The Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Space-Cyber Triad marks a critical evolution in how U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) prepare for strategic competition, crisis, and conflict.⁰¹ It is a practical concept that weaves space-based capabilities, cyber effects, and deep-sensing platforms into Detachment-level operations. The emphasis is not on developing bespoke technology for its own sake, but to extend the operational reach, survivability, and decision-making agility of forward Detachments. This is not a theoretical effort. Transformation is already underway across the force.⁰²

Yet, whenever the Regiment evolves, we must also pause to ask why it is changing and toward what end. ARSOF’s strength has always rested on its human-centric foundation, particularly its ability to conduct unconventional warfare at the ODA-level (Operational Detachment-Alpha) in its most basic, irreplaceable form.⁰³ The task is clear: pursue technological advancement without compromising the core activities that make ARSOF Detachments invaluable.⁰⁴

The Wars We Imagine vs. The Wars We Keep Fighting

SOF-space-cyber convergence lies at the intersection of two contrasting yet influential views of modern warfare. Works like Ghost Fleet envision near-future wars dominated by satellite denial, devastating cyberattacks, artificial intelligence, and armed autonomous systems. Much of what these novels portray is already unfolding on the modern battlefield. Our adversaries share a similar vision–China invests heavily in "intelligentized warfare," combining artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and persistent sensing to achieve a decision advantage.⁰⁵ Meanwhile, Russia employs sophisticated hybrid approaches by integrating cyberwarfare, information operations, and proxies alongside conventional forces to blur the lines between peace and war.⁰⁶

History, however, offers a sobering counterpoint. Drawing on nearly 600 cases of ground combat from 1942 to 2022, Ben Connable’s Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War shows that modern conflict remains dominated by infantry, armor, and artillery.⁰⁷ Despite the appearance of “technological transformation,” tactical outcomes continue to hinge on the same uncertain, friction-laden, and human-centric contests of will that have defined ground combat for generations.⁰⁸

Regardless of how we envision the next fight, one truth remains: the contested spaces behind enemy lines where ARSOF Detachments must thrive have not disappeared. The deep fight has just become significantly more challenging due to advances in detection and sensing. However, persistent surveillance and full-spectrum sensing are not absolute. The idea that "if you turn something on, you’re dead" has become a dangerous training maxim for Detachments that could have devastating implications if taken as an absolute truth. Even in places like Taiwan, neither China nor Russia can achieve perfect 24/7 satellite coverage.

ODAs must exploit maneuver windows in contested deep areas to enable the joint force; exquisite technology helps, but it will not do the job alone.⁰⁹ As innovation accelerates, Detachments now face a dilemma: modernize without overestimating technology’s ability to solve the enduring human demands of special operations.

Technology, Modernization, and Risk Aversion

The Army Transformation Initiative recognizes that modern Detachments cannot simply bolt new capabilities onto existing problem sets.¹⁰ They must fundamentally reshape how they analyze, decide, and act in contested environments. Technological integration positions SOF Detachments as critical nodes—bridges where advanced sensing, cyber effects, and space-enabled communications merge with ARSOF’s traditional core tasks.¹¹

However, modernization brings with it a temptation: risk aversion.¹² Military organizations often respond to new technology by investing in standoff capabilities that promise distance, precision, and control. While these tools provide real advantages, overreliance on them creates a false sense of security and risks distancing Detachments from the face-to-face engagement essential to unconventional warfare and strategic battlefield effects.

The more we rely on advanced systems that replace human presence, the more we potentially erode what sets ODAs apart: being human-forward, adept at navigating ambiguity, and lethal in the gaps and seams others ignore.¹³ Detachments must not fall victim to overreliance on emerging technologies, both in training and operations. ARSOF's identity continues to reside in its unique ability to operate in politically sensitive and denied environments along the conflict continuum, moving deep behind enemy lines, working by, with, and through partner forces, and ensuring Commanders have options for joint forcible entries and deep fires.

Cutting-edge technology should enable calculated risk-taking, not risk avoidance. Detachments must continue to view standoff technology as one option in a larger toolkit, prioritizing ways of delivering lethal effects alongside our partner forces wherever possible.

Preserving Human-Centric Warfare at the Detachment Level

The challenge is immediate and practical. Detachments today already face zero-sum training decisions between emerging technological skills and fundamental human competencies. This reality demands disciplined risk assumption: accepting that some training will be sacrificed to preserve lethality in the core activities that make ODAs unique. Commanders must not only prioritize training tasks but also explicitly communicate what will not be trained, based on comprehensive, threat-informed assessments of the current operational environment.

Detachments must accept less-than-perfect proficiency with emerging systems to preserve their comparative advantage. The alternative, which dilutes human-centric training to accommodate every technological advancement, represents far greater risk.

Building this proficiency requires immediate access to resources, infrastructure, and authorities for effective home-station training. Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are invaluable proving grounds for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures, and for integrating ARSOF detachments into large-scale combat operations. However, CTC rotations alone are insufficient.

To build lasting proficiency in space, cyber, and sensing integration, units of action urgently need persistent access to realistic scenarios and training environments at the local level. Equally important, they need ample opportunities to develop judgment about when these capabilities enhance mission success, and when they risk undermining trust and rapport with partner forces.

In resource-constrained environments, Detachments must find creative solutions to meet training objectives, ensuring that imperfect training environments are not the enemy of a good solution. Effective training requires disciplined experimentation and psychologically safe environments that reward calculated risk-taking as Detachments learn to exploit the gaps and seams of contested terrain.¹⁴ Accordingly, the best reps are in home-station training with cutting-edge systems—building muscle memory and the judgment to employ them selectively. This also allows ODAs to balance their time and resources against other core tasks that make ARSOF unparalleled in lethality.

Rounds Complete

The SOF-Space-Cyber Triad is not a break from ARSOF’s past. It is a necessary step in its evolution. Space, cyber, and deep sensing technologies expand the Regiment’s reach, resilience, and decision advantage. However, they cannot replace the trust, adaptability, and cultural fluency that only ODAs provide. Preserving unconventional warfare as the Regiment’s foundation ensures that technology enhances rather than erodes the human-centric values that make ARSOF unique.

Our advantage has never been tied to having the most sophisticated systems. It lies in our ability to operate in contact, adapt under pressure, and capitalize on opportunities others miss. ODAs must embrace technology as a tool that sharpens our edge, not one that redefines our identity.

Authors’ Note: Capt. Michael Lami and Capt. Brett Benedict are active-duty Special Forces Officers. Michael is currently pursuing an MA in Organizational Leadership and Learning at George Washington University, and Brett is at Georgetown University pursuing an MA in Security Studies. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed are the authors' own and do not represent the position of the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Army, or the Department of War.

References
01  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Army Special Operations Forces Strategy 2030,” USASOC, April 6, 2023, https://www.soc.mil/temp-pages/strategy/ARSOF_STRATEGY_2030.pdf
02  Headquarters, Department of the Army, “FM 3-05: Army Special Operations,” Washington, DC, June 26, 2025, https://armypubs.army.mil
03  Office of Strategic Services, “Special Operations Field Manual — Strategic Services (Provisional),” Washington, D.C., February 23, 1944, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5.pdf
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07  Ben Connable, “Highlighted Work,” BenConnable.com, https://benconnable.com/highlighted-work
08  Ben Connable et al., “Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War,” RAND Corporation, September 13, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10040.html
09  Daniel Driscoll and General Randy A. George, “Letter to the Force: Army Transformation Initiative,” U.S. Army, May 1, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/285100/letter_to_the_force_army_transformation_initiative
10  T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Warfare: Small, Many, Smart vs. Few & Exquisite?,” War on the Rocks, July 16, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the-future-of-warfare-small-many-smart-vs-few-exquisite/
11  SOF Support Foundation, “Converging Special Operations Forces, space, cyber, and information operations,” SOF Support Foundation, July 7, 2025, https://sofsupport.org/converging-special-operations-forces-space-cyber-and-information-operations/
12  Spencer Reed, “Recalibrating Special Operations Risk Tolerance for the Future Fight,” War on the Rocks, January 31, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/recalibrating-special-operations-risk-tolerance-for-the-future-fight/
13  Spencer Meredith, “SOF-Space-Cyber Triad In Action,” Line of Departure — Special Warfare (Summer–Fall 2024), July 1, 2024, https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Special-Warfare/Summer-Fall-2024/SOF-Space-Cyber-Triad-In-Action/
14  Amy C. Edmondson, “Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams,” Administrative Science Quarterly, June 1999, https://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Group_Performance/Edmondson%20Psychological%20safety.pdf