak Mexican government and trying to establish their own state within a state. The networking efforts of SOF with host-nation, indigenous anti-drug groups could look similar to John Arquilla's concept found in the article "The New Rules of War", where he described "200 Special Forces 'horse soldiers' who beat the Taliban and al Qaeda."¹⁹ Another example is found in the concept of "Light Footprints" where Major Fernando Lujan describes 50 to 100 personnel being effective in Yemen, Libya and Uganda.²⁰ The age old paradigm of "more is better" will not fit well in a country like Mexico where less will be much better in terms of being cheaper, leaner, smarter and networked to achieve more.²¹

Initially these auxiliary groups will be formed through initial face-to-face type of settings followed by other means such as through various social media tools. These tools will be predominately through the use of cell phones but enhanced through government covert apps that will be similar to the social media platforms of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and Blogger.²² These tools will serve in a dual effort communication role such as strengthening the various groups will to fight through virtual communication, and will also offer various means of disruption through cyber and physical mobilization. The use of various IP addresses and digital code for communications will enhance OPSEC during all operations from internal and external detection. As these UW realities are taking place, other interdependent type of options may become more available and needed. Some of these could be the use of a hybrid, Joint type of Brigade Combat Team.

Much has been said in the Capstone Concept with regards to joint operations and its relevance to future operations. However, there are some flaws within the joint arena, especially with training and organization. In the recent article by Col. Thomas Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms", he highlights statistics that point to the fact that less than 1 percent of maneuver majors and 5 percent of maneuver lieutenant colonels have served on Joint Staffs.²³ Additionally, you rarely if ever see any type of joint exercise being played out at the Combat Training Centers. Typically these training centers are focused on the BCT level incorporating various scenarios of force-on-force, stability operations and some guerrilla warfare. However, they could also be a better venue for a J-BCT exercise which could be played out in a real world type of exercise dealing with the realities of Mexico.

After well established UW SOF efforts have transpired over time, a small, but highly interconnected J-BCT, augmented with cyber, a battalion mixed with select companies of U.S. Soldiers, and companies of Marines, a UAV squadron and even an A-10 squadron could come in to provide greater stability. These efforts could range from disrupting the drug cartels ability to communicate, reinvigorating Mexican security forces by eliminating corruption, a myriad of unmanned aerial vehicles for ISR/Surgical strike options, A-10 show of force operations and other mitigating efforts to stop the flow of il-



SOF ROOTS A member of the OSS Detachment 101 embedded with a tribal group in Burma in the 1940s that planned and carried out espionage operations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its other operations including guerrilla actions, sabotage and psychological measures. *U.S. Army photo.*

legal refugees into the U.S. All of these efforts will be interlinked, and networked through interdependence among all of the various forces from SOF to the J-BCT, to various interagencies. Through enhanced training that aids in mitigating normal inter-service rivalries, inter-branch rivalries and interagency rivalries, more can be effectively accomplished with less under extreme budgetary constraints.

In conclusion, the future will be more interdependent amongst all services and agencies, within a whole-of-government approach to conflicts. These conflicts will more than likely be of the UW persuasion. Pushing this UW construct is the decentralization of power from centralized governments to their respective populaces, and is tied to the interconnectedness of the networked society through the power of social media tools. These tools are inherently decentralized in their nature. With a power shift moving to the people, there is great potential for those non-state actors rising to the occasion to disrupt not only internal countries for which they reside, but internationally as well. To better counter this, a greater interdependence effort will be needed. This will need to come from a new narrative that takes a critical look at our existing laws and policies that govern our approach to war. A start would be a revamped definition of UW as it applies to today's realities. Another look would be Title 10 as it applies to covert, modern-day operations in countries X, Y and Z. Additionally, better training through interdependence will be needed among the sister services in a J-BCT type of construct, and with better integration with other interagencies. Finally, due to extreme budgetary constraints, a hard international look will need to take place to figure out where we can effectively deal with strategic issues. Some of these may be regulated closer to home, as with Mexico.

Envisioning the future is hard to do. Even the great Gen. (R) Gordon Sullivan, instrumental to creating the modern day "all-volunteer Army", had trouble doing it. His concern over a \$1 trillion foreign debt prior to 1995 fails by comparison to what we face today.²⁴ The

best way to manage it will be through greater interdependence amongst all concerned with security, internally and externally. A future where CF will look more like SOF, and SOF will look more like the CIA, the OSS of old. **SW**

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10 THINGS:

The Military Should Know About the CIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. JOHNSON

Since President Harry S. Truman created the CIA with the signing of the National Security Act in 1947, the CIA and the Department of Defense have worked together toward a common goal of protecting U.S. national security.¹ Over the years, the results of CIA-DoD cooperation have been mixed. At times dealings between CIA officers and their military counterparts have been positive, while at other times the two organizations' cultures have clashed and officers on both sides have sought to keep the other at arm's length.² However, after the end of the Gulf War (1991) and especially since 9/11, CIA-DoD cooperation and understanding have increased across much of the spectrum of conflict ranging from conventional combat and insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan to unconventional warfare against transnational terrorism.³ This is particularly true of the relationship between the CIA and the military's special operations forces.⁴ The successful raid against Osama Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, is probably the best contemporary illustration of CIA-DoD cooperation and highlights the complementary nature of each organization's unique capabilities.⁵

Going forward, the CIA and the military will need to continue to work together in Afghanistan, even after the drawdown of U.S. military forces and the 2014 transition to Afghan-led military operations is complete, and in the fight against unconventional threats in places like South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, it is important that the military understands the CIA's missions, organization, authorities and capabilities, as well as how the CIA is different from the military. To that end, what follows is a list of 10 things the military should know about the CIA.⁶

1. CIA Mission. The CIA is an independent U.S. government agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers.⁷ The National Security Act of 1947 established the authority for the agency to carry out three principal activities: collect foreign intelligence; analyze intelligence; and perform other functions and duties as the President may direct, "where it is intended that the role of the U.S. Government will not be apparent


or acknowledged publicly." In other words, covert action.⁸ And, while one could argue that the CIA's foreign-intelligence collection mission lies at the heart of what the CIA does, there are also essential and unique facets of the CIA's intelligence analysis and covert-action missions, which are addressed below.

2. Organization. To accomplish its mission, the CIA is separated into four basic components or directorates: the National Clandestine Service, which was previously called the Directorate of Operations until 2005; the Directorate of Intelligence; the Directorate of Science and Technology; and the Directorate of Support.⁹ Each directorate also contains a myriad of sub-elements both at CIA headquarters and in the field.¹⁰ There is also a director's staff, which consists of multiple specialized offices such as the Office of Public Affairs, General Council, Congressional Affairs and the Associate Director for Military Affairs.¹¹

The mission of the NCS is to strengthen national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of human intelligence and covert action.¹² The NCS consists mainly of operations officers whose job it is to collect foreign intelligence information often by recruiting individuals, or assets, with access to sought after intelligence information. NCS officers are probably the type of person that many people think of when they think about the CIA — a James Bond type character.

The DI consists of officers who analyze intelligence from multiple sources such as NCS-generated HUMINT reporting, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, military intelligence reporting, and open source intelligence, among countless other sources. The result of this collection and analysis is the production of all-source or finished intelligence for the President, cabinet members and senior national security decision makers.¹³

If an NCS officer is our James Bond type, then the DS&T includes our "Q" department. The DS&T consists of officers who create, adapt, develop and operate the technical collection systems and apply enabling technologies to the collection, analysis and processing of information.¹⁴ They develop the tools and technol-



ogy needed to both collect foreign intelligence and support CIA activities in the field. As a classic example, think of a tie clip that is also a miniaturized camera.¹⁵

Finally, DS officers provide everything the CIA needs to accomplish its mission. DS officers are often the first CIA officers sent into difficult operational areas and are responsible for establishing key support functions such as communications, supply chains, facilities, financial, and medical services.¹⁶

3. Directorates & Centers. In addition to its four directorates, the CIA manages several functionally oriented centers with which the military routinely interacts. These centers include the Counterterrorism Center, Information Operations Center, Counterproliferation Center, Crime and Narcotics Center, Open Source Center, Special Activities Center and Counterintelligence Center.¹⁷ The major difference between the CIA's directorates and centers is that the centers bring together individuals from all four CIA Directorates and include officers from across the intelligence community such as the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.¹⁸

4. CIA Customers & Products. Whereas the military might seek out HUMINT sources at the tactical or operational levels in order to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements, the CIA for the most part, focuses on strategic-level HUMINT sources, or assets, who have the placement and access to the types of information that is of value to senior U.S. policy makers.¹⁹ Of note, the NCS's HUMINT reporting is available to the military in the form of classified Telegraphic Disseminations.

In a similar vein, the DI focuses its all-source intelligence analysis on topics of interest to the president and senior U.S. officials. The DI is a significant contributor to the intelligence community's premiere intelligence product, the Presidential Daily Brief and many of the DI's products are also available to the military via the CIA's classified web site, the Worldwide Intelligence Review.²⁰

Other unclassified CIA products the military should be mindful of are: the annual World Fact Book; the CIA's regularly published online directory of chiefs of state and cabinet members of foreign governments; and unclassified extracts from the CIA's professional journal, *Studies in Intelligence*.²¹

5. What is Covert Action? The National Security Act of 1947 gives the CIA the mission to conduct other functions and duties when directed to do so by the President (i.e., covert action).²² This is codified in law in Title 50 U.S. Code, which is why some refer to the CIA's covert action authorities as Title 50 Authorities.²³ The President directs the CIA, or other government agencies, to conduct covert actions via a mechanism called a Presidential Finding.²⁴ What sets covert action apart from other CIA and DoD activities is that for covert action, the involvement of the U.S. government is not publicly acknowledged during the operation, after the fact, or if the operation is discovered by a foreign government or the U.S. media.²⁵

6. Protection of Sources & Methods. The CIA, like DoD and other intelligence agencies, places a great deal of importance on the protection of sources of intelligence and methods of collection.²⁶ As a result, much of the CIA's sensitive intelligence is highly compartmented such that only those individuals who have a "need to know" and are "read into" a program have access to the information. The military is read into CIA programs when appropriate, but often times

CIA officers may not be able to share information about a CIA program with the military because the program is compartmented.

7. Chief of Station. In the field, the CIA manages its activities through a network of overseas stations.²⁷ The senior CIA officer at each station is the Chief of Station.²⁸ The COS serves in much the same capacity as a military commander would.²⁹ Among other things, the COS supervises the station's foreign intelligence collection efforts, liaises with foreign intelligence service partners, and manages the deconfliction of HUMINT and other operations with U.S. government entities such as DoD.³⁰

8. Rank & Relationships. While most CIA officers are certainly aware of military rank, the CIA is a less rank-conscious organization than the military. Practically speaking, a military officer or senior non-commissioned officer might walk into a meeting or send an e-mail to someone in the military and they would in all likelihood receive an immediate response due, in part, to their rank or position. The military's hierarchical structure works well for the military but does not always translate well to civilians who often work more informally. When dealing with the CIA, you would probably get a better result by meeting with your CIA counterpart in person, using your first name rather than your rank and last name and by developing a relationship with that person. In the CIA, it seems, relationships go a long way toward getting things done. That is not to say CIA officers do not appreciate the importance of rank or that relationships are not important in the military. Rather, it is simply a matter of differences in culture. Rank is but one example of the differences between the CIA and the military. Other differences include uniforms, acronyms, jargon, grooming standards, age, education, gender ratios, pay, budgets, and the number of personnel.³¹

9. Leaders and Managers. Another cultural difference between the CIA and the military is the idea of leadership versus management. The military is a leadership-oriented organization and this is apparent in the DoD's Professional Military Education curriculum. From the start of their careers, the military develops its officers to be leaders and leadership training continues over the course of an officer's career as they are promoted through the ranks. By contrast, the CIA has layers of management from the team, branch, group and division level all the way up to the directorate and agency-level senior management. Further, the CIA develops officers to be case officers, technical intelligence officers and analysts first, and only later in their careers do officers get the opportunity to become managers, typically at the GS13 through GS15 level. It is not to say that CIA managers are not also leaders, or that military leaders are not also managers. However, the two organizations do have different labels, training and timelines when it comes to who is in charge and what their role is. Related to this is the notion of experts and generalists. Because the CIA develops its officers to be case officers, technical intelligence officers and analysts first, the result is an organization of substantive experts. Military officers, on the other hand, tend to be generalists who move back and forth between command and staff positions and from one geographic region to another.

10. CIA-Military Nexus. To address the need for greater CIA-DoD cooperation and understanding, there are multiple connections the military can use to interface with the CIA and vice versa. At CIA headquarters, the Office of the Associate Director for Military Affairs has the mission to coordinate, plan, execute and sustain worldwide

activities that support CIA and DoD interaction based on priorities established by the Director of the CIA to achieve national security objectives.³² In the field, in addition to the previously mentioned Stations, the CIA has representatives located at DoD's Combatant Commands and Senior Service Colleges.³³ Finally, the CIA will at times embed liaison teams with deploying military commands to facilitate on-the-spot operational coordination and deconfliction.³⁴

The successful Bin Laden raid in 2011 represents a high point in the CIA-DoD relationship.³⁵ What is more, it appears the U.S. will continue to face threats in Afghanistan and elsewhere for years to come. Therefore, it is critically important that the CIA and the military understand each other, work well together, respect organizational and cultural differences and continue to leverage each other's complimentary capabilities against common enemies in order to better protect and defend the U.S. **SW**

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson, a U.S. Army officer, is a 1992 graduate of Texas Christian University. He has served overseas in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea and Germany in addition to multiple assignments in the U.S. He is currently assigned to the CIA's Office of the Associate Director for Military Affairs. This article has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. That review neither constitutes CIA authentication of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.

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3. *CIA Military Affairs, History*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/history.html> (accessed September 25, 2012). See also Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11, 2001*, (Penguin: New York (2004). For discussion on Spectrum of Conflict, see Chapter 2, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008
4. Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York, Penguin Press: 2012), pp. 188-189, 203-241, 262-265. See also Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, "The Long, Winding Path to Closer CIA and Military Cooperation," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 2011, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576340023120275758.html> (accessed September 22, 2012).
5. Transcript of President Obama's Remarks to the Intelligence Community at CIA Headquarters, May 20, 2011, at www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony (accessed April 29, 2012).
6. See John D. Johnson, "Working with the CIA," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, Apr-Jun 2012, pp. 50-52.
7. CIA Homepage, About CIA, at <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/index.html> (accessed September 20, 2012).
8. Remarks of CIA General Counsel Stephan W. Preston at Harvard Law School, April 10, 2012, at www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony, (accessed April 29, 2012).

9. CIA Press Release, *Establishment of the National Clandestine Service*, October 13, 2005, at <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2005/pr10132005.html> (accessed September 20, 2012).
10. *CIA Publications*, CIA Organizational Chart, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/cia-director-and-principles/cia-organization-chart.html> (accessed September 18, 2012).
11. Offices of CIA, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
12. *CIA Clandestine Service, Our Mission*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/ clandestine-service/our-mission.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
13. *CIA Intelligence & Analysis*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
14. *CIA Science & Technology*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/science-technology/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
15. The CIA museum offers tours to select military groups and houses and impressive display of DS&T's past creations and innovations.
16. *CIA Support to Mission*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/mission-support/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
17. *CIA Information Operations Center*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/organization-1/ioc-ag.html> (accessed September 20, 2012).
18. *CIA Publications, Centers in the CIA*, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/cia-director-and-principles/centers-in-the-cia.html> (accessed September 20, 2012).
19. *CIA Intelligence & Analysis*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/index.html> (accessed September 17, 2012).
20. *CIA Intelligence & Analysis*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/what-we-do.html> (accessed May 10, 2012).
21. At <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/products.html> (accessed September 24, 2012).
22. Remarks of CIA General Counsel Stephan W. Preston at Harvard Law School, April 10, 2012.
23. At <http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/50/15/III/413b> (accessed September 22, 2012).
24. *Ibid.* See also George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: The CIA During America's Time of Crisis* (New York: Harper, 2007), pg. 521.
25. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 520.
26. James B. Bruce, "The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and Leaks of Classified Information," CIA Center for the Studies of Intelligence, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article04.html> (accessed September 15, 2012).
27. See Joby Warrick, *The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA*, (New York: Vintage, 2011).
28. Garrett Jones, "Working with the CIA," *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, pp. 28-39.
29. *Ibid.*
30. See Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York, Penguin Press: 2012).
31. DoD personnel and budget numbers are significantly larger than the CIA.
32. *CIA Military Affairs*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/index.html> (accessed September 15, 2012).
33. *CIA Military Affairs, What We Do*, at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/military-affairs/what-we-do.html> (accessed September 15, 2012).
34. *Ibid.*
35. President Obama's Remarks to the Intelligence Community at CIA Headquarters, May 20, 2011. See also Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, "The Long, Winding Path to Closer CIA and Military Cooperation," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 2011.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Fourth-quarter FY14 Boards

DATE	BOARD
16 Jul	Army Reserve Battalion Command
12 Aug	Army Reserve AGR Colonel Command
26 Aug	ROTC PMS
3 Sep	Senior Service College
9 Sep	Lieutenant Colonel Command Select List Command

Professor Military Science

The Professor Military Science Selection Board convenes Aug. 26 to consider eligible lieutenant colonels to serve as Professors of Military Science at universities throughout the U.S. that have a Reserve Officer Training Corps. This year Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations majors (promotable) and lieutenant colonels are eligible to compete. The MILPER will be out shortly for the PMS Board. To access the list of available schools for active, USAR AGR and ARNG go to http://www.cadetcommand.army.mil/files/FY15_PMS_Vacancy_List.pdf.

School of Advanced Military Studies

Year Group 05 officers who attend Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., will have a unique opportunity to apply for the School of Advanced Military Studies. This highly sought after education focuses on operational art. ARSOF is building a cadre of SAMS graduates to increase operational planning capability in our regiments. Be on the look-out for the SAMS MILPER upon your arrival at Fort Leavenworth or contact the CAC SOF Cell. For more information, contact Lt. Col. Michael Kenny at 913-758-3193 or Lt. Col. Adrian Donahoe at 913.684.3954.

Distinguished Members of the Regiments

The Commanding General, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School recently approved Policy 10-74, Regimental Honors, Awards and Affiliation Program. The ARSOF Regimental Honors, Awards and Affiliation Program recognizes those who have significantly contributed to the welfare of the SF, CA or PO regiments. Members of the regiments are active or reserve component officers and Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, as well as civilians viewed in a private capacity. All ARSOF officers and enlisted Soldiers are automatically affiliated with their respective regiment upon graduation from their branch or military occupational specialty-producing courses. Officers and Soldiers not currently affiliated with their respective regiment may submit a request through their chain of command to, the Commander, USAJFKSWCS, using DA Form 4187.

ARMY RESERVE

38G – Military Government

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G1 (DAPE-PRP) has approved a proposal submitted by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School to establish AOC 38G for U.S. Army Reserve only. The establishment of a separate AOC under the CA Career Management Field permits the Army to effectively manage and build certified capacity of a functional specialist distinguishing them from other CA officers.

38G will utilize the existing skill identifier structure to identify civil experts in fields relating to governance, humanitarian assistance, social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law and security. Proficiency codes of 1L (Basic Functional Skill Practitioner), 1M (Senior Functional Skill Practitioner), 1N (Expert Functional Skill Practitioner) and 1P (Master Functional Skill Practitioner) are used to distinguish levels of expertise based on civilian education, civilian experience and professional credentials.

The preponderance of officers with the necessary civilian education, experience and credentials for these capabilities resides in the USAR. 38G is open to all USAR officers who meet the DA Pam 611-21 requirements; however, the initial requests for conversion to 38G are expected to come from current Civil Affairs (38A) officers. Additionally, the proponent is looking into direct appointment possibilities and establishing criteria for constructive service credit to allow for appointment at grades commensurate to the level of combined civilian education, civilian experience and professional credentials.

Implementation instructions will be announced by memorandum, Notification of Future Change (NOFC) O-1310-13, and posted in the electronic DA Pam 611-21, Smartbook. Authorization documents will see the addition of 38G beginning in FY16. Those interested in becoming a 38G should contact the Civil Affairs Proponent, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at swcscapersonnel@ahqb.soc.mil.

OFFICERS

FY14 ARSOF Officer Accessions

The Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches are currently recruiting officers from YG11 to try out for Army Special Operations. Officers interested in applying to one of the ARSOF branches must submit their packets by April 25 to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion. As major contingency operations migrate away from what we had experienced over the past 12 years, ARSOF will still provide officers relevant operational experiences, world travel, foreign-language training and cultural immersion. CA and PO are open to both male and female officers while SF is open only to males. If selected by the ARSOF Officer Accession board, officers will undergo a rigorous assessment and selection process prior to attending the regimental qualification courses. Included in the qualification courses, officers will receive language training for their regionally aligned theater. All three regiments have a high level of operational deployments that will hone language and cultural skills as well as develop experienced operators. These elite officers will primarily serve within special operations formations for the remainder of their careers.

Packets must be submitted to the SORB at <http://www.sor-brecurring.com> or contact the SORB at 910-432-1818.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

CMF 38 Individuals, who wish to become a 38A Civil Affairs Officer or 38B Civil Affairs Specialist, should submit an application through the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion <http://www.sorbrecruiting.com/CA.htm> or contact (910) 432-9697 to speak with a SORB recruiter.

Retention Effective Nov. 22, 2013, CMF 38 Soldiers became eligible to reenlist under the Critical Skills Retention Bonus Program. Soldiers in the grades of E-7 through E-9 with between 19 and 22 years of service are eligible to reenlist from 36 to 72 months and receive a bonus. MILPER message 13-342 for details and requirements.

DA Pam 600-25 All 38B Soldiers and leadership should frequently review DA Pam 600-25, Chapter 16 and CMF 38 Professional Development Model to see the duties, training, assignments and self-development emphasized for each rank. When being considered for promotion, it is critical to be as competitive as possible, and DA Pam 600-25 and CMF 38 PDM assist in this preparation. Soldiers should make themselves as desirable as possible, not only for the next grade, but the one beyond that, as many requirements take time. The focus should be on meeting the requirements for “best qualified” rather than “fully qualified” and experience, which is always considered a crucial requirement that cannot be gained in a short amount of time.

SPECIAL FORCES

CMF 18 PSA Former enlisted SF Soldiers have an opportunity to rejoin the SF Regiment in an active-duty status through the Prior Service Accessions program. The PSA is open to CMF 18 qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active or reserve component. The Soldier must volunteer for active component SF service. Reserve component Soldiers are required to obtain a conditional release from the National Guard Bureau prior to applying for active service.

GENERAL INFORMATION: All SF-qualified enlisted Soldiers not currently serving on active duty in SF require screening, assessment and revalidation prior to acceptance into active-duty SF. This includes prior service personnel, personnel currently serving in the reserve component and SF-qualified personnel on active duty who are not serving in a CMF 18 skill. This screening and revalidation is conducted at the USAJFKSWCS at Fort Bragg.

For more information, contact Master Sgt. Pope at popeb@soc.mil or commercial 910-432-7359, DSN 239-7359.

Special Forces Warrant Officer The Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS recently approved Policy # 14-062 for Active Duty SF Officers seeking transition into military occupational specialty 180A. A limited number of active duty branch-qualified SF captains and majors with 12 or fewer years of active federal service have the opportunity to transition from 18A

to MOS 180A. A MILPER message will be released announcing the time frame and process in which 18As can request to transition to 180A. The timeframe is sequenced with the U.S. Army Recruiting accessions boards for MOS 180A. Qualified and selected officers will have to complete the SF Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course. Upon appointment and completion of the SFWOTTCC, officers with more than 18 months on the active-duty list can apply for promotion to CW2. A Critical Skills Accessions Bonus may also be available. Appointment as a SF Warrant Officer is voluntary and incurs a six-year active-duty service obligation. Further questions can be directed to the 180A proponent manager.

DAG1 will release a MILPER message in the near future that will identify the process for the Call to Active Duty program. CAD is the program that allows ARNG Soldiers to apply for transition to active duty. This year's CAD is open to a limited number of ARNG SF 180As in the grade of W2 and W3. The prerequisites for 180As are: ASOT Level II or III, Current DLPT of 2/2 or higher, authorized release from the officer's ARNG Special Forces Group Commander and the State Adjutant, 180A Proponent Manager endorsement, must volunteer for assessment and selection for assignment to a 4th BN at one of the SF groups, and meet any additional requirements.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

CMF 37 PSA The Prior Service Accession program is open to Psychological Operations Career Management Field 37-qualified non-commissioned officers who previously served in the active or reserve components, or are currently serving in the reserve component and want to return to active duty.

GENERAL INFORMATION: The program applies to all PSYOP Soldiers who previously served in the active or reserve component and desire active duty service in CMF 37 or active duty Soldiers requesting reclassification back to CMF 37. The screening and revalidation is conducted at Fort Bragg. CMF 37 Soldiers are not required to repeat Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection.

For more information, contact Master Sgt. Hutson, at (910) 396-4349, DSN 236 or hutsonk@soc.mil.




OVER-SPEED TRAINING

BY LUKE SAGE, MA, CSCS

Over-speed training is nothing new. It is a technique that has been used in track and field for many years now and has found its way into the world of sports performance, much the same as many other speed-training techniques have come from track and field. There are a few different ways to implement an over-speed training effect such as down-hill sprints on a slight decline and the most common method that uses a belt and some sort of rubber stretch cable or band. With the belt and band method one athlete starts sprinting about 10-15 yards and approximately 2 seconds ahead of the other athlete. The first athlete is basically towing the other athlete.


Partner Training



The idea is that the athlete in tow will be able to achieve a speed greater than he/she would normally be able to achieve with no assistance. The training affect is the athlete being towed will be forced to perform the mechanics of maximum velocity sprinting at an elevated rate of speed. This teaches faster arm action, faster recovery and cycling of the lower assembly and in turn increases stride length, stride frequency and stride efficiency. For the Soldier this efficiency in mechanics will come into play more so during training, which will likely enable the Soldier to reduce the risk of injury.

Another application for an over-speed belt is to work on multidirectional deceleration. This is accomplished by performing very short distances with quick movements in all plains to include sagittal, frontal and transverse. This purpose is to enhance the ability of the Soldier athlete to decelerate his or her own body weight while doing a specific movement plus the resistance of the bungee cords pulling on the body. As with the over-speed sprinting drills these multidirectional drills should be perfected without any resistance prior to the application of any external resistance.

Individual Training



Luke Sage MA, CSCS is a Strength and Conditioning Specialist for the USAJFKSWCS THOR3 Program.

Potential Risks

Although these are highly desirable results there are several dangers with this type of training that must be addressed. First it should be understood that over-speed training should never be done with a beginner or even an intermediate level athlete. This type of training should be attempted only by an elite-level athlete who has been put through the proper speed progressions that give them a solid, technically sound foundation which will allow them to perform the mechanics of max velocity sprinting at a higher rate of speed as the drill intends to accomplish. It is very dangerous and counterproductive for an untrained, underdeveloped athlete to perform this drill. Dangerous because the athlete will be forced to move his/her body parts much faster than normal and can put the athlete at risk for muscle strains or possibly an uncontrollable fall. Counterproductive because the athlete with little or no training in enhanced sprint mechanics, will then be forced to perform their already existing poor mechanics, just at a faster rate of speed. This results in the reinforcement of poor mechanics. Another counterproductive result is the athlete will instinctively contact the ground in a heel-to-toe manner which will act as a breaking mechanism in order to control their speed during the execution of the drill. This too may result in a higher risk for impact injuries associated with excessive heel striking.

Preparation

Proper sprinting mechanics should be thoroughly taught and reinforced long before the athlete is hooked up to an external resistance or assistance tool such the one mentioned in this article. Even before the elite athlete uses these tools he/she should be put through a decline sprint progression which will allow the athlete to become more comfortable with the over speed sensation. One to two months of training on a slight decline will prepare the athlete for the next progression. The athlete should only be moved to the next progression if he/she has mastered the technique. **SW**

DIRTY WARS: THE WORLD IS A BATTLEFIELD

Arguing that the United States counterterrorism policy since 9/11 has expanded beyond the scope of federal law, author Jerry Scahill attempts to discredit policymakers, military leaders and U.S. national security strategy. Scahill's scathing critique is written in chronological order beginning with the crafting of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act, which gives the President the power to target imminent threats across the globe and ends with the 2013 white paper that defined the "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. citizen." Scahill's premise is that the U.S. counterterrorism policy and targeting program must have proper oversight and transparency or the U.S. will risk losing its standing as an ethical and moral country. Despite having won some of journalism's highest honors, and being on the *New York Times* best-seller list for his book *Blackwater*, Scahill does not hide his disdain for U.S. counterterror policies, special operations forces and high-level officials.

The book revolves around a 2011 drone strike in Yemen that killed the 16-year-old American citizen, Abdulrahman Awlaki two weeks after his father, Anwar Awlaki, was killed. The author paints the boy's death as an unlawful assassination, ordered by the President, simply because the boy's father was a terrorist and questions the approval process for such an operation. Awlaki's death was well within U.S. law. Speaking out of conjecture and his personal opinions, the author focuses on drone strikes and proxy efforts in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan as proof that the U.S. is conducting unwarranted assassinations in the name of national security.

Scahill uses well known military scandals of the past decade, such as: enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Ghraib, the targeted killing program and detention at Guantanamo Bay as the catalyst for describing out-of-control military leaders and units. Specifically, the author describes the Joint Special Operations Command as completely "unaccountable."


When speaking about JSOC, the author uses words such as "killing machine," "ninjas" and "murder incorporated," which degrade his arguments and sound unprofessional. At one point, he cites

a source stating, "If there's one person they're going after and 34 other people in the building, 35 people are going to die, that's the mentality." Scahill attempts to make it sound commonplace for special operations forces to accept civilian casualties. The critique diminishes the efforts of American military commanders, post 9/11, to reduce and eliminate civilian casualty incidents and is non-representative of U.S. military ethics or of the Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen in uniform.

The author describes the expansion of SOF authorities by delineating the differences between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities. He makes a clear distinction that Title 50 funds are for intelligence activities, while Title 10 authorities are for military activities. He then goes on to criticize the U.S. Special Operations Command for misusing Title 50 authorities to expand the war on terror and accuses SOCOM of conducting "paramilitary" operations under the Title 50 auspices. The author tries to turn this into a scandal despite the misuse being allowed in Title 50 law while operating under an intelligence agency. Scahill disregards the complexities of counterterrorist operations against an enemy that moves at will.

The author writes about the U.S. support of Somali power brokers to stop a rising Islamic radical movement in 2005 and uses this case to emphasize that the U.S. employed warlords to kill known terrorists. The author contends that U.S. support in this operation enabled the rise of al-Shabab and attributes the operation to CIA and JSOC eagerness to expand the targeting program beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Scahill's assertions are discounted because his sources come off as bitter and without understanding of the threat of a potential terrorist organization operating in a failed state or the complex ethical environment in which special operations forces are expected to operate.

Finally, Scahill references the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Exord as one of the most recent expansions in the administrations counterterror policy and cites it as a "permission slip" for elite military units to conduct clandestine operations across the globe without any approval process. The author presumes that



DETAILS

By Jerry Scahill

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Reviewed by:

Maj. Pat Collins, *Naval Post Graduate School*


clandestine operations are synonymous with capture/kill operations and admits that he has never seen the document. He focuses on SOCOM's expansion and authorities only as a means to conduct lethal operations worldwide. The author fails to mention the capacity building, intergovernmental role of special operators and clarify that the majority of missions being conducted globally are non-lethal.

Dirty Wars is a biased critique of the administrations counterterror policies and gives a loose history about the CIA and JSOC's role in post 9/11 operations. With sources that are not authoritative, a strong bias and much conjecture, this book is not convincing. Scahill fails to provide counter arguments for any of his premises and does not take into account the various levels of oversight. *Dirty Wars* will make the reader question the moral and ethical aspects of the U.S. counterterror policies, specifically with regard to U.S. citizens, as well as the blurred lines between military authorities. However, he does not make a convincing case that the military and intelligence communities are violating laws or operating without oversight. The book will keep the reader engaged, but should not be used as a professional development tool. **SW**

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