Introduction

The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, a longstanding cornerstone of U.S. special operations forces (USSOF) training, has faced tensions between the force provider components and the theater special operations commands (TSOCs). Per U.S. Code Title 10, Section 322, the primary purpose of JCETs is to train special operations forces. While JCETs can supplement TSOC theater campaign plans, they are often used as a convenient solution to achieve objectives outside the scope of training authorities. Therefore, the current sourcing and execution of JCETs are misaligned with the Army special operations forces’ readiness model.

The Army special operations forces’ readiness model is a framework used by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to manage the training cycle of its subordinate units of action. It cycles through three phases: red (low readiness, individual tasks and recovery from the previous cycle being the primary focus), yellow (moderate readiness, training events focus on preparation for certification and unit-level battle tasks), and green (ready, final training events focused on mission preparation, validation before deploying, and the deployment itself). In this model, JCETs are used as an example mission during deployment, and units frequently execute multiple JCETs during the green phase. However, as stated earlier, JCETs are a training authority. This represents a deviation from the intended purpose of JCETs. Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs) should be executing JCETs during the preparation phase. This allows them to train on their unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense mission essential tasks.

The Imperative of Proper JCET Employment

JCET misalignment can cause confusion among operators regarding the program’s purpose. Many become focused on training and increasing the capability of the partner nation force, which violates the U.S. Special Operations Command JCET program business rules. The policy is clear that partner-nation forces can only receive an incidental training benefit, and they cannot be the primary focus. USSOF is the training audience. Instead, if JCETs were aligned in the preparation phase of the Army special operations forces readiness model, SFODAs and their individual operators are more likely to focus on the training value they receive from working with a partner force multiple times bigger than their own, where the SFODA must coordinate all the logistical requirements, all while in a foreign country. No other environment can replicate these types of conditions.

As budgets decrease, SFODAs are increasingly losing access to training events and large exercises, where they can achieve the same level of training as JCETs. With the U.S. facing an increasingly complex and competitive global security landscape, with a growing focus on preparing for large-scale combat operations against near-peer threats, the reduction in training resources elevates the importance of JCETs and increases demand for them. However, this increased reliance on JCETs places a greater burden on the program to deliver high-quality training, which is not always possible given the constraints and limitations that often accompany these bilateral exercises.

Finding the Right Balance

The requirements imposed by TSOCs while SFODAs plan and execute JCETs frequently detract from the training potential. For example, partner force selection can limit the level of training achievable, as SFODAs are often tasked with teaching individual tasks to new recruits rather than conducting collective tasks with more proficient units. This can result in a watered-down training experience that fails to challenge detachment operators and push them to their limits. Location selection by the TSOCs can restrict available training areas and ranges, further limiting the training potential of JCETs. By prioritizing operational considerations over training objectives, TSOCs are inadvertently undermining the value of JCETs as a tool for developing the skills and proficiency of SFODAs. This forces detachments into a program of instruction regardless of whether it meets their specific needs. When combined with the Army special operations forces’ readiness model – where training calendars are at capacity and time is limited – this situation leads to long-term consequences for a SFODA’s proficiency and effectiveness.

Even more concerning is the tendency of TSOCs to "operationalize" JCETs, using them to achieve outcomes where other authorities would be more appropriate. This practice is contrary to the JCET authority. For example, a common misuse of the authority is using JCETs to build partner nation capacity, which is more appropriately the role of U.S. Title 10, Section 333. Furthermore, TSOCs often utilize JCETs to secure SOF participation in joint chiefs of staff exercises, essentially serving as the financial vehicle to support attendance when the exercise does not have sufficient resource allocation for USSOF. Additionally, JCETs may become a band-aid when trying to forward-posture forces on a persistent basis to prepare for crisis. By using JCETs in this way, TSOCs not only diminish the value of the program as a training tool but also risk changes to the fiscal and legal authorities associated with JCETs. Ultimately, the continued misuse of JCETs undermines the goal of this training authority, threatening the required targeted training and resource allocation that SFODAs need within their Army special operations forces readiness model to meet emerging global challenges and counter threats from near-peer actors.

Conclusion

The JCET program, a critical component of USSOF training, is facing significant challenges that threaten its effectiveness and alignment within the Army special operations forces’ readiness model. The loss of access to larger training events and other fiscal authorities due to budget constraints has increased the importance of JCETs to force providers. However, TSOC requirements and their tendency to "operationalize" JCETs diminish the return on investment for SFODAs and detract from the overall training potential. As a result, SOF units of action may conduct lower-quality training while on JCETs, which they need to develop and maintain their unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense mission essential tasks. To ensure the long-term readiness and effectiveness of USSOF, we must realign JCETs within the Army special operations forces readiness model, prioritize training objectives while executing JCETs, and prevent the misuse of JCET authorities to achieve outcomes that are outside the scope of the program.

Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Edward Tripp is a pseudonym for a Regular Army Special Forces Officer with more than 16 years of service. He wrote this as part of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course graduation requirements. The view, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.