Introduction
To avoid fighting “the last war,” strategic planners have tried to characterize the next fight, particularly as it relates to optimizing conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) to be adept at large-scale combat operations (LSCO). However, a clearly articulated vision or guidance on how to evolve has not been consistently communicated. This article will identify three functions by which SOF will provide value to the conventional commander in a modern competition or conflict environment, and one recommendation for ensuring “Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence” (CF-SOF I3). Additionally, the article will highlight two historical vignettes in which SOF supported conventional forces, which operational through tactical-level leaders can use as a framework for shared understanding of CF-SOF I3. The purpose is to enable operational—tactical leaders to extrapolate what a SOF-enabled LSCO mission or concept may look like, and more easily articulate how SOF operational lines of effort would tie into strategic value propositions for joint force commanders. This contributes to a shared understanding of CF-SOF I3 across the competition continuum.
For over 20 years, during the Global War on Terrorism era, SOF were often a supported force; however, in LSCO, SOF will most likely be in a supporting role to conventional forces. Despite a shift in roles, the decades of invaluable Global War on Terrorism experience gained within the SOF community in critical areas such as fires, targeting, and partnered operations should not be cast aside. The application of these experiences will prove even more vital in LSCO. Furthermore, SOF’s persistent global placement and access will be critical to providing decision space and options to conventional commanders planning or executing a LSCO fight.
Three Main Functions
For leaders to best prepare their formations, it is necessary to create a baseline for how SOF can operate in a battlespace dominated by conventional forces. The following are three main functions SOF would enable in a LSCO environment.
FIRST, persistent SOF engagements with host nation partners around the globe to build partner capacity remains key to enabling successful LSCO. This function refers to security cooperation and its payoff for the U.S., as opposed to a specific fiscal and statutory authority. Build partner capacity initiatives include a wide array of U.S. Code Title 10 and Title 22 programs designed to advance partner nation capacity and capabilities through the provision of training and equipment, and through some humanitarian-based programs that support national security objectives through soft influence. Although improving partner nation militaries have secondary benefits to the U.S., the real power of these partnerships is the access and placement they provide during competition, and even more so during escalation into crisis or conflict. Forward-deployed SOF, with access to partner forces and networks, positions U.S. forces in strategically important areas with proximity to critical infrastructure that would be invaluable during crisis or conflict.
The SECOND function is deep sensing and access. Through an enduring presence in their assigned areas of operation, SOF units gain invaluable familiarity with human and physical terrain. This presents an opportunity when considering the realities of an escalation from competition into crisis, or even conflict. Planners should anticipate that once a crisis escalates to conflict, contested areas will likely become inaccessible to conventional forces. However, SOF can serve in a stay-behind role or leverage their surrogates to maintain access to denied terrain, thus providing a deep sensing option to conventional forces and facilitating the targeting of high-payoff targets. Additionally, SOF units retain access and placement along the periphery, where they can conduct shaping operations either unilaterally or via surrogates if that terrain is denied to conventional forces.
THIRD, SOF units of action can enable the final application of national-level multidomain assets. Some space and cyber capabilities require proximity to the physical target. Through a smaller footprint or surrogate network, SOF could be called upon to close that final distance, allowing multidomain capability-convergence at the decisive point. This can facilitate the destruction of prioritized targets critical to the enemy and ease the opening of air/land/sea mobility corridors for joint force access.
Although these functions offer significant benefits, developing a shared understanding of CF-SOF I3 in LSCO faces challenges. These stem from traditionally distinct roles and missions, separate certification, verification, and validation processes, and limited opportunities for combined training. To best prepare the entire Joint Force for success in LSCO, there must be a mutual understanding of how forces will integrate. Persistent engagement between SOF and the combat training centers would advance collaborative and continuous development of this understanding. Participating in exercises at combat training centers alongside conventional forces allows SOF to demonstrate their capabilities and broaden conventional force understanding of potential support, informing strategic planners’ conceptualization of SOF employment in a LSCO campaign. As SOF consistently exceeds expectations and adds value at the combat training centers, trust and credibility will be built with conventional forces. Furthermore, SOF’s dynamic and adaptive thinkers can and should contribute to solving complex problems in a dynamic future operating environment.
Historic Examples
Vignettes can often be more effective than doctrine at conveying complex concepts, enabling leaders to visualize potential SOF-enabled missions and concepts within a LSCO framework. As such I will provide two historical vignettes which demonstrate SOF’s value in LSCO. The first vignette is about Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army during World War II, and his formation of the Alamo Scouts as a specialized unit in 1943 to conduct raids and reconnaissance work in the Southwest Pacific. Throughout the war, the Alamo Scouts conducted the doctrinal missions of special reconnaissance, direct action, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare. Notably, they operated in areas inaccessible to conventional forces, enabling capability convergence and even establishing a resistance force nested within the Sixth Army’s campaign to achieve mass effects and divide enemy resources. The conventional forces commander specifically force-generated the unit after the identification of an operational gap. The Alamo Scouts Training Center was set up and tailored to the specific needs of producing capabilities for the supported commander. In this vignette, the SOF unit filled operational gaps in direct support of the conventional force commander, which the conventional forces, at the time, could not cover. Furthermore, the SOF unit was integrated into the commander’s campaign plan, their lines of operation nested within a broader framework, much the way future operating concepts envision SOF as a supporting element. The Alamo Scouts demonstrated value to the commander through deep sensing and partner-building.
The second vignette comes from Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – North, also known as Task Force Viking, which operated in northern Iraq during the 2003 invasion. Task Force Viking was composed of joint SOF personnel and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. Its primary objective was to support the Kurdish Peshmerga in securing key cities and infrastructure in northern Iraq, while also conducting unconventional warfare and direct-action missions against Iraqi forces. Task Force Viking secured Kirkuk, Mosul, and the northern oil fields, preventing 13 Iraqi Army divisions from defending Baghdad or reinforcing defenses against advancing American and British forces in the south. In addition to unconventional warfare and direct-action missions, Task Force Viking conducted artillery forward observer and special reconnaissance missions to disrupt Iraqi forces arrayed along the “Green Line.” Additionally, the task force provided reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for insertion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into the battlespace. From this example, the SOF task force supported the main effort during the invasion of Iraq, a LSCO campaign. They played a significant role in employing fires, fixing enemy ground forces, and setting conditions for follow-on conventional forces to be introduced into the battlespace. Furthermore, they leveraged their unique expertise in partnered operations–specifically, building partner capacity—by employing the Kurdish Peshmerga as force multipliers.
Bottom Line: Embrace CF-SOF I3
These vignettes demonstrate the value proposition of SOF to the Army and the joint force in modern competition, crisis, and conflict environments, characterizing how actions taken during those contexts directly contribute to the success of conventional forces. Three functions by which SOF can provide value to the commander have been laid out: building partner capacity, deep sensing and access, and enabling the final application of national-level multidomain assets. The argument has also been made for the importance of CF-SOF I3, recommending that SOF involve themselves in combat training center exercises and other training venues early and often to build trust and credibility with conventional forces. In the future operating environment SOF can play a critical role in providing decision space and options to Army and joint force commanders. By understanding the value of SOF, operational and tactical leaders can ensure shared understanding of how best to integrate SOF into multidomain operations to achieve operational objectives. By using the unique capabilities and expertise of SOF, conventional commanders can enhance their ability to compete and win in a rapidly changing global environment.
Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Benjamin Wharton is a pseudonym for an active-duty Special Forces Warrant Officer. He wrote this article as part of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course graduation requirements. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.
References
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