In the dynamic landscape of modern warfare, the bedrock of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) has always been its unparalleled adaptability. Yet, as the character of conflict undergoes a quiet but profound revolution, there exists a critical vulnerability within the tactical small unit. The current gap within SOF units is the lack of an organic and expeditious package capable of conducting precision strikes and providing direct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Loitering munitions can address this gap.

While SOF detachments meticulously train on a spectrum of weapon systems, from machine gun employment and demolitions to mortar systems and anti-armor weaponry, they also integrate advanced capabilities like close air support, indirect fires, and electronic warfare. However, the pervasive absence of loitering munitions from routine training and widespread fielding at the lowest echelons represents a significant deficiency in our capabilities. Our forces face numerous competing training demands, yet we have only a limited amount of time to address them. This raises an important question: Are there tactics or equipment we continue to rely on simply because they were effective in past conflicts or because we are comfortable with them? And, more critically, will these methods and tools equip our forces to survive and adapt to the challenges posed by emerging technologies as the historical shift from bayonets to machine guns did?

Currently, the importance of loitering munitions is not lost on the Department of War or combatant commanders. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth signed a memorandum in July 2025, increasing funding and development of drones and loitering munitions to unleash U.S. military drone dominance.⁰¹ The Special Forces groups have already begun rapid drone fielding within their respective formations. However, current plans and implementation do not provide a solution for the mass production and deployment of organic systems, nor for training at the company and detachment levels. To further compound the problem, training opportunities on loitering munitions and drones are limited. Due to well-established Federal Aviation Administration air corridors, many ranges across installations heavily restrict drone use, further imposing hurdles for all units across the U.S. Army to learn and integrate these weapon systems at the lowest levels.

Advantages of Loitering Munitions

Loitering munitions, often referred to as “kamikaze” or “suicide” drones, are unmanned aerial systems designed to hover over a target area, enabling operators to identify and engage dynamic or time-sensitive threats with precision. These systems bridge the gap between guided missiles and drones, offering both strike lethality and real-time surveillance. What makes these drones so powerful is that they can be scaled down to be handheld and deployed from anywhere.

Their ability to bring air power directly to small units without reliance on external support has already proven decisive in modern conflicts. For instance, Ukrainian forces have successfully employed loitering munitions like the Switchblade to target Russian positions, effectively giving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capability at the squad and platoon level. This potential force multiplier remains underutilized in U.S. military doctrine, particularly among Special Forces.

The appeal of loitering munitions lies in their expeditionary and organic strike capability. Teams can move these systems deep behind enemy lines at the tactical edge and conduct precision strikes without higher echelon assets or support. Additionally, their standoff capability ensures soldiers can operate safely from cover while guiding the munition, thereby reducing personnel risk. Their small size and low radar signature make them ideal for SOF operations, allowing forces to strike from blind angles and evade detection.

The ability to integrate these systems at the small unit level offers a paradigm shift in combat effectiveness. These systems enable ground force commanders to exercise tremendous flexibility in surveying the battlespace and making rapid decisions against enemy targets. Much like how shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles empowered infantry against armored threats, loitering munitions enable squads and platoons to conduct precision strikes independently. However, despite these advantages, significant gaps remain in their adoption and deployment within U.S. forces.

Drawbacks and Challenges

One significant drawback is the cost per unit of the U.S. Army's Drone Systems. According to the Department of War Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Estimates, 294 Switchblade 600s will be purchased at a per-unit cost of $170,000.⁰² These bespoke, overengineered systems are too expensive to mass produce and to establish a meaningful war magazine. Cheap-to-produce drones that can easily integrate into existing military technology can rapidly increase the pace of deployment and decrease the time to train. The Switchblade uses a proprietary launcher system, but what if the Switchblade or emerging loitering munition technology could be launched from existing stock, such as the Javelin command launch units? Infantry and SOF units are well-trained and familiar with the operation of the Javelin, which would drastically reduce training time and the cost per unit of loitering munitions.

Operational integration poses additional hurdles. Units require training to effectively operate these drones and coordinate their use with other assets. The upfront cost to outfit units down to the squad level would require a large investment of funds. When units plan for their fiscal year training expenditures, loitering munitions are not available for small units to request in their annual ammunition training allocation. Instead, loitering munitions are opportunistic assets reserved for the upper echelons. Using a loitering munition during a once-a-year training exercise or employing these drones at a static range does not replicate the real-world application. How will a small unit’s loadout change with the new addition of loitering munitions? What current equipment or ammunition will be reduced or omitted to make room for the new munitions? The units explicitly tasked with working with drones may have an answer, but the SOF units with competing training requirements will be far behind the curve.

Another set of challenges revolves around the inherent design limitations of loitering munitions, which impact their effectiveness and survivability on the modern battlefield. For example, small models like the Switchblade 300 carry limited warheads and have constrained ranges, typically less than 10 kilometers. This makes them less effective against heavily armored or fortified targets. Larger systems, such as the Switchblade 600 or Israeli Harop, offer greater lethality but require vehicle launchers, reducing portability for dismounted forces.

Another concern lies in their one-time-use design. Each strike expends an entire drone, raising concerns about cost-effectiveness when targeting low-value assets. Training with these systems is also expensive and logistically demanding as live practice shots result in lost drones. Countermeasures further complicate their deployment. Adversaries equipped with electronic warfare systems can jam or hijack drones, while low-altitude radar and interceptor drones are increasingly capable of neutralizing loitering munitions. In Ukraine, improvised defenses like cage armor on vehicles and decoys have reduced their effectiveness.

Global Proliferation and Use Cases

Despite these challenges, loitering munitions continue to be rapidly adopted globally, demonstrating their tactical value in real-world conflicts. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War marked a turning point with Azerbaijan employing Israeli Harop drones to devastating effect against Armenian forces.⁰³ These drones overwhelmed air defenses and destroyed tanks and artillery, showcasing the potential of loitering munitions to shift the balance of power decisively.

In Ukraine, both sides have leveraged loitering munitions extensively. Russia’s Lancet drones have targeted Ukrainian artillery and vehicles, while Ukraine has utilized Western-supplied Switchblade systems and repurposed commercial drones with massive success.⁰⁴

Changing Tactics and the Modern Battlespace

The rise of loitering munitions is reshaping battlefield tactics and forcing armies to adapt. In Ukraine, the constant presence of loitering munitions has driven forces to rely on camouflage, decoys, and dispersed operations. Armies have developed improvised defenses such as cage armor on tanks to mitigate top-attack drones and mobile anti-drone teams equipped with jammers and interceptor drones to counter aerial threats.

Psychologically, the battlespace has become “transparent,” with units struggling to hide from persistent surveillance. This has slowed the operational tempo and pushed combatants to embrace trench networks and underground positions reminiscent of those of World War I.⁰⁵ The battlefield’s “low-altitude air domain” is increasingly critical, requiring coordination of ground forces, drones, and electronic warfare units to maintain dominance.

U.S. Military Adoption and Policy

Key initiatives include the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordinance Program (LASSO), aimed at fielding loitering munitions across U.S. Army brigades, and the Marine Corps’ plans to deploy squad-level drones by 2027. Defense firms are exploring recoverable loitering munitions to reduce costs, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) experiments with swarming functions enabled by artificial intelligence for coordinated drone attacks.

Doctrinal shifts emphasize counter-drone strategies, such as electronic jamming and interceptor drones, as well as the integration of loitering munitions into networked warfare frameworks like the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). However, bureaucratic resistance and a focus on high-end bespoke projects could delay full adoption, risking a disadvantage against adversaries who embrace drone technology.

The Road Ahead: Future Trends and Outlook

Loitering munitions are rapidly evolving and poised to change significantly in the coming years. This will take a significant investment to ramp production, implement across the force, and maintain our lead on the precipice of this quiet arms race. Future conflicts will likely see loitering munitions integrated into every aspect of military operations. The “atmospheric littoral,” or low-altitude airspace, will become a contested domain, requiring innovative tactics and technologies to maintain superiority. The kill web will be greatly expanded, as future systems integrate artificial intelligence to coordinate drone swarms on targets. This requires a heavy investment not only in loitering technology but also in production facilities and the establishment of robust acquisition chains.

Conclusion

Loitering munitions have transformed modern combat by enabling precision strikes at the small unit level. While their limitations and countermeasures mean they are not a silver bullet, their widespread adoption underscores their value in 21st-century warfare. The lessons of history urge militaries to adapt quickly to technological shifts. Those who embrace loitering munitions and develop robust counter-drone strategies will gain a decisive edge, while those who resist change, or are slow to implement change, risk catastrophic losses. 

Author’s Note: Captain B.V. Williams is a pseudonym for a Regular Army Special Forces officer. He currently serves as a Headquarters Support Company Commander. He is a graduate of Norwich University, and his Army background includes field artillery and special operations. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the U.S. Army or the Department of War.

References:
01  Hegseth, P. (2025, July). Secretary of War Memorandum. Retrieved from https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=093c42fe79e2e5ab0e86d21cacff635a966957cedf70aac6ef6f5ea6232b1b68JmltdHM9MTc1Nzg5NDQwMA&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=4&fclid=2bba6fad-78b1-69a5-2543-79c579526807&psq=secretary+of+War+drone+memorandum+july+2025&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWRpYS5kZWZlbnNlLmdvdi8yMDI1L0p1bC8xMC8yMDAzNzUyMTE3Ly0xLy0xLzEvVU5MRUFTSElORy1VLlMuLU1JTElUQVJZLURST05FLURPTUlOQU5DRS5QREY
02  Hambling, D. (2025, July 10). The US Army’s $170,000 FPV drone. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/07/10/the-us-armys-170000-fpv-drone/
03  Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2022, November 10). Combined arms warfare and unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/combined-arms-warfare-and-unmanned-aircraft-systems
04  Ibid.
05 Modern War Institute. (2025). The return of the tactical crisis. West Point. Retrieved from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-return-of-the-tactical-crisis/