Operation SPECTER HORIZON
In the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific, a rising regional power engages in covert influence operations and malign activities. These efforts include cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns targeting vulnerable populations, and territorial expansion in the South China Sea. To counter these threats, the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) mobilizes space, cyber, and special operations capabilities as the primary tools to create decisive effects.
Highly trained in maritime operations, a 12-man Special Forces operational detachment-alpha (ODA) infiltrates a derelict, decommissioned oil rig controlled by the adversary. The ODA disables a set of radars tracking U.S. and allied naval assets, as well as commercial fishing vessels. Using advanced signal-jamming equipment, the team deploys silent drones to neutralize additional radar and communication infrastructure, rendering enemy communications inoperative. During exfil from the objective, the ODA places digital beacons to deceive enemy forces, creating the illusion of unhindered, routine enemy patrols in the area. Ultimately, the ODA’s actions significantly degrade the adversary force’s ability to interdict friendly maritime activity.
Simultaneously, a Civil Affairs team operates on the ground in a nearby island nation increasingly influenced by the adversary’s economic and political pressure. The team works with local officials to distribute emergency humanitarian aid, rebuild infrastructure damaged by a recent natural disaster, and launch public health campaigns. By fostering goodwill within the local population, the team prevents the adversary from exploiting local frustrations and dividing public opinion. Their efforts to provide humanitarian aid and medical support to a key village enable the ODA to prepare and launch their operation from a site within the village. Through targeted efforts, the Civil Affairs team also provides mobile internet access via satellite to key villages, bypassing the adversary’s attempts to control online information. Using an encrypted network, they collaborate with a Psychological Operations team to broadcast real-time reports on the true situation in contested regions, countering the adversary’s false narratives and encouraging anti-occupation sentiment.
Concurrently, additional Psychological Operations detachments initiate a regional information campaign to target the adversary’s key officials and military leadership. Using advanced data mining and cyberspace capabilities, they track internal communications between adversary commanders, exposing corruption, betrayal, and hidden financial deals. These findings are disseminated to create dissent within the adversary’s ranks, further weakening their morale.
Such operations rely upon close integration with both the United States Space Command and United States Cyber Command, as well as interagency partners. Satellites and surveillance systems continuously monitor enemy movements to support the Special Forces ODA’s movement to their objective. The drones employed by the ODA are linked to the Space Surveillance Network and receive automated instructions to assist in real-time targeting during their mission.
In parallel, cyber warfare units initiate a series of targeted strikes against the adversary’s local military command and control (C2) systems. Using cyber capabilities, units on the ground open a conduit to the adversary’s social media platforms, allowing for a strategic flood of misleading information developed by the Psychological Operations detachments and designed to cause confusion and delay decision-making processes. As a result, key channels are taken offline for 72 hours, neutralizing the adversary’s propaganda machine.
The United States, in close cooperation with regional allies, enhances its influence in the Indo-Pacific, neutralizes immediate threats, and shifts the balance of power towards diplomatic solutions. The Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Space-Cyber Triad’s efforts in Operation SPECTER HORIZON are heralded as a triumph, proving that Space, Cyber, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations capabilities can work in tandem to disrupt adversary malign activities.
Framing
The above fictional operation could soon become a reality. As the U.S. military faces the complex challenges of modern warfare, the role of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE), particularly in the cyberspace and space domains, has come to the forefront of national security discussions. Within the changing context of military operations, the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad has emerged as a key strategic framework that seeks to help illustrate the ways and means of harnessing OIE towards a greater competitive advantage over our adversaries. This competitive advantage is defined by the convergence of trans-regional, multi-domain, and joint capabilities across the spectrum of conflict now and into the future. Each part of the Triad relies on the other components to deliver asymmetric impacts before, during, and after conflict. SOF, when properly trained and employed in this construct, offers the Joint Force agility, endurance, convergence, and depth.
SOF’s unparalleled access, along with a nuanced understanding of the operational environment and a focus on the human dimension, are all critical components of the Triad. Within SOF, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are trained, manned, and equipped for information activities. However, in most discussions about SOF capabilities within the Triad, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are often underemphasized or overlooked. This article aims to highlight the opportunities and advantages that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units bring to the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad in order to maximize SOF contributions to U.S. military operations.
Civil Affairs: Understanding and Leveraging the Civil Environment
Adversaries increasingly choose to compete in non-lethal spaces, leveraging tools outside the military domain to achieve dominance without direct conflict. Through humanitarian assistance, cultural influence, economic initiatives, and diplomatic efforts, they actively operate within the civil environment, vying for influence and strategic advantage. These efforts are often bolstered by their willingness to disregard international norms and laws. Civil Affairs capabilities play a vital role in countering these strategies as critical assets for analyzing and understanding the complexities of the civil environment, including key infrastructure, influential local figures, and political and cultural dynamics.
Civil Affairs executes civil reconnaissance (CR) and civil engagement (CE) to provide civil knowledge integration (CKI) products that showcase capabilities and vulnerabilities in the operational environment. In other words, CA teams serve as the commander’s eyes and ears to the civil populace, providing access and insight into key stakeholders and vulnerabilities within an area. From electrical infrastructure to local leaders to political and cultural dynamics, Civil Affairs elements are mapping and developing networks to ensure a competitive battlefield advantage. These networks and relationships offer a diverse opportunity for access that differs from the security forces environment, which often is focused solely on the protection and defense of the populace against aggressors. Additionally, understanding the civil environment not only informs targeting by providing a different view of adversary operations, but also helps commanders make informed decisions about risks and opportunities with the utilization of the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad. Finally, when layered appropriately, Civil Affairs executes operations to consolidate gains and prevent adversary exploitation of destabilized or chaotic operational environments.
Civil Affairs missions have a broad spectrum of activities that provide an understanding of the operational environment, including foreign humanitarian assistance and support to governance during armed conflict. Additionally, Civil Affairs may be employed in politically sensitive environments to identify indigenous networks, build capacity for operationally relevant partners, and conduct operational preparation of the environment. The identified indigenous and governance networks can directly aid the Triad. The human dimension, often neglected in favor of technological advancements, is central to the success of any military operation.
Triad activities often focus on understanding and countering adversary efforts to disguise their intentions and activities. These efforts may manifest through economic investments, the operations of civil society organizations, or influence within academia. Civil Affairs has the unique capabilities and focus to engage or interact with such organizations and activities. Area assessments, atmospherics, and targeted CE provide insight into how adversaries may be conditioning, developing, and influencing the operational environment. Identification of key civil networks or critical infrastructure related to operational objectives also enables SOF elements to engage the strategic targets of USCYBERCOM or USSPACECOM. By identifying and engaging key civil networks and infrastructure, SOF elements help build resilience against adversary influence, protecting critical systems such as infrastructure, local economies, and governance from disruption.
Psychological Operations: The Information Frontline
Psychological Operations forces remain an irreplaceable component of modern influence. The information environment, increasingly shaped by the use of disinformation and propaganda, is as critical as any physical battlefield. As highlighted by the Department of Defense’s institutionalization of the influence cross-functional team and strategic information oversight board, influence and perception management are priorities within the national security apparatus. The ability to deter, influence, or contest rivals through information advantage, and the erosion of an adversary’s legitimacy, will, or credibility, remains critical. In the context of the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad, Army Psychological Operations units operate in coordination with cyberspace and space assets, or with cyberspace and space capabilities, in support of their influence activities. These activities change behavior, adjust narratives, influence enemy decision-making, and shape foreign public opinion in favor of U.S. objectives.
Psychological Operations units’ ability to affect the information environment will be crucial in a future conflict with China, where both sides are expected to participate in large-scale OIE. To mass effects in the information environment against a global competitor like China, Psychological Operations units will be the main effort, alongside the Department of State, to integrate information forces. This is already occurring. China’s well-documented influence campaigns—both domestically and internationally—demonstrate its commitment to attempting to control the narrative.
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Psychological Operations units maintain the ability to use cyberspace and space-enabled tools to disrupt adversary communications and spread counter-messaging that emphasizes adversary government overreach or violations of international law. Additionally, U.S. narratives could be further amplified with space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (ISR), which provide real-time intelligence on adversary movements and operations. Masking and covering actions while amplifying other influence efforts is a means by which Psychological Operations units could scale impacts in the information environment.
One of the enduring strategic values of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) is “influencing relevant audiences to change perceptions, behaviors, and decisions.”
02 Further integrating Psychological Operations unit capabilities into the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad brings that value to the forefront. Importantly, Psychological Operations units maintain global reach, persistence, endurance, and responsiveness.
03 As the Army looks to streamline and transform its Information Forces, this reach, persistence, endurance, and responsiveness will grow in capability and capacity. Special Forces and Civil Affairs teams, in tandem with Psychological Operations Soldiers, establish relationships with key influencers in contested regions, thereby ensuring that U.S. influence is tailored to resonate with local populations.
Special Forces in the Cyber-Space Domain: An Evolved Partnership
The role of Special Forces ODAs has evolved beyond the traditional framework of unconventional warfare. Their expertise now spans the integration of advanced technological tools within the broader SOF-Space-Cyber Triad. Special Forces are uniquely positioned to execute operations where human networks meet technological innovation. As asymmetric warfare increasingly hinges on cyber dominance and control of space assets, ODA teams will become critical nodes of influence in the larger strategic web.
While much focus is placed on their unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions, ODAs also have an unparalleled capacity to integrate cyber and space assets with on-the-ground networks.
04 In a future conflict with China, where control over the electromagnetic spectrum and satellite communications may determine the pace and scope of operations, Special Forces will leverage their deep cultural knowledge and relationships within contested environments to guide cyber and space-enabled precision strikes. Their ability to place and, therefore, expose an enemy to key technologies will contribute to the generation of convergence against the critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy. But more than just consumers of these technologies, they act as forward-deployed decision-makers, translating complex cyber capabilities into contextually relevant actions within denied or degraded environments.
In practice, this can manifest in operations where cyberattacks disrupt enemy communications and space-based ISR assets deliver real-time data for assessments of enemy movements. Special Forces, embedded with local resistance forces or partnered with indigenous allies, would be responsible for making rapid, informed decisions on how best to exploit these disruptions. In this manner, Special Forces facilitate deep area sensing and contribute to the joint force’s efforts to conduct deep area fires.
05 Their ability to interpret and act on complex information provided by cyber and space forces allows for tactical flexibility that adversaries may find challenging to counter, exemplifying the multi-domain operations tenets of agility and depth.
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As the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad continues to evolve, Special Forces stand at the forefront of the U.S. military’s hybrid warfare capabilities. Their ability to fuse indigenous approaches with cutting-edge technology ensures that future U.S. operations are not only lethal but also strategically decisive, allowing for agile responses in a rapidly evolving battlefield. Their capacity to bridge the technological-human divide and provide access while enabling space and cyber effects will be central to U.S. success in the complex, multi-domain operations of the future.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations: A Unified Approach to Cyber and Space Integration
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations unit capabilities are inherently complementary. Together, they offer a more comprehensive approach to influence, one that is grounded in both on-the-ground engagement and large-scale influence activities. In the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad, their combined efforts can translate tactical and operational effects into strategic success.
For instance, in a future conflict, cyberattacks could be used to sever adversary communications, while space-based ISR tracks the movements of local populations and leadership. The operational environment would be congested and opaque, obscuring the joint force’s ability to visualize and understand the impacts on the ground and consolidate the advantages gained from the operation. Deployed and CONUS-based Civil Affairs elements would use their authorities in the civil environment to support continued governance, resilience, and stabilization. However, more importantly for the commander, their access and civil networks on the ground would help visualize the physical and cognitive layers of the battlefield to develop a common picture and identify additional opportunities to gain advantage and influence over our adversary. Simultaneously, Psychological Operations units could exploit the information vacuum created by the cyberattacks, using targeted messaging to undermine the legitimacy of adversary control in the conflict zone.
A truly effective SOF-Space-Cyber Triad cannot exist without the full integration of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. These two capabilities ensure that the technological advantages provided by cyber and space operations translate into strategic influence and physical advantages on the ground. In a future conflict with China, where control of the narrative and the human dimension will be as important as control of the physical battlefield, Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units will be critical to success. According to recent security assessments, China is already fighting us cognitively via these very means.
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Conclusion: Elevating Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations for Future Success
The ARSOF Strategy 2030 highlights the need for information advantage, particularly through cyber and space capabilities.
08 Cyber and space operations are as much a vehicle as they are the domain and environment of choice for gaining information advantage. While they are not interchangeable with ODAs, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units offer a different means to operationalize the Triad. As the U.S. military adapts to the evolving threats posed by near-peer competitors like China, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations capabilities must be fully integrated into the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad. The unique capabilities of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units in influencing populations, shaping the information environment, and restoring governance structures are critical to ensuring that the U.S. achieves its strategic objectives.
The battlefield of the future will not be defined solely by technological superiority in cyberspace and space; it will also be won through the ability to influence and control the human dimension. In a conflict with China, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units will be indispensable in countering Chinese influence, shaping public opinion, and building long-term stability in contested regions. Their integration into the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad will ensure that U.S. operations are not just tactically successful, but strategically decisive.
Without Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations capabilities, the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad may fall short of its potential as the U.S. risks losing the critical battles for influence and legitimacy. By fully embracing these forces, the U.S. military will be better positioned to face the challenges of 21st-century warfare and secure victory on every front—from the physical battlefield to the information and human domains.
About the Authors
COL Chaveso “Chevy” Cook, Ph.D., is a Psychological Operations officer currently serving as a Division Chief on the Joint Staff, working in the Deputy Directorate for Global Operations (J39). A Lieutenant General James Dubik Writing Fellow, Chevy previously served as a battalion commander at Fort Meade, speechwriter for the Secretary of the Army, and as a tactical officer and instructor at the United States Military Academy. Other assignment experiences have taken him to Iraq, Afghanistan, Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Tajikistan, Niger, and the United Arab Emirates. He would also like to thank Mr. Robert Kellogg for his input on this article.
LTC Nicole Alexander is a Civil Affairs officer currently serving as a Policy Advisor in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict. She has over 15 years of experience in Special Operations through all levels of leadership, including her last position as a Battalion Commander for the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion. As both a combat engineer and civil affairs officer, she has seven Operational Deployments across the Middle East and Europe. She would like to thank CPT Travis Swafford for his input and brainstorming on this article.
MAJ Charlie Phelps is a Special Forces officer and is currently an SF company commander at 10th SFG. He has previously served as an instructor and tactical officer at the United States Military Academy and as a Special Forces Detachment Commander in 10th SFG(A). His operational deployments and experiences have taken him to Afghanistan, Australia, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines.
References
01 Lilly Min-Chen Lee, “Decoding China's Digital Offensive: An Analysis of Information Warfare Tactics in Taiwan's 2024 Presidential Election,” Yale Journal of International Affairs. (Accessed 20 December 2024 at https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/decoding-chinas-digital-offensive-an-analysis-of-information-warfare-tactics-in-taiwans-2024-presidential-election).
02 Ibid., pg. 7.
03 Ibid., pg. 13.
04 Brian Hamel, “Reframing the Special Operations Forces-Cyber-Space Triad”, Military Review, 2024, (Accessed 20 December 2024 at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/March-2024/Cyber-Space-Triad/SOF-Contributions-to-Space-UA.pdf).
05 Charles Wilson, “Embracing the Future of a Multidomain Army,” NCO Journal, 2024 (Accessed 20 December 2024 at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2022/December/Embracing-the-Future-of-a-Multidomain-Army/#:~:text=Agility%2C%20endurance%2C%20and%20depth%20are,for%20success%20in%20multidomain%20operations.).
06 Ibid.
07 Alexandre Marc and Bruce Jones, “The New Geopolitics of State Fragility,” The Brookings Institution, February 3, 2021, (Accessed on 19 December 2024 from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-new-geopolitics-of-state-fragility/); Mazarr, Michael J., Bryan Frederick, John J. Drennan, Emily Ellinger, Kelly Elizabeth Eusebi, Bryan Rooney, Andrew Stravers, and Emily Yoder, “Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China”. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021.
08 Ibid., pg. 15.