George S. Patton, Jr. remains one of the most renowned leaders in American military history. This is the narrative any student of history will find, emblazoned by Patton’s own memoirs, the seminal works of Martin Blumenson, Carlo D’Este, and Stanley Hirshon, and autobiographies of Patton’s peers and superiors. Historian Kevin Hymel seeks to contextualize this narrative through the lens of another Patton, “the man mentioned in the letters and memoirs of the many soldiers he led into battle.” Hymel’s research is nothing short of stunning – his search spanned 20 archives and yielded thousands of unpublished memoirs, interviews, and notes from the soldiers who served under Patton. Hymel produces something that is part biography and part analysis, a story that seeks the truth about Patton, which rests somewhere between reality and perception. It is a tale that will satisfy the most passionate World War II and Patton experts, remains accessible to casual readers, and holds valuable lessons for the special operations enterprise.
Notably, Hymel demonstrates exceptional skill in contextualizing the leader through the perspective of his soldiers. For example, Hymel depicts Patton’s methods to resuscitate a diminished II Corps in Tunisia as draconian, rooted in aggressive discipline, cursing, and a fair amount of shaming. The accounts of soldiers under his command add gritty detail to just how hard Patton pushed his units to feel like soldiers again. The challenges and opportunities of instilling a fighting spirit in a demoralized force will resonate among resistance professionals. Patton’s methods focused on the soldiers’ morale and their fighting spirit, a key requirement for a resistance force’s will to resist. The II Corps emerged 12 days later a lean, fit, determined force that closed Montgomery’s open flank in rapid fashion.
Patton’s fighting spirit carried II Corps through North Africa and then fueled Seventh Army’s victory over the enemy (and Montgomery) at Messina. Hymel paints Patton as a leader whose men fought for him rather than simply against the enemy. The account of Patton’s personal contribution in defending a Nazi counterattack at Gela is particularly gripping – the image of a lieutenant general firing a mortar at advancing enemy armor surely stuck with Patton’s men. Here, the idea of exploiting time and tempo with distributed forces provides insights for irregular warfare. Patton leapfrogged his amphibious forces around mountain defensive strongpoints, creating tactical dilemmas that overwhelmed the Nazis. These types of dilemmas, especially those originating from geography outside of prepared defenses, are precisely what the recently updated FM 3-05 outlines in what is expected from ARSOF in large-scale combat operations. Small, specialized teams, approaching from unexpected angles, leapfrogged ahead of the main force to turn and disrupt the enemy, allowing Patton and his Seventh Army to maintain the initiative over a determined foe.
After Sicily, Patton had relatively less contact with his soldiers before losing them when he went to England. Thus, the latter half of Patton’s War is where Hymel shifts to a historical analysis. The story of Patton’s days in England was characterized by uncertainty, fear, and determination. Hymel deftly peers into how Patton viewed his environment and fought to lead American fighting men once again. This narrative crescendos to Hymel’s most significant contribution, a well-founded analysis of what Patton may have done differently had he planned the Normandy invasion. Often considered the father of tanks, Patton was also the Army’s most combat-tested general and the foremost expert in amphibious landings, airborne assaults, and joint land-air-sea operations. Hymel’s examination of this issue will resonate with readers.
Volume 1 concludes on the eve of the activation of Third Army. In a testament to Hymel’s skillful writing, the reader will finish both satisfied and wanting. Satisfied in the dexterous weaving of perspective to contextualize and illuminate Patton. Wanting to see how this perspective shapes our understanding of Patton after he and the Third Army were unleashed into France.
Hymel’s holistic analysis of Patton offers valuable lessons for leadership, as well as for the art and science of maneuver warfare in large-scale combat operations. Viewed through a special operations forces (SOF) lens, these historical retrospective calls attention to the challenges of the past as they inform our understanding of the future of large-scale combat operations across multiple domains. Such a reflection of history from a non-SOF viewpoint illuminates the perspective of the conventional force and offers insight into how SOF can best enable conventional maneuver.
Patton’s War: An American General’s Combat Leadership, Volume 1, November 1942 – July 1944. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2021. ISBN 978-0-8262-2245-9. Photographs and Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 436.
Author’s Note: Maj. Joseph Bedingfield is an active-duty U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer with over 20 years of service. He has served with the 45th Infantry Brigade, the Army National Guard Warrior Training Center, the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, and 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) with various deployments to the Middle East and Europe. Joseph holds three master’s degrees (MBA, MMAS, MA), is an Art of War Scholar, and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.