How do special operations forces (SOF) plan operations against threats delineated in the National Security Strategy that transcend the geographic and legal boundaries imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Unified Command Plan? The Department of Defense (DoD) requires, but does not have, an entity that connects, integrates, and globally synchronizes irregular warfare across combatant commands and the interagency. The solution to fulfilling that requirement is to create an entity that can integrate and leverage all the instruments of national power, domestically within the U.S. and through international allies and partners throughout all phases of the conflict continuum.
In November 2021, the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) established a transregional irregular warfare task force to address gaps and seams being exploited by adversaries of the United States. Since its inception, this task force has garnered perspectives on planning and coordinating globally integrated irregular warfare. Since 2021, it has been assessed by the irregular warfare task force planners that conventional planning tools U.S. leaders use are rigid and not optimal in some problem sets. The DoD emphasizes traditional planning over the ingenuity, critical thinking, and flexibility required to compete in the irregular warfare space. Novel solutions, integration of agencies outside of the military, leveraging multinational partners, and non-traditional planning methods employed in new ways are critical in preparing and synchronizing transregional irregular warfare effects.
Task force planners have observed the joint planning process and military decision-making process as stand-alone methods which are suboptimal to address the complexities of transregional irregular warfare. The planning methodologies do not account for the complexity of spatial, temporal, and human variables when they are overlaid by threat streams that cross multiple combatant commands. In the same vein that T.E. Lawrence observed elements in his surrounding that were constants in his planning considerations, the authors suggest the following algebraic equation as a start point to conceptualize known variables that can be rapidly iterated on in a complex environment:
(M)(CIAcAu)(A+P)4= properly planned irregular warfare operation
Figure 1: This graphic represents a simplified rendition of the algebraic expression meant to depict iterative planning considerations for irregular warfare operations.02
Inputs for the variables can be derived from multiple sources, and no one variable has absolute primacy. For example, a capability or authority can be sourced from the interagency, an intergovernmental organization, a commercial partner, or an ally. Below is the context of the variables as the planners have applied them against problem sets.
03
M = MAPPING RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS: This should be the first variable to be addressed to accurately plan. Alternative compensatory control measures, special access programs, and other controlled access programs (the intelligence community variant of special access programs) exacerbate the problem of finding equities that can contribute to, or are already contributing to, a problem set. If not mapped completely, planners and executors may spend years on an initiative only to find an adjacent organization rendered their work redundant. To conduct transregional irregular warfare effectively, a planner needs to map stakeholders (conducting a form of link and nodal analysis) across capability developers (MIT Lincoln Labs, Sandia National Labs, the U.S. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), intelligence agencies, those that can generate access (special mission units or departments within the intelligence community), authority holders (combatant commanders, or chiefs of station), and allies and partners, while continuously updating this map. This is also an early step to identify risk-holders, discussed below.
C = CAPABILITY: An agent (person) or physical device(s) that affects the targeted system in the desired way. As an example, think of a physical implement that can degrade a SCADA system’s ability to monitor industrial equipment.04 A capability can be derived from an on-hand solution, produced from the Defense Industrial Base, or through partnerships with academia. Capabilities have a close relationship with the Available or Possible expression, as some capabilities are developed for a specific operation, activity, or investment. Scientists and researchers may focus efforts on a capability that functions on the edge of what physics permits (possible).
I = INTELLIGENCE: Refers to the most appropriate collection capabilities, production methods, details, and disciplines (e.g. human intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source intelligence, measures and signature intelligence, etc.), in which each contributes to target identification and decomposition, link and nodal analysis, and efficacy of measures of performance or measures of effectiveness. These outputs are facilitated through a multi-layered approach in coordination with intelligence community and international partners.
Ac =ACCESS: What kind of access is needed? Physical (on the ‘X’), proximal (one terrain feature away but within range of the selected capability), or virtual (in cyberspace parlance this is access to the logical layer, available to anyone around the world predicated upon technical acumen and a network that is not air-gapped). Any type of access can be achieved by working by, with, and through partners or an indigenous force. Ultimately, understanding what kind of access is needed to achieve the desired effect should help answer who, or what is the optimal equity (special mission unit, inter agency, ally or partner) to facilitate the intelligence collection process or finish option (e.g. leveraging the Office of Foreign Assets Control to emplace economic sanctions against a State-Owned Enterprise, or working with the National Security Agency to develop access to a threat actor’s cyber infrastructure). Access is traditionally predicated upon placement because placement establishes the existence of and reason for being at a particular location relative to a system or geographic location. Access is the subsequent step, involving the ability to interact with, retrieve, or use the placed item or resource in question. Without placement, access customarily has no starting point.
Au = AUTHORITIES: Whose authorities (granted by Constitutional and Congressional frameworks and delegated to Combatant Commanders), and permissions (delegated from combatant commanders to subsequent commanders to approve or disapprove an action) are required to execute this operation? Authorities typically revolve around a particular program or aspect of warfare which varies by maturity across combatant commands. As an example, U.S. Central Command’s program surrounding space control is the most mature and advanced of any other combatant command because of the last 20 years of the Global War on Terror. An authority holder assumes a portion of risk. However, in transregional problems, there are often multiple entities assuming risk in different geographic regions. This assumption of risk becomes complicated when the operational or tactical risk holder is not the strategic risk holder.
As a realistic fictitious example, if there is an operation in South America against Russian private military companies, the strategic risk holder is the commander of the U.S. European Command as the commander retains primacy when countering Russia.
05 The operational/tactical risk holder is the commander of the U.S. Southern Command. Concurrence from both is required to conduct this operation. This challenge is further exacerbated depending on the type of effect desired. If U.S. Cyber Command is delivering a payload to achieve an effect, then the operation needs their consent as well. In this example, the operation needs the approval of three combatant commanders, the concurrence of three different staffs with different levels of targeting expertise, and three different legal offices with varying frames of reference. If transregional irregular warfare is to move at the speed of war, there needs to be a faster way to gain approvals and synchronize operations. In the interim, the below equation can assist in optimizing the operations process when coupled with accounting for
(M)(CIAcAu):
(A+P)4= ([Access + Placement] × [Authorities + Permissions] × of [Allies + Partners] predicated on [Availability + Possible])
Two of the [A+Ps] seem to mirror the initial ‘AA’ in the CIAA expression. However, the ‘CIAA’ portion of the expression is typically introspective, in that it looks for solutions that are organic to the DoD and wider U.S. government to engage in irregular warfare tasks. The key here is applying the mapping function of the variables within the polynomial against
(A+P)4 to understand what our allies and partners can develop and facilitate. The virtual or physical, access and placement of our allies and partners is different from that of the U.S. The access and placement of partners represent another front to create dilemmas and facilitates a symbiotic relationship with US capabilities when competing against a common adversary. Partners and allies have authorities and permissions, especially in the information dimension and materiel acquisition timeline that are more efficient for irregular warfare tasks (function at the speed of relevance) when compared to U.S. policy. This efficacy allows allies and partners primacy during certain phases of an operation to contribute to the intelligence gathering process in different ways. Leveraging multiple allies and partners across different operations also allows planners to widen the scope of work as the analytic rigor is spread to a broader community.
(A+P) = AVAILABILITY + POSSIBLE: Planners need to consider if certain capabilities, intelligence platforms, formations, or infrastructure are available or possible (bounded by physics), both within the context of U.S. power and that of participating allies and partners.
All the variables of the expression, when applied against each other should illuminate shortfalls, complications, or opportunities. It is important to note that these known variables in the expression should change as planning efforts mature, inform subsequent stages of the operation, and shape how the commander or civilian lead accepts risk and uncertainty.
T.E. Lawrence astutely identified three elements, which would impact his campaign against the Turks. The algebraic element highlighted immutable variables that would impact his operations. The authors assess that operations conducted between combatant commands require a similar approach taken by T.E. Lawrence and have crafted an expression to showcase the variables of trans-regional irregular warfare. The authors found the above expression is best applied when integrating special operations, space, cyberspace, the interagency, and allies, all of whom maintain the operational flexibility to impose cost throughout the competition continuum. In late 2021, the USASOC commander established a task force designed to address transregional problem sets with the combatant commands. These efforts need to scale accordingly. The joint staff should implement concepts from this paper by examining how they conduct and synchronize transregional irregular warfare at the speed of war for the U.S. to accumulate strategic relative advantages against our adversaries.
Lateral Thought Experiment for the Concept of Transregional Operations
A lateral thinking exercise illustrates the points of this paper with a simple scenario posing hypothetical questions.
SCENARIO: Imagine your neighbor is stealing your packages and mail and you want to confirm or deny this fact, as well as intervene to stop this behavior. How would you confirm this information? How would you set conditions to stop the behavior? Some answers appear obvious at face value, if you are unconstrained in your planning. Rarely is planning unconstrained. For the point of illustration, it’s important that your neighbor doesn’t know that you suspect them, and you want to ensure they come to the natural conclusion it’s no longer worth the trouble.
Outcomes: Consider the variables laid out in the article. First, what’s your desired outcome? To confirm who is stealing your mail and stop the behavior. Then determine what effects will produce the desired outcome?
MAPPING: The planner must consider all relevant actors. Of course, you and your neighbors are stakeholders, but so too are your adjacent neighbors, your children, the neighbor’s children, the mail carriers, delivery services, and the police, as examples. They are all affected in different ways by the neighbor’s action and your counter actions. You, as the planner, must map and consider those actors and their interests.
THE VARIABLES: The next is to look at (CIAA)(A+P)4 holistically; as a combination, what obvious solutions exist? Are there solutions that are less obvious, but equally effective? Are there solutions that are unobtrusive and indirect, yet also effective? Each of these can be considered in any order.
INTELLIGENCE: What intelligence is needed to confirm or deny what your neighbor is doing, and how do you resource those? This includes talking to the mail carriers or other neighbors to determine if they have any information. Look at your home camera footage and ask to see others’ home camera system footage. Can you make a direct observation at your neighbor’s house while asking to borrow their yard tools? These are ways to generate incriminating evidence or indicators that lead to reasonable conclusion. For the scenario, assume you have strong indicators your neighbor is stealing your packages and mail.
CAPABILITY: What capabilities are useful to set conditions to deter your neighbor? A direct solution from afar where a note is left in your mailbox or the neighbor’s mailbox that reminds them of the federal penalty. If you have a strong research and development bone, a glitter bomb deliberately left on their doorstep. You could take a more indirect route and pay your children or ask other neighbors to drop hints while at their house for a weekend barbeque. Each of these capabilities is determined by your level of access to the suspected perpetrator’s home discussed in detail below. Finally, you could amass the evidence and call the police or mail service to report the behavior as they represent both a capability and appropriate authority.
ACCESS: For the collection and deployment of capability, a determined level of access is needed. Considerations include what type of access do you need, and for how long? Simple observation, by coming home early and observing user access you already have. A little more audacious is access to public spaces like their mailbox. To apply the capability and collect the intelligence, different accesses may be required. Of course, getting onto their property or into their home is the most challenging with the greatest risks. But access by someone else, such as your neighbors at backyard barbeques or your children who play with the neighbor’s children, present opportunities for collect or delivery.
AUTHORITY: In this case, outcome is tied to your morals, perceptions, and legal frameworks. The authority is held by the risk holder who has the power to say “yes.” So, the authority lies in the decision to act, and manage the risk or uncertainty tied to decisions. Retaliation is probably not an effective deterrent in this case and may sour the neighborhood milieu or escalate into a mail thievery war. Communicating your knowledge of the situation and your continued discretion could be an acceptable option, since you have the power to act, and your risks become balanced by continued theft or behavior change. As mentioned before, calling an authority, such as the post office to report the theft and using the associated legal framework is an option, whereas you are not transferring options to another authority. As in the police example, you could invoke a civil dispute with legal consequences that have both the authority to act and the capability to deliver your desired effect - legal and lasting deterrence. But now your risks affect stakeholders differently. Finally, you can execute other options that may not be illegal but are alternative and indirect means, which carry different risks.
ALLIES AND PARTNERS: Do you have friends in other neighborhoods or towns, whose hobbies may be conducive to assisting you in determining your neighbor’s culpability? How much do you trust them, and can they do differently than your immediate neighbors, who may be able to help you solve the problem of the mail thief.
AVAILABLE AND POSSIBLE: Your friends who live in an adjacent neighborhood are several tax brackets above you and can afford the most technologically advanced drones that money can buy. The drone makes no noise and can be retrofitted with advanced imaging devices that can help you identify if your neighbor is stealing your mail.
AUTHORITIES AND PERMISSION: Due to their affluence, this same group of friends received a special permit (permission) from the Federal Aviation Administration (authority holder) to fly at a higher altitude, further obfuscating their activities to help you uncover the culprit.
ACCESS AND PLACEMENT: These friends who live in an adjacent neighborhood don’t come to your house very often and might tip your neighbor off that something is awry if they suddenly are routinely coming to your house. However, they can use the drone to obfuscate and offset their activities (proximal access), so your immediate neighbor doesn’t suspect that you are surveilling his house.
By mapping out
who can help you and with
what capability – either directly or indirectly – to gain information, you will be well on your way to determining the culpability of your neighbor.
About the Authors
Lt. Col. Shawn Bourdon serves as a Strategy, Plans, and Policy Planner for the U.S. Army. Shawn’s 17-year career is marked by several deployments to the U.S. Central Command area of operations to support the U.S. Coalition and allied partners. His notable achievements include a Batchelor’s in Nursing Science and a Master’s in Operational Planning from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His academic work discusses the integration of cyber-electromagnetic activities into U.S. Army formations. Of interest, Shawn is currently exploring and writing fictional topics intended to experiment with and illustrate modern and future warfare concepts. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.
Maj. Brian Hamel is the Space Operations Officer for TF 40-25 at Fort Bragg, N.C. He holds multiple advanced degrees and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. His previous articles and podcasts focus on special operations forces’ contributions to space warfare and operationalizing celestial lines of communication to augment sustainment systems to the joint force in the Indo-Pacific. He has deployed to multiple theaters to support special operations. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.
References
01 Lawrence, T.E. The Evolution of a Revolt. Accessed March 24, 2025. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/evolution-of-a-revolt.pdf.
02 CIAA as a concept is not intended to be represented as the authors’ original idea. The authors unsuccessfully attempted to source the original author. This planning construct is routinely used by special operations planners and has been expanded upon in this article to meet broader trans-regional irregular warfare planning needs.
03 The last two pages of this article are dedicated to an addendum that is structured as a lateral thinking exercise as a mechanism to help describe the articulated variables in a different scenario that may resonate better with readers.
04 A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a system that allows industrial organizations to monitor and control their processes remotely. Emplacing a capability to disrupt industrial SCADA system could result in physical damage.
05 https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-and-irregulars-past-battles-and-new-endeavors/