

SPECIAL WARFARE

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RESISTANCE IN THEORY
FORGING EXPERTISE FOR
TOMORROW'S FIGHT



RESISTANCE

THE OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

ARTICLES

- 06 | The Special Forces Profession
- 08 | "Bloodline," "Partyline" and "Bottom Line"
- 12 | Forging Expertise
- 22 | Civil Affairs in a Resistance Environment
- 28 | Ties that Bind

DEPARTMENTS

- FROM THE COMMANDANT _____ 04
- UPDATES _____ 05
- BOOK REVIEW _____ 30
- MEMORIAL _____ 31

About the Cover Flag



You might have noticed the tricolor flag behind the *Special Warfare* name on the cover of this issue. These colors were taken from the the unofficial flag of the Pineland Resistance Forces — the Guerrilla forces in Pineland. The flag, adopted by the guerrilla forces from the 1870 Pineland Liberty flag, features a bear paw, which is a sign of the resistance. Pineland is the fictitious land where the culmination exercises for the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses takes place.

ON THE COVER

Students in the Special Forces Qualification Course look over a map with a role player during the final culmination exercise known as Robin Sage. See "About the Cover Flag" below left for more information on the cover art.

U.S. Army Photo by K. Kassens



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SPECIAL WARFARE

COMMANDING GENERAL & COMMANDANT
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**U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
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from the COMMANDANT




In this issue of Special Warfare we take a theoretical look at the concept of resistance, which is the heart of what we as special operators do. Over the past two years, a large and diverse group of people — led by the U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe — have been involved in developing the Resistance Operating Concept. That work is the basis of the redesign of our Special Operations Qualification Courses.

It is imperative that our Soldiers in the field, and those teaching here at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, have a deep understanding of resistance, which includes the tools we use to either support or defeat a resistance such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. With that understanding, we will be able to train and educate new special operators to operate successfully in this environment and in support of multi-domain operations.

This theoretical look at resistance will be followed in the next issue by an in-depth look at resistance in practice in the Special Operations Command-Europe theater of operations, which will focus on Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

As we deepen the bench with a broad understanding of knowledge, we can begin to train in a way that will incorporate each of our regiments into a resistance environment that will allow them to operate successfully.


KURT L. SONNTAG
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING GENERAL

**“Liberty has never
come from the
government. Liberty
has always come
from the subjects of
the government.
The history of
government is a
history of resistance.”**

— Woodrow Wilson

THE PRINCIPLES* OF RESISTANCE ATP 3-18

1. Resistance is efforts by individuals or groups to resist, oppose or overthrow an oppressor. In the context of Special Operations doctrine, the oppressor usually connotes an established government or occupying power.
2. Resistance is fundamentally a political activity.
3. Resistance requires a "will to resist," however derived, for at least some members of any resistance.
4. The essence of resistance is subversion of opponent strength in all domains through a wide range of activities.
5. Potential resistance activities inhabit a range from individual and organized group passive, non-violent, non cooperation and demonstration through a wide range and scale of violent activities.
6. Resistance activities typically involve a combination of overt, low-visibility, clandestine and covert methods.
7. The requirement to conduct certain resistance activities clandestinely is a function of both the opponents' ability to repress and the nature of the resistance activity.
8. Resistance efforts typically must begin with small-scale clandestine organization and sporadic activity to survive.
9. Resistance strategy, methods, organization, narrative and leadership style are subordinate to resistance objectives.
10. Every instance of resistance will have unique characteristics based on its



01

underlying social, economic, cultural, historical, and political circumstances.

11. Not all persons useful to a resistance are members of that resistance, are willing to its true objectives, or even aware of its existence.
12. Most successful resistance efforts require some level of popular support.

**Principle - A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)*

01

Special Forces candidates assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School listen to a briefing during the final phase of field training known as Robin Sage in central North Carolina. Robin Sage is the culmination exercise and has been the litmus test for Soldiers striving to earn the Green Beret for more than 40 years. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY JASON GAMBARDILLA

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—THE SPECIAL FORCES PROFESSION—

BY PAUL J. TOMPKINS Jr.

Special Forces have a single subject that is at the core of their profession and it is not Unconventional Warfare. The distinction must be clear; Resistance or resistance movement is the subject of the profession, UW is one of several means of engaging resistance movements.

It is imperative in any profession that those who constitute the body of said profession are fully educated on the subject of their expertise. This subject is the reason why the profession exists in the first place. For example, all medical doctors work on the human body in some capacity, the body being their subject. All culinary experts work on food and all plumbers work on pipes. Every medical doctor begins their professional journey by study-

ing human anatomy, the subject of the medical profession. They study the parts, system, functions and characteristics of the human body. Without this knowledge a doctor cannot determine what is right or wrong, what is normal and what is abnormal or what is working correctly and what is not. He or she would be guessing at the cause of an affliction or wrongly conclude nothing at all is amiss. This doctor would be failing in his profession. In addition to anatomy, doctors study the techniques and procedures of how to work on their subject. How a doctor engages with and analyzes the patient's problem or how he runs his office are examples of how he works on the subject. Therefore the subject of what a doctor works on is the human patient and the method is how he or she delivers the care.

For Special Forces it has been long argued that the established purpose and

organizational design of Special Forces is for UW. Special Forces was designed to support insurgencies, it was the best force to counter an insurgency, assist others to counter insurgencies (Foreign Internal Defense), and to counter terrorists (counterterrorism). Viewing these core activities in this light has translated into a generational understanding that the subject of the profession is unconventional warfare. Contrary to this belief, the majority of missions SF has performed over the past 60 Years was FID, not UW. While it is true that the organizing principle for SF was UW, and its structure is operationally relevant today, UW and FID are concepts of execution; a means, not the subject. The subject that the means is being applied to is a resistance or resistance movement. In all of these cases, Special Forces are supporting or countering a resistance, either directly or indirectly.

Carl Von Clausewitz, in his treatise on warfare, states emphatically that before all else you must first know the type of war you are addressing. In Joint Pub-


01 Special Forces candidates participate in a sand table exercise with guerrilla forces during Robin Sage, the final unconventional warfare culmination exercise for the Special Forces Qualification Course at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY K. KASSENS

lication 1, there exists only two types of warfare, traditional and irregular. All of the core activities of Special Forces considered above are categorized in JP 1 as IW. They may be executed singularly as the main effort such as in Syria in 2015 or as a supporting effort to traditional war as seen in the Kurdish support to the 2005 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Regardless of the execution of the IW activities, Traditional War and Irregular Warfare remain two significantly different types or warfare.

Joint Publication 1 states that the mechanisms of victory for traditional warfare are to close with the enemy, destroy his will or capability to fight and occupy his terrain. This type of warfare is fought on the physical terrain. The occupation of the enemy's terrain is essential. In IW, however, there are no mechanisms of victory listed. Irregular warfare is uniquely a competition to maintain one's legitimacy while gaining the support of the population. It is a battle of narratives conducted to sway the majority of the population. It is not about the destructions of will or the occupation of terrain. This type of warfare occurs in the minds of the population. It may manifest itself in physical actions but those actions are only designed to reinforce the narrative. The exception to this is when a resistance movement has transformed into a traditional warfare-like composition and is capable of challenging the government or other opposition forces on equal status, which Mao calls the "war of movement" phase. Whether the resistance has achieved peer status or continues to challenge asymmetrically, the resistance must gain the majority support of the population in order to succeed. We can conclude from the framing of JP 1 that Special Forces primarily conducts IW. This is their form of warfare, not the subject of their profession. To summarize, Special Forces' primary form of warfare is IW, the means of conducting that type of warfare is through the execution of UW, FID, COIN and CT.

Understanding that COIN, FID, CT and UW are how we work on our subject, we can then derive the subject from analyzing what those activities are being conducted against. Counter-

insurgency is the effort of a governing power to eliminate a violent organized resistance to its governance and existence. The thing that is being affected by the activities and operations is the insurgency. Whereas, the conduct of FID is the U.S. (generally SF) assisting the security forces of a foreign state to counter an insurgency. In this case the security forces of the country are conducting COIN and the supporting country forces are conducting FID. This is most commonly based on an Internal Defense and Development strategy. Counterterrorism, on the other hand, is fundamentally different as it is the countering of a tactic. In essence, it is the elimination of the leadership, facilitator and militant actors of a resistance organization. Finally, when conducting UW, the external sponsor is supporting a resistance movement, generally in the form of an insurgency.

In all of these cases Special Forces is working either against, or in support of, a resistance movement. COIN, FID, CT and UW are the means of working on a resistance organization. Resistance or resistance movement is the core base object or thing that is being affected or worked on, making it the subject of the Special Forces profession. Therefore, it is imperative that the Special Forces professional studies and is knowledgeable on resistance organizations, their parts, systems and functions. A Special Forces Soldier must also be well versed in the doctrine of how to support or counter them. It is with the full knowledge of the resistance organization's parts, systems and functions, coupled with the relevant doctrine, that enables the professional to employ the art necessary to accomplish the nation's objectives. Otherwise he is just guessing: Would you go to a doctor who hasn't studied human anatomy? 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul J. Tompkins Jr. is a retired Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer. He is the project lead for the USASOC Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgency Strategies project conducted in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University.

DEFINITIONS

Profession: A trusted, disciplined and relatively autonomous vocation whose members provide a unique and vital service to society, without which it could not flourish, provide this service by developing and applying expert knowledge, and establish and uphold the discipline and standards of their art and science, including the responsibility for professional development and certification. (*ADRP 1, 14 June 2015*)


Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (*JP 3-05.1*)

Resistance movement: An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (*JP 3-05*)

Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN. (*JP 3-24*)

Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (*JP 3-22*)

Counterterrorism: Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism. (*JP 3-26*)



“BLOODLINE,” “PARTY LINE” AND “BOTTOM LINE”

Thoughts on the Role of Resistance Doctrine
Vis-à-vis the “Science of Resistance.”

BY JEFFREY HASLER

U.S. Army Special Operations Command *does not provide*, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School *does not assess, select, train, educate and write doctrine for*, and U.S. Army First Special Forces Command *does not command and train* Army Special Operations Forces “scientists.” These commands train highly capable elite Soldiers. Therefore, those who conceive, approve and support the pursuit of what is being touted as the “Science of Resistance” should carefully reflect on what such “science” promises; especially vis-à-vis the enduring and Army-prescribed role of extant ARSOF doctrine for resistance.

In 2017, *Small Wars Journal* article, “The Science of Resistance,” Paul Tompkins and Robert R. Leonhard state their purpose is “to elevate the study of resistance movements from a scholarly field of interest to a science.”⁰¹ Generally, there is nothing wrong with this proposal and resistance professionals should welcome contributions to understanding the phenomenon of resistance by academics and others. However, there is peril in superficially assuming a so-called “Science of Resistance” is somehow a cognitive panacea or a magic-bullet doctrine, training and education solution for ARSOF. Moreover, their assertion that doctrine is only interested in “resistance science... once a resistance movement takes up arms...” is a falsehood. Tompkins and Leonhard claim that a “science of resistance” would be a larger, more comprehensive context than doctrine does or could address, and therefore they imply that doctrine is subordinate to such “science.”

DEFINITION OF SCIENCE

- 1: the **state of knowing**: knowledge as distinguished from ignorance or misunderstanding
- 2 **a**: a department of **systematized knowledge as an object of study** //the science of theology
b: something (such as a sport or technique) that **may be studied or learned** like systematized knowledge //have it down to a science
- 3 **a**: knowledge or a system of knowledge covering **general truths or the operation of general laws** especially as obtained and tested through scientific method
b: such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena: **natural science**
- 4: a **system or method reconciling practical ends with scientific laws** //cooking is both a science and an art

03DEC18 from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science>

While a “Science of Resistance” has some promise and can be one contribution of many, it should not be conceived of, nor wielded as, a replacement for the doctrine, training and education that prepares ARSOF Soldiers to conduct resistance-focused missions such as unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense or counterinsurgency. Special operations benefit from and are informed by science, but such operations are inescapably practical undertakings that differ from “science” per se.


There is a need, therefore, to identify some of the virtues of Army resistance doctrine in contrast to a “Science of Resistance.” Doctrine and science are different things and have different virtues. This article outlines the enduring utility of Army doctrine for resistance and its proper relation to “science,” followed by some select cautions and recommendations for decision makers.

Army “resistance doctrine” is based on decades of experience and intellectual enterprise; it has a “**bloodline.**” Regardless of the interests of all other entities and actors, Army special operations writes resistance doctrine primarily for *practical* Army purposes; the Army and its doctrine have a “**party line.**” And although doctrine is routinely updated and revised, it is not temporally open-ended and endlessly speculative; it is a distillation of information in time, an official snapshot, a truncation, a “**bottom line.**”

BLOODLINE

Army doctrine for resistance stretches back to the manuals produced by the Office of Strategic Services in World War II in the early 1940s; it has a “bloodline.”

Thinking carefully and publishing systematized knowledge and general truths about “resistance” has a decades-long pedigree in international literature generally, and in the intellectual undertaking of Army Special Operations doctrine specifically. Resistance is discussed as early as the OSS FM No.4, *Special Operations Field Manual – Strategic Services*, 23 February 1944.



“BLOODLINE,” “PARTY LINE” AND “BOTTOM LINE”

Post-war and post-OSS Army manuals continued these ideas in FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, 5 October 1951, which refers to “special forces operations” even before the unit was officially established in 1952. The discussion of why people resist and mention of “unconventional warfare” specifically appears as early as FM 31-21 *Guerrilla Warfare*, 23 March 1955. Unconventional Warfare, Special Forces Operations and related doctrine represent a continuous application of thinking about resistance shaped into practical products to train and educate Soldiers, and available to inform policy makers and partners on Army Special Operations capabilities.

The “science of resistance” is already implicit in the explicit characterization of resistance and how to support or oppose it in this doctrine as it has been for almost 80 years. Much of this historical continuity is carefully outlined in the new ATP 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, March 2019. If a formalized “science of resistance” contributes to expanded knowledge of the phenomenon of resistance, that is welcome. But ARSOF has already been thinking about resistance at least since Maj. Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan. As this Army doctrine has been designed to support or oppose resistance, and explicitly includes considerations of human dynamics, political intercourse, psychological methods, non-lethal activities, etc., it is absurd to suggest that Army doctrine has not, and does not, treat resistance itself. Furthermore, to suggest Army doctrine for resistance is not an established and important voice on a field of knowledge the Army itself created, is an affront to all of the visionary leaders – and professional doctrine writers — who have developed that field for three quarters of a century.

PARTY LINE

Army doctrine for resistance constitutes a disciplined support of what could be characterized as a doctrine “party line.”

The Army has a purpose [apply land power], a perspective [how to be effective in applying land power] and a charter [train and command forces to effectively wield land power]. All of these must be in accordance with U.S. law, American values and U.S. Government policy. Regardless of the interests of all other entities and actors, Army special operations writes resistance doctrine to support these practical Army requirements and within these legal and moral boundaries. In addition, Army Special Operations is the U.S. Special Operations Command’s lead service component for the resistance-related missions prescribed by Congress. Therefore, Army Special Operations resistance doctrine is responsible to the

Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Furthermore, the Army establishes doctrine on doctrine itself, which all members of the Army are obliged to acknowledge. Finally, somewhat like law, Army doctrine is deliberately conservative and is expected to be faithful to time-honored principles and doctrinal precedent that remains valid. The doctrine process is not “just one man’s opinion” and never has been. It represents an orderly, systematic procedure intended to ensure the organization vets doctrine for appropriateness and quality. Army doctrine is accountable to all of the above authorities.

What master will a “science of resistance” serve? Conceivably several. But no matter where that “science” leads or who it may claim to serve, the Department of Defense (and ARSOF resistance doctrine) is obliged to follow the multi-faceted “party line” described above. The DoD has understandable equities it must and should articulate, forward, and defend against competitors for policy favor, budgets etc. The DoD is answerable to both the President and the Congress in ways that academics are not. “Science” and “scientists” are neither infallible nor omniscient. As is shown by the political rancor over “scientifically-settled” topics such as “global warming /climate change” or the “When does life begin, at conception or birth?” question which has “scientists” in support of opposing views; “science” is not necessarily definitive and unassailably authoritative. Caution is in order so that we encourage “Science” to be a partner, but do not allow ourselves to begin to accept “Science” as a master. The “party line” remains in effect.

BOTTOM LINE

Army doctrine for resistance represents a consciously abridged version of “reality” for Soldiers who require a unifying, professional, team language good enough that they can understand one another; unbounded inquiry however fruitful eventually requires a “bottom line.”

People from all professional walks of life understand the phrase “the bottom line.” Entertaining the “good idea fairy” is often popular because it represents creative thought, in genuinely free circumstances it offers opportunities for participation by many voices, there is something exciting about intellectual discovery, and frankly, it offers a stage for personal opinion and an opportunity for personal acclaim of cleverness. But in counsels great and small or rich and mean, and in fields as diverse as business, defense, management and many others, debate and differing opinions must come to a halt at some point in time for some type of conclusion; a “bot-

THE “SCIENCE OF RESISTANCE” IS ALREADY IMPLICIT IN THE EXPLICIT CHARACTERIZATION OF RESISTANCE AND HOW TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE IT IN THIS DOCTRINE AS IT HAS BEEN FOR ALMOST EIGHTY YEARS ... ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN THINKING ABOUT RESISTANCE AT LEAST SINCE MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM “WILD BILL” DONOVAN.

tom line.” In some cases, this is achieved by amalgamating the differing opinions presented into a synthesized summary by a collective body. In other cases, the senior decision-maker present shapes the conclusion after considering and drawing from the diverse discussion.

The purpose of the “bottom line” is to produce a useable result; a practical point of reference from which to proceed. The “bottom line” is a truncated model of reality, an active-voiced discriminatory decision to include some ideas and eschew others, a sober disciplining of endless nuance, a practical set-resolution-standard focus restricting distorting magnification and emasculating reductio ad absurdum, and a rebuke to uncertainty when a practical position must be established.

The “bottom line” means “(for now) the time for discussion is over, this is the answer, the plan. Does everyone understand it? Now let’s get stuff done.”

Opposing “philosophers” both deep and facile will object that the “bottom line” is invalid either because it is an affront to the ethereal nuances of epistemology which can only be appreciated by the elite few, or because they simply don’t like the answer. But the bottom line is not an advocacy for anti-intellectualism, it is an advocacy for practicality. Science is necessary, but so is the game plan.


Select Cautions and Recommendations

1. Better science is worthwhile in any field. Better and more “science” focused on resistance is also worthwhile, and that science which may help inform better resistance doctrine is welcome.

2. However, science is neither a panacea nor an infallible authority; not for “resistance” or anything else. Beware giving “science” authority over the legitimate perspectives, needs and responsibilities of Army Special Operations doctrine (among others).

3. Science may inform the creation of better doctrine, but it does not automatically translate into doctrine. Don’t succumb to the notion that doctrine must be “scientific”— as determined by scientists — as opposed to supporting the Army (and others) – as determined by Army leadership.

4. To what extent is a perceived need for so-called “science” a result of ignorance of 80 years of Army Special Operations resistance doctrine?

5. When was the last time you — the reader — read, discussed, taught, argued, commented on, or contributed to, the improvement of Army resistance doctrine? 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jeffrey Hasler is a 28-year veteran of Army Special Forces and is currently a doctrine writer and analyst in Special Forces Doctrine at the USAJFKSWCS. He is a graduate of Indiana University, Bloomington Indiana; the Defense Language Institute (Mandarin Chinese) and the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California; and has studied at the Beijing Institute for Economic Management Cadre, Beijing PRC.

NOTES 01. Paul Tompkins and Robert R. Leonhard. “The Science of Resistance,” in *Small Wars Journal* 2017, downloaded 30NOV18 from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-science-of-resistance>.

DEFINITION AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF DOCTRINE

“Army doctrine [is] **fundamental principles**, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is **authoritative but requires judgment in application**. Army doctrine is the approved (by the Secretary of the Army through the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army) **body of knowledge that is taught and used for the conduct of operations.**” [para. 1-5]

“**Doctrine is not established arbitrarily, nor is it static. It is based on decades and often centuries of experience** (and incorporates the best of) local procedures, best practices and lessons learned from operations and training.” [para. 1-6]

“Soldiers and leaders should **avoid confusing concepts with doctrine**. Concepts are proposals and the basis for experiments on conducting future operations whereas doctrine addresses how Army forces actually operate today.” [para. 1-7]

“Army professionals use doctrine in two contexts: study and reflection as well as conducting (planning preparing, executing and assessing) operations. Thus, **doctrine is—and must be—both theoretical and practical**. Doctrine is not a catalogue of answers to specific problems. Rather, it is a collection of fundamentals, tactics, techniques and procedures for thinking about military problems, which operations are the most complex, and what actions best solve them. **Doctrine is not what to think or how to solve specific problems.**” [para. 1-8]

Army Doctrine Publication No. 1-01, Doctrine Primer, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 2 September 2014.

FORGING EXPERTISE

Enabling Resistance in Tomorrow's Fight.

BY FIRST SERGEANT ROBERT BODE AND
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 JOSH WILLS AND
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 NICHOLAS GERIS

In September 2018, a Chinese warship shadowed and threatened to ram the *USS Decatur*, coming within 135 meters before veering off in the last few seconds to avoid an imminent collision. The People's Liberation Army continues to expand and exercise its special operations forces.^{01, 02} Russian forces have built up on the borders of Ukraine, deploying medium and long range missiles into range of NATO allies and fighter aircraft have continuously intercepted NATO and U.S. aircraft.⁰³ Iran beckons for the apocalypse and North Korea continues to defy the international community by developing and testing nuclear weapons. The stage is set for the great powers of the world to collide.

Conventional maneuver warfare and textbook counterinsurgency operations have given way to new forms of hybrid warfare, blurring the lines between military, and civilian; state and non-state; protest and conflict; legal and illicit; intentional and incidental.⁰⁴ In this space between peace and war, the United States Special Forces provide the United States Government with a small-footprint option for influencing unfriendly regimes, addressing insurgencies and containing conflicts that could destabilize U.S. allies and partners.⁰⁵ While conventional units focus on fighting and winning "hot" wars by dominating physical terrain, ARSOF works to expand the competitive phase, operating through and with indigenous forces to deter escalation, defeat hybrid threats, and set conditions for prompt shift to conventional armed conflict when needed.⁰⁶

Special Forces is arguably the best force the Department of Defense has for countering hybrid threats, influencing populations, reporting on enemy rear area activities, and operating behind enemy lines as combat multipliers; recruiting, training and advising indigenous forces to disrupt, coerce or overthrow an occupying power.⁰⁷ **To ensure SF is ready to transition to collaborative, multi-domain support to resistance operations in a denied environment amid great state competition, emphasis must be placed on the development of expertise (through high quality training over many years), human ego development (through development of expertise) and exceptional leadership (through human ego development).**

THE NEED FOR EXPERTISE

According to FM 3-05, a denied area is defined as:

*An area that is operationally unsuitable for conventional forces due to political, tactical, environmental or geographical reasons. It is a primary area for special operations forces.*⁰⁸



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Similarly, the TRADOC Pamphlet on Multi-Domain Operations proposes the following definition for deep fires areas:

*The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires, SOF, information and virtual capabilities can be employed.*¹⁰

What will be required of Special Forces Soldiers in denied area support to resistance operations? In unconventional warfare, each Green Beret is expected to organize, train, advise and lead a company of indigenous forces; each Operational Detachment-Alpha a battalion. The battalion should be able to self-sustain its teams and partners through the use of conventional and non-standard logistics, build rapport across cultural boundaries, understand operational variables, and synchronize guerrilla and resistance efforts with adjacent and parent organizations, all while remaining undetected.¹¹ They will be expected to collect and report intelligence, establish and exploit physical and human networks to provide early warning and deter escalation while operating completely in the dark, at times cut off for days or weeks from communication with higher headquarters. Instant and near-real-time communications, ISR soak, and FBCB2s will be impossible in a denied area when facing a peer adversary. Their use will likely result in intercepted, masked and degraded communications, enemy radio direction finding and immediate triangulated fires, as witnessed in Ukraine.¹² Special Forces Soldiers are purpose-built



to be advisors. The nation needs SF Soldiers who have enough experience and high quality repetitions at their required tasks that they can teach and execute them efficiently — not just effectively. Survivability in an austere environment should be central to everything Special Forces do. In short, the nation needs experts.

EXPERTISE AS A FEEDBACK LOOP

Green Berets can currently be assigned as instructors at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, sent to various broadening assignments (drill sergeant, recruiter, staff, etc.) or promoted to E8 after only 36 months of team time.¹³ But are they experts at that point? Do they have the requisite cross training, knowledge and skills to lead a 12-man team consisting of eight different Military occupational specialties across nine principle tasks in a deep-fires area of large-scale combat? Are they ready to produce the next generation of Green Berets?

These are serious questions that require thoughtful deliberation. After 18 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, Green Berets have myriad training and experience in the fields of foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and direct action. According to the 1st Special Forces Command(Airborne) portal, that leaves five principle tasks ignored, including unconventional warfare, the capstone of resistance warfare, and preparation of the environment, the principle way we set conditions

in the competition phase.¹⁴ In contrast, to face the emerging threats of great state competition below the threshold of overt armed conflict, 1st SFC(A) needs resistance experts who can be effectively employed by theater and field commanders in the deep-fires area. Soldiers who only spend 36 months on an SFOD-A, predominantly deployed in a non-resistance role supporting the United States Central Command area of operations, do not have sufficient time and exposure for the personal and professional development required to become resistance experts.

Expertise is developed over time as a result of concentrated, high-quality, deliberate practice and world-class education. The time required to achieve an expert level of mastery is debated, but research suggests 10 years of dedicated practice or more.¹⁵ One study suggests that as many as 50,000 to 100,000 hours may be needed to achieve expertise.¹⁶ Assuming 50,000 hours, a Soldier working 10 hours a day, 7 days a week with no holidays would achieve expertise in 13.7 years — but only if the repetitions were consistent, high quality, concentrated and uninterrupted.¹⁷ Expertise will develop more slowly if interrupted by unrelated tasks. Most people don't make it to the expert level for a variety of reasons: motivation, baseline intelligence, access to expert instruction or lack of deliberate practice, to name a few.¹⁸

It may prove infeasible to keep Green Berets on a team for 13.7 years, but providing SF Soldiers the time and resources to achieve true expertise is a worthy investment that will pay dividends for generations. Learners who work for or study under experts learn to solve com-

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A seasoned instructor teaches students at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape Level-C training (SERE) at Camp MacKall, North Carolina. Expertise is developed over time as a result of concentrated, high-quality, deliberate practice and world-class education. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY K. KASSENS




Figure 01

plex problems in their domain faster and more efficiently than those exposed to the same information from non-experts.¹⁹ In other words: expertise begets expertise.

Expertise in a certain field is absolutely necessary for an instructor to produce experts, but does not by itself guarantee that experts will be capable of teaching others. Instructors need to be subject-matter experts *and* expert teachers.²⁰ An expert in long range marksmanship who is a sub-standard instructor will only produce mediocre snipers, at best. Likewise, an expert instructor with no knowledge of underwater operations will only produce average divers. In short, SF Soldiers who are assigned as instructors before they achieve expertise simply cannot produce expert pupils due to reduced knowledge and expertise. Instructors must therefore be selected based on existing expertise, aptitude and a desire to teach. Those selected as instructors should be given the absolute best academic instruction in how to teach, hundreds of high quality repetitions and enough time to become expert instructors.

Although it may take 10 years or more to develop experts, evidence suggests being an expert streamlines the process. The concept of adaptive expertise theorizes that once a person is an expert in one field, they can more easily become an expert in other fields.²¹ Applied to the SF Regiment-SWCS relationship, a Green Beret who is given 7-10 years on a team to develop true expertise before being assigned to SWCS would master the new domain of teaching faster and more effectively than those lacking expertise. If Soldiers who are not yet experts are assigned as instructors, longer and more intense on-boarding is required to prepare them

to teach, and even then the quality will be sub-optimal.

Education and training are both inherently linked to the development of expertise, but they are not the same and one cannot replace the other.²² Close synchronization and integration of the two are required to create synergy as students progress through cycles of education and training with more complex scenarios and skills.²³ As all combat arms Soldiers know, training is one of the most important things units can do to prepare for combat and it is through training repetitions that the potential of education is realized.²⁴ Training provides an opportunity for Soldiers and leaders to take risks, be creative, and learn from their mistakes. This is a key component to both team building and leader development.^{25,26} Expertise is forged on the anvil of challenging, realistic, focused training. It requires high-quality, concentrated repetitions under the tutelage of an expert instructor or leader.

FORGING RESISTANCE EXPERTISE

When repetitions are not concentrated or are interrupted by unrelated tasks, the development of expertise is slowed. Army doctrine echoes this concept, reminding readers that battle-focused units train selectively, and that units who attempt to master all tasks simultaneously generally fail to do so, achieving only average results across the board.²⁷ Which leads back to SF Principle Tasks.

As mentioned above, depending on which manual is consulted, there are as many as 14 core activities for Special Operations Forces. 1st SFC(A) lists nine: COIN,

Figure 01
 Many years and thousands of high quality, concentrated repetitions are required for the development of expertise. Soldiers who mature into experts before being assigned as instructors and leaders will be more effective in those positions and more likely to develop their subordinates and students into experts.

FID, UW, CT, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, special reconnaissance, security force assistance and information operations.²⁸ If the Army and Special Forces senior leaders are serious about building the expertise needed for SF Soldiers to succeed at STR operations in a denied area, a deliberate decision must be made to focus training on the core activities of UW (including sub-tasks of SR and DA), preparation of the environment, and IO and an equally deliberate decision needs to be made to jettison or mothball the rest. The benefits of such specialization can be easily observed in the 4th Battalions, Crisis Response Force companies and Special Mission Units.

This focus will permit the development of expertise by requiring every training event that SF Soldiers and ODAs undertake is focused on resistance, and teaching foreign forces as a force multiplier and leader in a denied or deep fire area.^{29,30} Chief Warrant Officer 5 David Holton, Commandant of the SWCS Warrant Officer Institute, expands on the need for focus: "Elements of resistance exist in both the competitive and armed conflict phases, and SF Soldiers' understanding may well determine failure or success. Our understanding of resistance must evolve at the same pace as the operational environment so our Special Forces can dominate in the competition phase and prevent a transition to armed conflict"

To achieve this, SWCS will need to focus courses on resistance-specific tasks, in a progressive and sequential manner. The Special Forces Qualification Course, Professional Military Education and advanced skills courses will provide opportunities for short-term, high-quality training repetitions on leadership, analysis, planning and ARSOF interoperability within a denied area.

Development of commissioned and enlisted leaders is critical to any unit's success and deliberate preparation of SF leaders for the specific challenges they will face in a denied area will be absolutely essential in UW or enabled resistance activities.³¹ Leadership in a denied area will be completely foreign to Army and SF leaders who were raised in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom theaters of war. There is no place in the deep fires area for ambiguity surrounding the commander's intent, micro management or risk-averse leadership. Leadership is not a skill learned through on-the-job training or by reading books. Like any profession, it must be practiced repeatedly to be mastered. Professional Military Education is the key institutional component to leader development, and should comprise a balance between academic instruction and high-quality training repetitions in the application of new and enduring concepts.³²

The National Defense Strategy recently called out the neglect of PME, stating that it has "stagnated" and is "focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity."³³ As an example, consider a SF Master Leaders Course graduate with 15 years of time in service. This senior NCO is likely a team sergeant, or will be soon, and is charged with being the master trainer, coach and mentor for an SFOD-A. Additionally, he is respon-

sible for training, advising, and leading a battalion of indigenous forces in a denied area.³⁴ But when in his PME was he provided high-quality education and concentrated repetitions preparing him for those feats? To equip him for these daunting tasks, he received a total of four months of PME (about 684 hours) over 15 years. This PME, which constitutes roughly 2 percent of his career and which is tens of thousands of hours short of what is required to achieve expertise, is grossly biased towards education, especially at the higher levels of the Senior Leaders Course and Master Leaders Course and only includes roughly 80 hours on resistance — all academic.

Offsetting this deficit will require balanced application of the Army Training Domains (Institutional, Operational and Self-Development), and considerable changes to the training and education outcomes of current and horizon courses. Enlisted PME courses at SWCS should be modified to work in concert with the WOI and the Special Forces Qualification Course and include intensive, successive and compounding education *and training* on resistance, leadership, planning (including Military Decision Making Process and Operational Art and Design) and Army Special Operations Forces integration. Courses should then transition to leadership training, focusing on decentralized platoon (Advanced Leaders Course), company (SLC/ Warrant Officer Technical & Tactical Certification Course) and battalion (MLC/Warrant Officer Advanced Course) combined arms offense, defense, and guerrilla tactics and integration of enablers. The existing course lengths, content and outcomes should be reevaluated through Critical Task Site Selection Boards to synchronize efforts. Courses should focus more on critical thinking, discussion and debate and choreographed failure, and less on rote memorization and rigid performance standards. Consideration should be given at CTSSBs for how leadership training for PME can be integrated into existing SWCS courses, to include PME, SFQC and advanced skills courses. Could SLC and WOTCC students lead multiple student ODAs through their Robin Sage lane to simulate sector command and area complex integration?

Operating in a denied environment will require SF leaders to effectively lead not only their ODAs, but other ARSOF elements and partner nation forces in dire circumstances with little to go off of besides end state and intent.³⁵ SF leaders, both enlisted and officer, need to be well-schooled in the theories, concepts and core activities of Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and other enablers in order to influence enemy formations, networks and populations to reduce their will to fight.³⁶ This concept could be called ARSOF I3 (Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence). These Career Management Fields contribute and enhance key capabilities that SF leaders at all levels need to understand so they can effectively request, utilize and command these forces when needed, or generate effects in their absence.³⁷

In addition to brick and mortar training and education, SWCS should develop a Resistance portal page with



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emerging doctrine, case studies, pre-packaged classes covering the fundamentals, components and planning considerations of UW and resistance, articles and news. Delivered through the use of historical case studies in an ODA/small group environment, these classes could provide the Regiment with the tools to conduct deliberate, self-directed study and ODA learning. SWCS should then dispatch purpose-built teams from the NCOA and WOI to rotate to each of the SF Groups, to illustrate the portal resources and provide leaders the most cutting edge doctrine, updates on resistance theories, training outcomes in the SFQC and PME and resources available for resistance training at the unit.

While SWCS and the institutional domain will play a crucial role in training new Green Berets and refreshing existing Green Berets on resistance during PME, the bulk of the burden for building resistance expertise will fall on SF Groups. Command-endorsed operational and training focus will be critical to sustaining and enhancing the skills learned in the institutional domain. Units can accomplish this by capitalizing on Joint Combined Exchange Training events, Combat Training Center rotations, Robin Sage, Ridge Runner and tailored operational deployments.

Joint Combined Exchange Training events are specifically designed to provide mission-essential task training for USSOF, particularly in the areas of FID and UW.³⁸ This has become watered down over the years, but still represents a great opportunity for building resistance expertise across the Regiment. Instead of the current 1:3 ratio of USSF:HN/PN, the ratio should be increased to 1:50 and instead of using near-

peer SOF units that are already proficient at shooting, moving, and communicating, the standard should be the least capable units available. JCETs should truly simulate the challenges of organizing, training and leading a company size element.

The CTCs have recently made a shift from COIN to Multi Domain and Large Scale Combat Operations and have revised their scenarios to include both conventional and hybrid threats. These changes are designed to allow units to fail miserably, reset and use the failure to fuel rapid adaptation to the threat.³⁹ While this long overdue change is a welcome and encouraging step in the right direction, the CTCs still need to better cater to ARSOF tasks. SF units training at the CTCs should not have to adjust their critical tasks and training objectives to the conventional units. Instead, they should both train together to meet collective training objectives. This should consist of a Brigade Combat Team charged with conducting LSCO and at least one SF Company.

At JRTC and NTC, conventional brigade, battalion, company and platoon command teams, focused on MDO, should be paired with SF leaders from the ODA, ODB, and battalion levels (junior Green Berets with platoon and company leadership; team leadership with battalion leadership, etc.). The ODB should shadow the BCT's combat support functions. The remaining SF Soldiers should be deployed in a simulated denied area and required to link up with indigenous forces, consisting of a battalion of opposition forces role players scattered throughout the battlefield. SF should be required to organize them, train them, and lead them in guerrilla

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Green Berets assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) conduct a raid during a routine training mission at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. A Command-endorsed, operational and training event focus is critical to sustaining and enhancing the skills learned in the institutional domain.
U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SGT. STEVEN LEWIS

battles synchronized with non-lethal messaging against the BCT in an attempt to disrupt rear area activities, delay planned attacks and prepare the population to resist after invasion. Mistakes made by USSF need to result in catastrophe and should be exploited as learning opportunities. Through the crucible of failure, USSF will identify their weakness, adapt to the dangers of LSCO and mitigate the pandemic of the Dunning-Kruger effect across the regiment.⁴⁰

Robin Sage and Ridger Runner are both specifically built to exercise SF tasks in UW and STR. As Robin Sage transitions to a four-start calendar, resources and time should be made available to allow Groups to send teams to “re-blue” on UW and resistance. Training at Robin Sage and Ridge Runner should include tasks ranging from pre-deployment sight survey to transition, with specific emphasis on developing the area command and having each team prepare their sectors to receive, stage, move onward and integrate conventional forces during a JFE. Additionally, ODAs should be hunted by conventional forces specializing in EW, ISR, military canine operations and espionage.

Finally, units can expand on UW and resistance skill sets by selecting and tailoring their operational deployments to incorporate skills specific to those activities. Special Forces have spent years “building partner capacity.” If the emphasis is to be expanding the competitive space through enabled resistance, commanders at the highest levels should refuse mis-

sions that do not build an organic capacity to operate in a denied area and engage in resistance activities. The schoolhouse can teach UW, but if Green Berets are being deployed to kick doors in the CT fight, they are going to build expertise in kicking doors, not UW.

Expertise cannot be developed overnight, but the combination of longer time on a team, enhanced training and education at SWCS, and more resistance-focused, realistic training and operations at the groups will pave the way to building expertise over the next 10-15 years. Providing enough ODA time and the resources to develop expertise will allow USSF Soldiers and leaders to reach a critical milestone in human ego development, marking a point of maturity at which the needs, desires and opinions of others begin to come into view.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & EXPERTISE

Human development plays a formative role in leader development. According to Dr. Susanne Cook-Greuter, developmental leadership theorist, there are nine levels of adult ego development: Impulsive, Opportunist, Diplomat, Expert, Achiever, Individualist, Strategist, Magician, and Ironist. For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be the first five. The Impulsive level could be called the survival level: “How will I get the bare essentials (for me)?” The next level, Opportunist, expands on this as selfish ambition becomes

Figure 02
As operators mature through the levels of human ego development, they become more willing to work with others, see the big picture, and enforce ethical standards.

LEVELS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT			
	DIPLOMAT	EXPERT	ACHIEVER
Self/Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused on self, and immediate peers • Allegiance is to family, tribe, group; us against the world • Peer pressure is driving force; everything is fun 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aware of others; immature introspection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aware of others and self; us/we/they, not just me • Respectful of differences between different cultures
Knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic knowledge on narrow range of subjects; uncomfortable when pushed outside knowledge limits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technically competent at their core occupational requirements • Has it all figured out; nobody can tell an expert anything • Highly susceptible to one-upmanship; wants the last word; may bully others with information; constantly comparing self to others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possesses a high level of proficiency and a desire to improve immediate surroundings and coach others to improve through use of expertise. • Tolerance for delay between action and effect;
Ethics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defined by the group; ethics are subject to change based on the group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High moral standards; tend to blame the system when things don't meet their expectations • Rationalize away things that don't fit their belief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unwavering, well established ethical beliefs • Intrigued by motivation of self and others • Self reliant, conscientious, and efficient
Problem Solving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hostile to outside perspectives • Capable of solving simple and repetitive problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of seeing alternatives and eager to apply their expertise to internal problems • Highly critical of things they don't understand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willing to work with others to improve their surroundings and achieve organizational goals • Interested in problem solving; drawn to root causes • Advocate of logic; convince others through logic
Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lives in the now; no past or future effects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused on results now; aware of but apathetic about past and future impacts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Considers past, present, and future impacts

Figure 02

the theme: “How can I get more for me?” Diplomats recognize others as being present, but only within the context of “What can I get out of this relationship?” and “How can I be accepted by this group?” At and below this level, problems are blamed on others, ethics are wavering, actions are driven by peer pressure (diplomats desperately desire to be liked), sharing and collaboration are hostilely avoided, and remorse only occurs when caught.⁴¹ Not exactly a recipe for successful leadership. Examined through a resistance lens, an SF Soldier at this level of human development is likely to look down on his counterparts and view their differences as inconveniences rather than assets.

Expert is the first level at which humans see differing opinions and views, become introspective and confident in their ethical stance and consider that bad things may be their fault.⁴² They can be highly critical of things they don't understand and instead of digging for the root cause or better understanding, they tend to blame the structure, tools and the system. Applied to the resistance domain, a Green Beret in the Expert level or below is likely to approach resistance partners with an attitude of superiority, discounting or openly subverting efforts to share and collaborate with joint, interagency and multinational partners and allies. Cultural idiosyncrasies are seen as annoyances and indigenous networks, understanding and unique capabilities are ignored because “they can't be as good at this as we are.” In short, people in the first four levels are only concerned about themselves. Expert is the ideal level for new team guys, and the absolute floor for instruc-

tors and team-level leadership (although not ideal).

At higher levels of human ego development, those who have developed expertise and a concept of self-identity move on to use their expertise to make their immediate surroundings better. As people continue to move up the ladder of human ego development, they increasingly try to apply their expertise to improve their organization, their local community and make the world a better place. The Achiever level is widely considered the target for adult human development and people at this level are very concerned with core reasons, motivations and causes and are no longer as susceptible to peer pressure.⁴³ In resistance, an SF Soldier who has attained the level of Achiever would be more likely to collaborate with partners, allies and interagency counterparts, conceding that others can bring valuable ideas to the table and that achieving maximum success on missions and objectives is unlikely without a cooperative effort. The Achiever level would therefore be an excellent trait for SF Green Berets at all levels, and a qualifying prerequisite for SF leadership and instructors.

It is important to note that there is no time line to human ego development and there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to its progress. There could be an 80-year-old diplomat or a 22-year-old achiever, but the critical constraint is the amount of time required to develop into an expert. When other tasks distract from the specific objectives of training or fail to provide focus, the result is not only a delay in the Soldiers' 10 year journey to expertise, but also their human ego development, counteracting efforts at

Figure 03
Longer tenures for operators and leaders gives more time to develop subject matter expertise. Expert leaders who are allowed to remain in position longer will be more empathetic, more open to collaboration, and less focused on short term results. Their expertise will trickle down and propagate across the force as their expert subordinates ascend into leadership and instructor positions.




Figure 03

leader development, ethical problem solving, and the accomplishment of strategic objectives. Expertise, in contrast, facilitates the development of the human ego, catapulting Green Berets into a perspective that focuses on the big picture and accomplishment of organizational goals. To be successful in a denied environment, SF needs effective and efficient leaders that have progressed to at least the level of achiever.

LEADERSHIP & EXPERTISE: PAYING IT FORWARD

In much the same way that expert instructors build expertise in their pupils, leaders who have achieved expert status incorporate their expertise into their style of leadership, resulting in a diffusion of knowledge to their subordinates.⁴⁴ Therefore, as mature Green Berets graduate into leadership positions of increased responsibility, it is important that first and foremost, leaders *are* expert Green Berets and afterwards *become* expert leaders. Their expertise will allow their focus to shift from themselves to others and they will no longer swayed by their desire for the acceptance of “the group.”

Leaders who have not reached the level of achiever or higher in their own human ego development will fail to empathize with their Soldiers, be driven by selfish ambition, stand on shaky moral foundations and will be worried more about being liked and achieving short-term effects (that benefit them) than doing the right thing—the antithesis of what leadership should be. Leaders may feign empathy or concern for others to win the praise of their leaders and dazzle their subordinates, but if they have never gotten past the level of expert, it is all showmanship with the intent of taking care of self. On the other hand, leaders at the higher levels of human ego development will be more comfortable trusting and delegating to their subordinates, sacrificing for the greater good and exercising empathy.

U.S. Special Forces deployed to sensitive areas around the world as SFOD-As, split teams or individual operators will need the trust and unfettered empowerment of their commanders to successfully operate on intent. These elite Soldiers will be isolated by physical distance and degraded communications, far removed from command elements and supporting infrastructure in the deep fires area where fast moving, complex problems must be dealt with at their level.⁴⁵ It takes time to build high quality leaders built on the foundation of expertise, much longer than the breakneck pace of modern promotions, but the long-term benefits far outweigh the short term costs.

Ideally, leaders should be selected after they have reached the level of Achiever, rather than selecting them in order to spur development, and it should be a natural progression for them to advance to a leadership position. It should never seem forced or early. Commanders and Sergeants Major should manage talent based on comprehensive analysis of what is best for the unit and the security of the nation, not how

AS MATURE GREEN BERETS GRADUATE INTO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS OF INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT FIRST AND FOREMOST, LEADERS ARE EXPERT GREEN BERETS AND AFTERWARDS BECOME EXPERT LEADERS.

fast a leader needs to be promoted to “stay competitive” with peers. This would also allow leaders to stay at levels where they are effective until they are ready to progress and it is in the unit’s best interests to do so. An interview with the group psychologist to ascertain development levels could be an effective tool for screening the efficacy of assigning Soldiers to positions of increased responsibility.

An important distinction should be made regarding levels of leadership. An expert at the team level is not necessarily an expert at any other level. An up or out promotion strategy replaces effective leaders, removing them from a position where they are impactful and possibly putting them into a position where they will not be. An expert team warrant might be ineffective as a company operations warrant. If he is forced off an ODA (where he is effective) and then forced to compete with his peers for a job he doesn’t want and doesn’t have the aptitude for, he will be as effective as possible, but he will never be efficient and will not develop expert subordinates.

Aside from allowing leaders to first become experts, perhaps the single most important thing that can be done to equip the Regiment with capable leaders for the resistance fight of tomorrow is extending tenures for effective Special Forces leaders. To be effective, Army leaders are charged with intimately knowing their subordinates two levels down, a feat rarely achieved in the revolving door leadership of today.⁴⁶ A typical company commander gets 12 months of command time; company Sergeant Major: 12-24 months; SFOD-A detachment commander: 18-24; and SFOD-A team sergeant: 24-36 months. Leaders in short-term billets will inevitably be focused on short-term results, and worse, do not have time to build relationships with their subordinates causing a bidirectional lack of trust. Without trust, subordinates will deceive, usurp and hide deficiencies from their superiors who will in turn demand redundant risk mitigation measures, implement rigid constraints, have little tolerance for mistakes and manipulate failures and shortfalls into overly optimistic reports of success — and the same phenomenon occurs at every successive layer of command. Like human ego development, some leaders might need more time to



Figure 04

prepare for the next level and some might need less, but all require enough time to learn their subordinates and their duties. Putting time lines on career progression inevitably pushes some leaders too fast, while holding others back. In short, leadership effectiveness is constrained by the amount of time leaders have in leadership position.

The solution is to freeze movement of effective leaders in their current positions. Leader tenures in SF should be extended to afford leaders the time to learn their jobs and their people, building trust and focusing on long term coaching and mentoring. Recommended minimum tenures would include: Company commander: 24 months; company Sergeant Major: 36 months; SFOD-A detachment commander: 36 months; SFOD-A assistant detachment commander: 60 months; and SFOD-A team sergeant: 60 months. Leaders who are effective can be moved to adjacent units, much like a top performing squad leader of the Infantry is moved to the worst squad, disseminating his experience and professionalism across the unit to improve collective lethality and readiness.

As a final note on leadership, investment in the development of expertise in pursuit of a strategic pivot to resistance warfare will require strong command emphasis. As an example, in 2014, in the midst of two wars and open hostilities on the African continent, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that preventing sexual harassment and assault was the military's number one priority.⁴⁷ Training, facilities and resources have been shoveled into SHARP training ever since — as the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa remain as competing priorities. The command emphasis is what

made the leaps and bounds of the SHARP program possible in the midst of a three front war on terror. That same level of command emphasis will be needed to make the development of resistance expertise possible.

CONCLUSION


In the emerging global operating environment, SF teams will continue to be deployed early and often to uncertain and austere locations to conduct operations with geopolitical implications. SF Soldiers will need to be both masters of technology and able to operate effectively in its absence. The level of air support, logistics and freedom of maneuver which have become the status quo in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be expected in horizon competition and conflict. In the deep fires area of tomorrow's engagement area, every aspect of U.S. operations will be contested.

To succeed in this denied environment, education must be balanced with high quality training focused on denied area operations and company and battalion level tactics and leadership. Short ODA stints and a lack of focus preclude the efficient development of expertise, which is a prerequisite for both instruction and leadership. Lack of expertise slows the human ego development of SF operators, limiting collaboration, perspective, and effectiveness. Furthermore, truncated tenures deny leaders at every level the opportunity to master their positional responsibilities and develop a professional relationship with every Soldier in their charge two levels down, virtually eliminating mentorship and encouraging a focus on short-term results.

Special Forces Soldiers need longer tenures and

Figure 03
Operators need time and deliberate development to mature through the levels of human ego development.

concentrated training repetitions to accrue experience and develop psychologically to the level (Achiever) which they can effectively lead and mentor at the unit or teach at SWCS. Units need to focus training on resistance through tough, realistic training on JCETs, Robin Sage, CTCs and on operational deployments with robust top cover from commanders at all levels who support and endorse a reprioritization of training and resources. Effective leaders should be rewarded for their acumen with longer and subsequent leadership duties, with enough time at each assignment to build mastery of their positional responsibilities and develop trust and relationships with their subordinates.

Every conflict is unique. No two insurgencies or partisan groups of yesterday, today, or tomorrow have been the same — and yet, they succeed and fail in spite of their similarities and differences. The complexities which exist now and those which are on the horizon will continue to require extensive use of Special Forces. When they are called upon, there will be no time to prepare them. The force needs to ready itself now by building mature, well developed SF leaders who are truly experts in every art and artifice of war. 

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CIVIL AFFAIRS IN A RESISTANCE ENVIRONMENT

BY MAJOR KANE MANSIR AND MR. BEN GRUMBACH

According to the Resistance Operating Concept, the population is the primary actor in a resistance environment. Civil Affairs elements are the “commander’s tool of choice” to engage the population. Further, collaboration between civic organizations, government entities and the larger public is pivotal to the success of any resistance operation. Resilience of the population is paramount when society finds itself struggling to withstand external pressures or influence.⁰¹

U.S. Army Civil Affairs is the purpose built asset that interfaces and engages the civil component of the operational landscape (see Figure 01). Due to their unique knowledge, skills and attributes, Civil Affairs capabilities are at the forefront of any resistance operation. The ability to bolster or degrade the resilience of the population translates directly into supporting or defeating a resistance. Civil Affairs is successful in a resistance environment due to two main themes; *CA Teams are 1) overt and 2) accessible.* Their ability to gain significant inroads to all areas of the civil component through a hyper-communicative and overt approach is unparalleled throughout the Army. At first glance this concept may seem to counter intuitive to some of the ARSOF activities; however,

Civil Affairs has made deep inroads to support or defeat a resistance over the past decade. The following article lays out how any CA element can support of defeat or resistance in broad terms through a counterinsurgency, foreign internal and unconventional warfare crosswalk. Further, it briefly lays out how CA is closely nested with Multi-Domain Operations and some larger Army concepts such as Cyber. Finally, several real-world examples will show the impact CA elements are making throughout the ARSOF enterprise.

The role of CA is to understand, engage and influence unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions, conduct military governance operations, enable civil military operations and provide civil consider-

ations expertise through the planning and execution of CAO. This role, founded in policy, directive, and joint doctrine, clearly depicts the reason why the CA Branch was established and the unique contributions it provides to the Army and the Department of Defense. Civil Affairs forces execute CA core competencies and functions. The CA branch provides three core competencies nested within CAO. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information and processes) into executable capabilities to achieve the desired effects. They may execute competencies prior to, simultaneously with or in the absence of other military operations across the range of military operations and all levels of war.⁰²

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 highlights the “continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we com-

01
A U.S. Army Civil Affairs Soldier and Philippine partner forces engage with local community members to discuss family survival and evacuation plans for natural disasters in Barangay Popolon, Palayan City, Philippines. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SPC MITCHELL KNAUS




Figure 02 Civil Affairs Core Competencies and Functions (FM 3-57, 1-3)

pete short of armed conflict.”⁰³ The U.S. Army employs CA forces throughout competition, armed conflict and return to competition continuum during joint, interorganizational and multinational operations that include military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, crisis response, limited contingency operations, operations in dense urban environments, defense support to stabilization and large scale ground combat operations. Under mission command authority, and with particular regard to the mission, human factors and other requirements, CA forces operate in small teams, task-organized units or multi-stakeholder organizations that include interorganizational partners. Fully integrated at echelon, future

CA elements must provide Army and joint commanders with the capability to understand, anticipate, shape and exploit the changing conditions in the human geography (see Figure 03, page 22) through civil knowledge integration, to include processed and evaluated civil information and through the development and employment of local, regional and transregional civil (human) networks.⁰⁴

It is widely known that the Army has many varying definitions of components and approaches to resistance. Mr. David H. Ucko writes in his paper titled “Resistance and the Future of Insurgency: Trends and Challenges” that insurgent strategy is evolving. Although states retain force on force superiority, insurgent entities are undertaking

different strategies of resistance. These varying approaches of resistance are leaving the military of these states unable to address the insurgent activity.⁰⁵ Major General Kurt L. Sonntag recently gave his insight on how ARSOF formations are postured to address resistance and the profession of resistance. Although training, definitions and formations will continue to evolve to shape the profession of resistance, ARSOF is, and will be, conducting operations to support or defeat a resistance.

To support or defeat a resistance Civil Affairs will remain focused on the civil component. Civil Affairs Operations will be executed through the lenses of counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense and unconventional warfare. Oftentimes, the on-ground reality of operations makes it difficult to discern whether the operation is a COIN, FID or UW; however, authorities and funding help to bring clarity to this complexity. In a UW environment CAO support is continuous and cyclical (Figure 04, page 23); it represents the relationship between civil strengths and civil vulnerabilities as they pertain to civil instability for the current regime, civil opportunities for the resistance, and stability for a new government. The left side depicts CAO and corresponding resistance actions that increase the de-legitimization of the current regime, through degradation of civil strengths with the population, and attacking civil vulnerabilities to provide legitimacy opportunities for the resistance.

Civil Affairs forces support UW through the execution of CAO, which is critical to the planning and execution of UW campaigns. When integrated throughout all phases of UW planning and execution, CA forces provide the




Figure 01 FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Logic Chart Excerpt

capability to analyze the civil component's strengths and vulnerabilities as applicable to both the existing regime and to the resistance movement. CAO also provide a comprehensive approach toward assisting the resistance in legitimacy and transitional governance, from the initial resistance movement through transition, to an emergent stable government. Also, CA forces are able to assist in developing broader CMO efforts in support of the resistance. CA forces are typically sought for their unique capabilities with regards to identifying the underlying causes of instability, which can then be mitigated in order to create a stable environment. This same capability, however, can be utilized by the resistance to identify strengths and bonds of the existing regime, which they can then work to degrade into vulnerabilities, resulting in its continued de-legitimization. This in turn creates legitimacy opportunities for the movement. Separately, within their sphere of control and influence, the resistance can consolidate legitimacy and initial governance by utilizing CA assessments, strengthening civil vulnerabilities and cementing a bond with the greater population. Methods to realign the legitimacy of power should consider the timeliness required to help facilitate restoration of essential services and strengthen the bonds between the population and the resistance movement or new government upon the collapse of the old regime.⁰⁶

Figure 05, page 24, is a macro-level example of major tasks a CA team would plan and execute in support of UW operations. Oftentimes, CA is thought to only interface with certain UW actors or in certain geographical areas within the context of UW. Simply put, that is a myopic view of the capability that Civil Affairs brings to bear. In fact, the CA tasks would be closely planned and executed with the other ARSOF team members; therefore, ensuring the ARSOF Cross Functional Team is operating at its maximum potential.

Through Support to Civil Administration, CA forces can support a "shadow government or government-in-exile" to plan for and administer civil government in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare and public education and information. SCA is the systematic application of specialized skills for assessing and advising on the development of stability and governance. When conducting Civil Reconnaissance and Civil Engagement to develop civil knowledge, CA forces assigned to special operations CA formations collaborate with CA military government specialists within United States Army Reserve CA formations to formulate governance and stability lines of effort for the resistance. The resistance gains legitimacy and transitional governance by addressing grievances and providing essential services to create a civil strength or bond with the

population. As the regime becomes severely degraded or collapses, CA will assist with addressing the remaining civil vulnerabilities to create stability for the emergent government, and inclusively, across the indigenous population.⁰⁷

In FID, CAO facilitate the integration of U.S. military support into the overall internal defense and development programs of the supported nation. Within the FID framework and functional areas associated with joint strategic capabilities planning, CA forces:

- Perform specific planning tasks in support of the Services and combatant commands.
- Execute targeted Civil Reconnaissance to support IDAD framework goals.
- Identify and address human factors of the civil space.
- Coordinate internally and with the host nation and other unified action partners.

CAO are vital to theater FID operations in areas from planning to execution. It is a valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort. CAO also support the reconstitution of viable and competent civil infrastructure in the operational areas that were previously ungoverned, undergoverned, or in the direct control of threat forces or shadow govern-




Figure 03 Civil Affairs Whitepaper 2025 and Beyond (Components of the Solution)




Figure 04 Civil Affairs Operations in Unconventional Warfare

ments. Through CAO, CA forces assist the government by executing SCA. The CA forces supporting FID range from staffs to Civil Affairs Teams. Essential tasks performed may include:

- Incorporating CAO in all activities related to FID (from planning to execution).
- Reviewing and supporting HN internal defense and development goals.
- Ensuring HN public support, from local to national levels.
- Close coordination with UAPs to ensure HN agencies are at the forefront of all operations.
- Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Advocating HN self-sufficiency. (This must be the primary goal of CAO in support of FID).⁰⁸

Figure 06, page 25, is an ideological representation of how Civil Affairs can directly support any specified mission in the resistance environment. Additionally, they can support or defeat a resistance through Civil Reconnaissance

(tactical mission task), Civil Engagement (tactical mission task), and Civil Information Management (at echelon), Civil Affairs elements translate these skills into tangible capabilities for commanders in a resistance environment. Civil Affairs can take on any of the roles listed in Figure 05 irrespective of the specified resistance mission (UW, FID or COIN) to achieve mission accomplishment. Further, Civil Affairs can operate in a permissive, semi-permissive or denied environments while executing *capabilities* such as engaging unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions.

The mission sets and resistance environment across Africa are widely complex. The operational setting in Kenya is vastly different from that in Nigeria; ball down the field one first down at a time and making positive mission strides with each deployment. The 91st Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th CA BDE(Special Operations)(Airborne) is an Africa Command-focused battalion that lives and breathes the challenges existent across that mission set. They are highly trained


in all aspects of mission planning, survival, language, governance, culture and many others that make them highly successful in this extremely austere landscape. A Special Operations Civil Affairs Company Commander assigned to the 91st CA Bn., just redeployed his company from a tough deployment and has on-ground resistance insight. During a recent interview, Major “S” highlighted that in proxy conflicts and competition there is greater opportunity for CA involvement. For example, Boko Haram maintains a monopoly on coercive violence in many of the areas within Nigeria; civilians have to decide whether to capitulate or resist.

The CA teams have seen many examples of the latter and the teams have worked with partner governments and military forces to support them. This is a long-term effort that presents many challenges; it requires CA teams that possess an innate understanding of authorities and how to best employ Civil Affairs Support Activities. In Cameroon, the government dug hundreds of miles of trenches to protect populations on the Nigerian border and partnered with civilian groups called vigilance committees that would guard crossings (the extensive trenching can be seen on Google Earth around the town of Kolofata, Cameroon). The U.S. CA team provided material support to the vigilance committees and helped the Cameroonian forces tap their potential as an early warning network. Working with this kind of resistance or militia group certainly indicates a localized conflict that possesses numerous other implications of long-term resistance efforts. However, the teams were able to navigate those challenges and support indigenous resilience and resistance with minimal investment. In cases where the insurgent opponent is state-sponsored, more resources would be required to counter their influence.⁰⁹

Similarly, operations in Europe are also highly complex but in a much different way when compared to Africa. The CA Soldiers in the 92nd, CA Bn., 95th CA Brigade (SO)(A) are trained to the same high standard as mentioned above, but

ACCORDING TO THE RESISTANCE OPERATING CONCEPT, THE POPULATION IS THE PRIMARY ACTOR IN A RESISTANCE SITUATION. CIVIL AFFAIRS IS “THE COMMANDER’S TOOL OF CHOICE” TO ENGAGE THE POPULATION.

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN A RESISTANCE ENVIRONMENT



are uniquely postured to address the ever-changing landscape of the EUCOM theater. CPT “B”, a team leader from the 92nd CA Bn., recently re-deployed from Lithuania from his second rotation to a country that lives a *culture of resistance* as a way of life. His teams two primary tasks were to identify and build the partner resistance capabilities throughout the region. The team utilized CR and CE to identify human and physical infrastructure for resistance. These missions were directly tied to Lithuania’s capability to conduct crisis response (conflict). By leveraging civil society groups CPT B and his team were able to identify key influencers and relationships. These operations were anything but unilateral; the team was partnered closely with the Lithuanian Special Forces and ultimately were able to integrate civic capabilities into exercises much beyond basic NATO Civil Military Cooperation activities. CPT B’s rotation is an extremely positive example of a USSOF cross functional team . They partnered closely with other USSOF entities and in many cases were able to access areas of Lithuania that other US-SOF partners were not. They were able to accomplish this by joint missions, daily interaction, and methodical synchronization with other SOF elements. The CA

team also made significant contributions to developing institutional viscosity within physical, infrastructure and key human terrain networks that can be leveraged in future contingency operations. According to TC 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, to support resistance activities, a complex area must include a security system, guerrilla bases, communications, logistics, medical facilities and a series of networks capable of moving personnel and supplies. The area may consist of friendly villages or towns under guerrilla military or political control.¹⁰ Capt. B and his team proved that Civil Affairs is an extremely valuable member of the ARSOF CFT.¹¹

As the *profession of resistance* continues to be codified throughout USAJFK-SWCS, examples are plentiful throughout the force from which to emulate. SFC K, a team sergeant from the 92nd CA Bn., is a great example of an NCO who has become a regional resistance expert based on his mental acumen and a number of repeated deployments to the EUCOM AOR. Additionally, he was selected to attend a pilot course at the Naval Postgraduate School) called the Master UW Practitioners Course. Following that he was able to sync resources at the CORE lab (Common Operating Research Environment) from

NPS and work on a variety of organizational thickening of several internal Estonian networks that culminated in U.S. SOF CA spearheading (along with other ARSOF cross functional teams in the region) the creation, advisement and seminar on an Estonian State, Resistance Communications Center that garnered significant attention from the President of Estonia’s personal staff. This is just one example of the professionals that are already existent in the CA formations. He has personally briefed Commander, USSOCOM and other general officers on resistance throughout the EUCOM region and continues to be invested in Civil Affairs’ resistance profession.¹²

The concept of a resistance is not new but the conditions in which they are undertaken are evolving and changing. As highlighted above, our enemies will continue to employ new stratagems to achieve their objectives; Civil Affairs must be ready to counter these. Cyberspace continues to influence the operational environment; moreover, ARSOF missions are, and will continue to be, affected by cyberspace. The U.S. Army Concept for Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare¹³ specifically highlights the ability to employ cyberspace, EW and SMO capabilities as an integrated system,





Figure 06 Civil Affairs crosswalk in a resistance context

acting as a force multiplier, improves the commander's ability to achieve desired operational effects. Cyberspace systems provide significant points of presence on the battlefield, and can be used as delivery platforms for precision engagements.¹⁴ Civil Affairs Teams of the future could be called upon to exclusively engage the civil component digitally. Although authorities and permissions are the precursor that drives these, Civil Affairs Operations have to be more than just face to face communication. In a UW context, a CA Team could engage a government in exile through social media due to the nature of the denied area. Other science and technology is currently available to aide CA teams in civil reconnaissance such as throwable, commercial off the shelf drones. These pieces of equipment are capable of short duration flights and can digitally "stitch" several city blocks together. Although this capability should

not be exclusive to only Civil Affairs, it has clear applicability. A CAT could use these renderings to provide updated assessments and input into civil vulnerabilities, which would bring clarity to the common operating picture.

Civil Affairs remains the tool of choice to engage the civil component of the OE. Through its core competencies, CA is doctrinally built to address the myriad of challenges existent in resistance environment. Whether executing missions in a FID, COIN or UW context, Civil Affairs can expertly navigate the human geography to produce results for commanders. The battlefield of the future in competition, armed conflict, and return to competition is constantly shifting; Civil Affairs will continue to be an essential component in the resistance landscape by ensuring the ARSOF enterprise's success remains in current and future operating environments in which the population is an essential component. 

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Ben Grumbach is a Training Specialist for the Civil Affairs Training Development Division, CA Directorate at USAJFKSWCS. He served 20 years on active duty in the Field Artillery and Civil Affairs regiments, including tours in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. His positions included CA Team Sergeant, CA Instructor and SOF Advanced Skills Instructor. He holds a masters in Applied Arts and Sciences and a bachelors in Emergency and Disaster Management.

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01

TIES THAT BIND

Relationship building through Joint Combined Exchange Training in the Indo-Pacific Region.

BY CAPTAIN MICHAEL MANZANO

“China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific to their advantage. While some view China’s actions in the East and South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as coordinated, methodical and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order.”

— Admiral Harry Harris, Former Commander,
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 15, 2018

01

A Special Forces Soldier from 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) conducts small unit tactics training with Thai partner forces during a Joint Combined Exchange Training exercise in Thailand.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY JASON C. GAMBARELLA

For nearly half a century United States Army Special Forces units have conducted Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises with allied military forces across the globe. JCETs provide participating units with valuable opportunities to exchange military tactics, techniques and procedures, develop greater regional expertise and strengthen both professional and personal relationships in ways stateside combat training centers cannot replicate. In today’s complex, global environment the relationships U.S. Special Forces and their counterparts build during these JCETs are more important than ever. Our nation’s adversaries, most notably China, are actively working to expand their influence all over the world; threatening U.S. national security. The Indo-Pacific region has become the hub for this activity, resulting in a regional competition for partners and allies. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) leads U.S efforts in this competition for allies by maximizing the benefits JCETs can provide. In the summer of 2018, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) executed a series of JCETs throughout the Indo-Pacific, demonstrating the vital role U.S. Special Forces units can play in ensuring the United States remains the partner of choice for countries in the region.

In October 2017, President Xi made his vision for China clear at China’s 19th Party Congress. China is to develop a world-class military and become the “global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence.”⁰² Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis directly addressed the dangers this vision poses to the U.S. and the global community in the 2018 *U.S. National Defense Strategy*. The document declared China and Russia’s actions are creating a dangerous level of “inter-state strategic competition,” threatening the current international order. The threat is so severe, it overtakes terrorism as the “primary concern in U.S. national security.”⁰³ In outlining challenges the U.S. is currently facing, Mattis also pointed out potential solutions. The core of these solutions lies in our nation’s ability to build alliances to counter a global threat. “Our strength and integrated actions with allies,”⁰⁴ he continued, “will demonstrate our commitment to deterring aggression.” With extensive foreign language training and cultural expertise, U.S. Special Forces remains uniquely equipped to carry out those integrated actions with our nation’s allies.

The JCETs 2nd Bn., 1 SFG (A) executed demonstrated the full extent of Special Forces’ capabilities to combat the threat of Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific. JCETs in Mongolia, Thailand, and Malaysia showcased Special Forces’ cultural and language skill sets while providing U.S. Soldiers unparalleled training opportunities. On the grounds where Genghis Khan once launched a campaign that con-

quered more than half the world, U.S. and Mongolian Special Forces Soldiers spent a month training in the country's famous snow-covered steppes. While in the field, SF Operational Detachment – Alpha members and Mongolian Soldiers exchanged techniques in small unit tactics, survival skills and combat casualty care. In their sleeping quarters, Soldiers from both units shared their language, music, food and even watched the 2018 NBA finals together. Mongolia's strategic geographic location sandwiched between China and Russia makes it the center of a battle for influence between its neighboring countries and the United States. But Mongolia's foreign policy, driven by its desire to find a suitable "third neighbor" to balance China and Russia, has resulted in a significant increase in U.S. influence over the past several decades. U.S. Special Forces detachments have been at the forefront of that influence for years through JCET deployments. The result has been a persistent U.S. presence in the country built on personal relationships, mutual trust and shared security concerns over their geographic neighbors.

As Special Forces detachments traveled south from Mongolia to Malaysia and Thailand, the influence U.S. forces built in the region was clearly apparent. Senior ranking Commandos from the Malaysian Grup Gerak Khas spoke fondly of the relationships they built with American generals while conducting JCETs together many years prior. These Malaysian officers and NCOs, who now work to schedule JCETs, recounted their positive experiences and invited 1st SFG (A) units back to their country to conduct marksmanship training, multi-language mission planning and airborne operations with the next generation of GGK Soldiers. The same was true in Thailand, where decades of partnership between Thai and U.S. forces resulted in invaluable region specific jungle and pack animal training for U.S. Soldiers. The shared hardships in training and eagerness for U.S. Soldiers to speak to partners forces in their native language enhanced our capabilities and built trust with grateful allies. As a result, the relationships both units' commanders started on JCETs many years ago persists today.

Every SFOD-A in Co. C returned to the United States with the same message from their partner force: 'Come back and let's continue to build these friendships.' The countries recognize that our partnerships are not transactional exchanges between two governments but rather deeply personal relationships, rooted in shared hardships and demonstrated commitment to one another's interests. As China continues to build their military and encroaches on countries in the region, U.S. Special Forces Soldiers are sharing tents with the future military and political leaders of Mongolia, Thailand and Malaysia. Leaders who will one day become defense ministers, generals and political

THE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PARTNERSHIPS ARE NOT TRANSACTIONAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS BUT RATHER DEEPLY PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, ROOTED IN SHARED HARDSHIPS AND DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO ONE ANOTHER'S INTERESTS.

representatives. These leaders will craft foreign policy and determine which nations will provide them the most benefit as partners. There is no doubt our nation's persistent involvement in these countries through the JCET program helps retain our partnerships. The value in conducting JCETs in the Indo-Pacific region extends far beyond the immediate tactical benefits. They demonstrate our commitment to the region while simultaneously countering China's own efforts to do the same.

China will not stop its quest to become a global leader in military strength and international influence. In an address to the Senate Armed Forces Committee Admiral Harris acutely pointed out that what began in the Indo-Pacific is rapidly expanding into Central Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South America and Europe.⁰⁵ The U.S. knows it cannot prevent China from working towards President Xi's vision. But what the United States can continue to do is develop meaningful relationships with our allies and partners through JCETs and similar unit exchanges. The military, and Special Forces in particular, remains a crucial element of national power that can be employed to counter China's global influence. 1st SFG (A) understands that a JCET's value extends far beyond a unit's enhanced tactical capabilities and improved foreign language proficiency. Today, as a result of JCETs, Commandos in Mongolia, Malaysia, Thailand and so many other countries look at the U.S. and see more than a flag, new equipment or potential monetary investment. They see partners and friends who will stand by their side as they climb steep terrain in the snow; patrol jungles in the brutal summer heat; and swim for miles in oceans with heavy equipment. There is a reason why every country 2/1 SFG (A) traveled to in the summer of 2018 requested future engagements. A half century of JCETs has demonstrated to our allies the value we bring to their countries and the sincerity of our partnerships. Now, more than ever, these partnerships remain vital for our country's ability to maintain influence in a region China seeks to dominate. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES **01.** Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Opening Statement, ADM Harry Harris | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command | March 20, 2018. **02.** iBid. **03.** 2018 United States National Defense Strategy, page 1. **04.** 2018 United States National Defense Strategy, page 5. **05.** iBid, 01.

ELITE WARRIORS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FROM AROUND THE WORLD

Special Operations Forces have proliferated and further evolved in development and employment since 2001. Ruslan Pukhov and Christopher Marsh compiled a worthwhile edited volume on Special Operations Forces from 14 nations of interest to today's operators, analysts and strategists. Ruslan Pukhov is a respected author on Russian military activities including military reform efforts in Russia as well as Russian operations in the Ukraine and Syria. Dr. Christopher Marsh is a subject matter expert on Special Operations and is a professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Presented in an encyclopedia-like format and written in a concise and easy to read style, *Elite Warriors* provides details and analysis of SOF capabilities in the context of contemporary threats and political developments.

Coverage of Russian *Spetsnaz* provides an insider look into the rebuilding of Russian Special Operations Forces. Going beyond mere organization, training and equipment, Alexey Ramm and Alexey Nikolsky provided two chapters that explain how Makarov initiated development of an unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency capability similar to U.S. Army Green Berets, including the cultural and philosophical challenges associated with that effort. These chapters provide details of how organizational cultures, training and equipping evolved throughout the reorganization of Russian SOF and creation of the newer Special Operations Command, both before and after the replacement of Serdyukov by Shoigu. The authors also offer insights into how Special Operations Forces were employed in Chetchnya, Syria and the Ukraine.

Anton Lavrov, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided a refreshingly candid and balanced treatment of Ukrainian *Spetsnaz*. Tracing the evolution of Ukrainian *Spetsnaz* from the early 1990s, Lavrov bluntly outlined the failed attempts to reform the *Spetsnaz* after Ukrainian independence. Fairly, but critically, Lavrov also highlighted the challenges of the Ukrainian government to fund reformation efforts while applauding the combat record of specific *Spetsnaz* units in Eastern Ukraine for their dogged

performance against Russian-backed separatists in battles at Kramatorsk and Donesk airport.


Individual authors also contributed to critical reviews of special operations forces from 12 other nations: France, Poland, Germany, Italy, Iran, Israel, Jordan Turkey, China, Singapore, Algeria and Colombia. Each country received a


chapter in this edited volume. Historical and political background provide important context that sets the stage for the assessment of how forces evolved and how they are or may be employed. A few common themes emerge that resonate across chapters.

Woven throughout the volume are lessons about how different countries use similar terms with dramatically different meanings; terms like company, detachment, and group may hold very different connotations from the comparable U.S. taxonomy. Aside from such disparities, common mission sets arise in how SOF are employed. From the common orientations of counterterrorism, reconnaissance, and precision direct action missions, other SOF, like the Ukrainian *Spetsnaz* focused on countering organized crime prior to the current conflict.

Development, evolution and reforms of SOF have followed similar paths in the context of the respective environments. While funding, training and experience levels vary, most nations diligently work to learn from the experience of others. Performance of U.S. SOF during Operation Desert Storm and more contemporary operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as more localized experiences, continue to influence SOF development worldwide.

Each country prioritizes mission focus and training based on their respective strategies and their perceived threats. For allies and adversaries alike, understanding how

SOF in these key nations evolved will help analysts and operators alike understand how these nations view their respective security environments. This pragmatic volume provides a candid and useful perspective on SOF forces important to the United States. It is a valuable read for operators, analysts, and planners interested in the capabilities of these key U.S. allies and adversaries. 



BOOK DETAILS

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IN MEMORY

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