Introduction
Modern battlefields are characterized by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)-saturated and electronic warfare (EW)-contested environments. Large formations are vulnerable to drone swarms, rapid counter-battery fire, and automated targeting, making agility, dispersion, deception, and timely action critical for survival. Special Forces (SF) employ these necessary characteristics of modern warfare through split-team operations – dividing into small, independent elements, even down to singleton operators – to achieve stealth, autonomy, seamless integration with joint fire support, and increased operational coverage.
01 Institutionalizing this approach requires more than tactical rhetoric; it demands codified standard operating procedures for operating behind enemy lines in modern combat. Consequently, leaders must prioritize training focused on stealth and evaluating success based on survivability and sensor-to-shooter latency, so that operating in split-teams becomes a repeatable institutional competency rather than a boutique skill. In essence, studying and training split-team operations will foster the operational characteristics SF must adopt for modern warfare, driving tactical innovation and enhancing both survivability and lethality in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
The central claim of this article is that split-team employment should be re-institutionalized as SF’s default organizing principle for both training and employment for LSCO. Doing so aligns ODA force design with detachments that can infiltrate, persist, sense, and rapidly cue joint effects in the deep, extended-deep, and periphery fights.
02,03 This paper examines the historical effectiveness of small teams in combat, drawing lessons from World War I through the current conflict in Ukraine to illuminate enduring principles of maneuver warfare. It then translates these historical insights into training implications, advocating for a renewed focus on mission command, signature control, non-standard sustainment, and specialized fieldcraft. Finally, the paper proposes adjustments to combat training center rotations to better prepare units for the realities of modern small-unit operations and fully capitalize on their potential.
Historical Precedent: Small Unit Effectiveness
Throughout a century of warfare, small, highly adaptable units have consistently achieved disproportionate impact on the battlefield. During World War I, German stormtrooper detachments overcame the stalemate of trench warfare by combining short, intense artillery barrages with decentralized mission command – known as
Auftragstaktik – and specialized small-unit tactics for close-quarters combat.
04 Stormtroopers infiltrated enemy lines under the cover of a creeping artillery barrage, bypassing fortified trench lines to disrupt enemy artillery, command posts, and communications in rear areas.
Auftragstaktik empowered junior leaders and individual soldiers to make rapid, independent decisions amidst the chaos of battle. This demanded flexibility, as small unit leaders could not depend on detailed, timely orders from higher headquarters once the assault began. The tactic relied on decentralized execution and initiative from junior leaders operating in a high-threat environment. However, stormtrooper tactics also had limitations. Units often advanced beyond the reach of their supply lines and supporting artillery fire. Despite these drawbacks, stormtroopers pioneered a revolutionary approach to warfare, trading lengthy battlefield scenarios for rapid, decentralized assaults that prefigured modern infantry tactics.
05
Half a century later, SOF reconnaissance teams refined small unit tactics through partnered, deep-penetration operations in Laos and Cambodia. These teams operated for days, relying on stealth, cunning, and strict discipline in signature control, fieldcraft, and mission command.
06 This allowed them to gather critical intelligence and strike the enemy in highly contested areas. Reconnaissance teams prioritized remaining undetected and completing their intelligence missions without engaging in firefights. Their effective tactics, techniques, and procedures were developed through hard-won experience and formalized through training and in-unit knowledge sharing – tailored explicitly for operations in denied terrain. These small, combined U.S.-indigenous teams prioritized avoiding contact while converting observation into precise targeting data. Rigorous and repetitive fieldcraft was essential, including meticulous kit and personal sanitization, off-trail movement, spoor management, establishing caches for extended operations, and utilizing discreet signals for planned extraction and evasion.
07 Mission success depended on continuous, intensive training in immediate action drills for various potential contact scenarios.
Currently, Russian reconnaissance units in Ukraine employ the same small-unit logic under ubiquitous sensors, probing defenses with four- to six-person elements and rapidly cueing artillery, one-way attack drones, and glide munitions.
08,09 These small units have had marked success in exploiting terrain for concealment, slipping behind front-line defenses and striking vulnerable rear areas, disrupting Ukrainian logistics and troop rotations.
10
For modern Special Forces split-team operations, these historical cases converge into clear design principles. Success hinges on decentralized execution – empowering junior leaders with a clear commander’s intent – combined with rigorous training in stealth, fieldcraft, and signature control.
11 These units excel at infiltrating defenses, gathering time-critical intelligence, and/or rapidly cueing precision fires. Therefore, the consistent success of these small units across diverse conflicts indicates that their effectiveness is not simply a matter of technology or tactics. It is a product of specific, repeatable skillsets and leadership approaches that Special Forces must deliberately cultivate through realistic training.
12
Forging Split-Team Operators: Training for the Deep
Training must prioritize skills critical for small team success: mission command, signature management (controlling electronic, infrared, radio frequency, and thermal signatures), non-standard logistics (establishing and utilizing caches), rapid target development, and secure reporting in denied communications environments (using low probability of detection/low probability of interception communications, off-axis relays, terrain masking, and courier networks).
Mission Command for Split-Team Operations: Effective split-team employment requires empowering non-commissioned officers to exercise independent leadership and initiative. Staff sergeants and sergeants first class must be prepared to lead isolated elements on independent missions. SF training must emphasize mission command at all levels, teaching non-commissioned officers to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, synchronize actions with minimal guidance, and assume responsibilities traditionally held by officers. Training exercises should routinely place junior leaders in command of split detachments to build confidence and sound judgment. Split-team training must challenge leaders to operate with near-zero emissions, validate targets to joint standards, and execute clean breaks from contact when compromised.
Signature Management as Daily Discipline: Developing proficiency in signature management requires a shift from infrequent training events to continuous practice focused on evading detection and maintaining operational security. EW and unmanned systems (UxS) should be considered constant environmental factors, not temporary training injects. Training should prioritize low probability of intercept/low probability of detection communications, communication windows, directional antennas, and non-emitting control measures as primary techniques, utilizing voice and data communications only when opportunities arise. Continuous challenges from the Red Team UxS, thermal optics, and software defined radio (SDR)-based jamming will build proficiency in rapid detect-mask-move immediate action drills. This approach cultivates units that maneuver primarily by terrain and time, treating communications as brief, pre-planned events. Split teams should be able to operate for days with minimal emissions, practicing strict communications discipline under EW conditions.
Non-standard Logistics: Split-team missions often occur in remote and austere environments, such as mountainous regions, jungles, or expansive rural areas, requiring teams to be self-sufficient for extended periods. Training should therefore re-emphasize robust fieldcraft and sustainment skills reminiscent of those used in long-range reconnaissance patrols. This includes living off the land or utilizing caches, navigating without reliance on GPS, and maintaining prolonged covert hide-site occupation. Teams must practice emplacing, authenticating, and recovering caches, as well as rehearsing joint precision airdrop system and UxS handoffs for clandestine resupply. Proficiency in recovery and contested exfiltration is also vital, including practicing exfiltration under denied airspace or coordinated handoffs with auxiliary or other units.
Distributed Sensing to Joint Effects: Teams must be able to collect, validate, and rapidly disseminate targeting-quality intelligence to cue joint effects without compromising operational security. This requires a thorough understanding of authentication and fires-deconfliction procedures to ensure SOF effects are synchronized with conventional force operations to minimize the risk of fratricide.
Objective Measures of Effectiveness: Assessing split-team effectiveness necessitates a shift from subjective evaluations to objective, data-driven metrics that focus on survivability and lethality. Objective assessment frameworks should replace broad after-action reports with measurable standards tied to split-team outcomes. Key metrics include exposure time after detection by unmanned aerial systems, PACE message delivery under jamming, cache emplacement/recovery times with zero detectable signature, sustained operations exceeding 96 hours, and sensor-to-shooter latency. Training must also validate casualty care and evacuation procedures for prolonged field care without relying on motorized or air transport, reflecting the realities of deep operations. Data collected from these measures should continuously inform refinements of standard operating procedures (SOPs), equipment sets, and training curricula.
Refining the Approach: Testing the tactical and operational utility of Split-Teams at CTCs
To maintain their specialized skills, SF require dedicated training environments that replicate the challenges of denied operating areas. This training must focus on core SF competencies – stealth, human intelligence gathering, distributed sensing, and independent decision-making – and include regular integration with conventional forces to ensure seamless coordination of fires, targeting, and maneuver. Combined training centers provide the ideal opportunity to rehearse these complex operations at scale.
In 2024, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) conducted its first rotation focused on Special Operations (24-06J), involving an entire Special Forces Group and other SOF elements operating within a large-scale combat scenario. This rotation, described as “breaking new ground… at an unprecedented scale,” allowed Army special operations forces to test their ability to fight in future high-intensity conflicts across all echelons, from individual detachments to joint task forces. Building on this success, combined training centers should incorporate split-team scenarios into their rotations, allowing ODAs to practice link-ups, passage of lines, and fires integration with conventional forces.
Integrating SOF into Combined Training Center Scenarios:
Dedicated SOF Lanes: Each rotation should include two dedicated SOF lanes integral to the corps plan: (1) an extended-deep lane that requires non-standard logistics sustainment for special reconnaissance that cues joint effects and (2) a periphery lane for deception operations with a partisan force. Each lane should replicate an actual denied environment – GPS degradation, persistent UAS/ wide area motion imagery (WAMI), enemy signals intelligence, and human terrain noise – and grade units on detection rates, emission control violations, cache recovery percentages, and sensor-to-joint effects timelines.
Decisive SOF Tasks: SOF tasks should be designed as decisive enablers, targeting critical enemy vulnerabilities to enable joint forcible entry, penetrate anti-access/area denial systems, and delay and/or degrade enemy advances.
Realistic Threat Replication: Combined training centers must simulate a truly denied environment, including GPS denial, persistent ISR from UAVs and acoustic sensors, EW, and unreliable human intelligence. This will force SOF to utilize signature mitigation techniques, including land navigation, terrain masking, camouflage, and concealment of hide sites.
Hybrid Resupply Testbeds: Incorporate realistic resupply scenarios utilizing joint precision air drop system (JPADS) drops, unmanned aerial system (UAS) sorties, and pre-placed caches. Scenarios should require authentication procedures and strict pickup windows. Introduce potential failure modes, such as missed drops or jamming, to force teams to execute contingency plans.
Dispersed Operations and Command & Control: Advanced operations base (AOB) command and control architectures must be evaluated for their ability to effectively task and sustain dispersed elements for extended periods, utilizing deception, caches, auxiliary networks, and time-based logistics.
Embedding these challenging conditions in combined training center rotations at scale will align special operations training with the demands of modern large-scale combat operations and re-establish split-team proficiency as a core institutional competency within the Special Forces.
Conclusion: Shared Horizons- Partnered Sensing for Over-the-Horizon Reach
Institutionalizing split-team operations aligns Special Forces with this enduring logic: train it as the default, test it under denial at combined training center s, and resource it with the tools and authorities it requires. The payoff is units of action that can persist in the deep, remain below the enemy’s detection thresholds, and deliver decisive effects for the conventional force in modern LSCO. Historical precedents and current battlefields alike confirm that well-trained small units, operating under mission command, can achieve decisive effects. By integrating the split-team concept into SF training and culture, the Army will cultivate leaders and units that are comfortable with autonomy and stealth in high-threat environments. Split teams will markedly enhance the force’s ability to operate in contested environments where large conventional force formations are constrained.
Leveraging our proven success in training allies and partners in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Special Forces must now prioritize mastering split-team operations for deep reconnaissance. Developing this expertise will enable SF to expand its training to partners, thereby building a wider network of distributed sensors capable of operating in challenging environments and extending operational reach. This initiative will demonstrate SOF readiness and ability to integrate effectively with joint forces and indigenous partners. As the military faces the challenges of large-scale combat against near-peer adversaries, making “getting small” a core competency ensures that America’s Special Forces remain a decisive strategic asset capable of outthinking and outmaneuvering the enemy when it matters most.
Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 3 Greg Urbanski is an active-duty United States Army Special Forces Warrant Officer. He has currently served over 23 years both as enlisted and as a commissioned officer, including over four years in light infantry followed by 17 years as a Green Beret. He has a Master of Science degree in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School.
References
01 Department of the Army. Special Forces Operations. FM 3-18. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014.
02 Moynihan, Michael J., and J. C. Klick. "Relearning Infiltrations: The Light Infantry Advantage."
Infantry (Fall 2024). Accessed October 9, 2025.
https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/Infantry-Fall-2024/Relearning-Infiltrations/.
03 TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Enterprise.
Russian and Chinese Infiltration Tactics Take Two Different Paths to Power. Report, April 3, 2025.
https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Red%20Diamond/TRADOC_3APR2025_RD_RUS_CHI_Infiltration_Tacti_anonymous.pdf.
04 Bull, Stephen.
German Assault Troops of the First World War: Stosstrupptaktik - The First Stormtroopers. The History Press, 2014
05 Lupfer, Timothy T.
The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981.
06 Plaster, John L.
SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Elite Commandos (Simon & Schuster, 1997).
07 Gillespie, Robert M.
Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACV/SOG (Naval Institute Press, 2011).
08 Institute for the Study of War. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2025." Report, October 1, 2025.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025
09 Institute for the Study of War. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2025." Report, October 8, 2025.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025.
10 Zabrodskyi, Mykhaylo, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds. “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russi’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2002.” London SW1a 2ET United Kingdom: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, November 30, 2022
11 Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. “Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy.” RAND Corporation, January 1, 2001.
12 Department of the Army. Army Special Operations. FM 3-05. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014.
Edwards, Sean J. A. “Swarming and the Future of Warfare.” RAND Corporation, May 16, 2005.