The United States Army is currently undergoing a transition and restructuring period, which historically occurs at the end of prolonged conflicts, such as World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). During this transition period, the U.S. Army seeks to, once again, modernize its force structure and conduct a thorough review of its doctrine. Many experienced combat leaders will inevitably retire or leave the military, creating a heavy reliance on doctrine and institutional learning to fill the gaps left by these experienced veterans. As the U.S. Army conducts force-modernization and doctrinal changes, an emphasis should be placed on combat agility regarding the mission-essential equipment soldiers are required to carry into combat. Over the last few decades, rucksacks, personal protective equipment, and vehicles have become increasingly larger and heavier, increasing the weight and bulkiness of a soldier's equipment. The increase in weight and bulk degrades the mobility, sustainability, and lethality of U.S. Army soldiers, as additional carried weight increases fatigue, elevates sustenance consumption, and significantly reduces their ability to maneuver quickly and over long distances on the battlefield. This article examines mobility, sustainability, and lethality, and it provides recommendations for consideration during the U.S. Army’s current transformation period.

Throughout the history of warfare, movement and maneuver played an important role on the battlefield. Mobility was a key element of the German campaign strategy during World War II, as they employed Blitzkrieg tactics. Blitzkrieg, translated into English as “lightning war,” enabled the Nazis to invade France and the majority of Europe, completely overtaking territories at a speed never encountered before. Fundamental to the strategy is ensuring a force is light, mobile, and self-sustaining for a period, which allows a force the agility to overwhelm an enemy before the enemy can react to offensive operations. When examining this form of warfare, it is critical to examine the loadout and accompanying equipment these forces brought into denied enemy territory. Typically, Allied and Axis infantry would carry their weapons, ammunition, one to two quarts of water, an extra pair of socks, a raincoat, one to two days of rations, and their load-bearing vest.

Compare this loadout to what the typical packing list or loadout is for modern U.S. infantry soldiers, which includes an extra pair of boots, two pairs of uniforms, five pairs of socks, five shirts, five to ten meals ready to eat, four quarts of water, a sleep system, a poncho, a tool, a double basic combat load, a plate carrier, a helmet, night vision devices, etc. The distinct differences between these loadouts are clear, and it shows how the ounces turn into pounds (and pounds turn into pain) rather quickly. It illustrates the severity of reducing a soldier’s ability to maneuver for extended periods and requiring more water and food, which increases reliance on logistical lines of communication. For modern military forces to increase their mobility, leaders must become comfortable with prioritizing speed and agility over preparing for every possible contingency. Commanders must be willing to accept the risks of not being able to prepare for every possible outcome and to trust the intelligence provided to them before committing forces in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment, where sustainment will be severely reduced or restricted.

While the conventional U.S. Army has been reorganizing its force structure and capabilities to address the modern threat, the question of how Special Operations Forces (SOF) will integrate into LSCO has become a key area of focus. Not only must the U.S. Army contend with modern electronic warfare or cyber threats, such as drones, unsecured communications, and direction-finding capabilities, but it must also determine how SOF will integrate with conventional forces and sustain themselves while operating in the deep area. Upon historical review, the depth and breadth of the Allied forces in World War II were remarkable, yielding lessons that inform fundamental frameworks for modern-day military sustainment. However, despite the vast industrial backing of military sustainment at the time, forward offensive forces (e.g., Jedburgh teams operating in denied areas) still relied on battlefield recovery to sustain their forces and maintain offensive momentum. This concept of battlefield recovery not only allowed the Jedburgh teams and the whole of the Allied forces to reduce the overall weight they carried but also to outmaneuver and extend their operational reach, which would not have been possible if they were reliant solely on standard military logistics.

This concept is often referred to as non-standard logistics and is typically associated with unconventional or irregular warfare and guerrilla units. This concept not only allows an offensive force to maneuver but also reduces the enemy's ability to sustain its forces and deny it the ability to recover these supplies, thus reducing the enemy's combat effectiveness. The application of non-standard sustainment to offensive forces vastly increases their ability to maintain combat agility and, overall, provides a fundamental increase in a military's lethality.

A military’s fire and maneuver fighting functions are essential to its overall lethality and combat effectiveness. However, leaders and equipment designers will often sacrifice mobility for efforts to increase protection. U. S. Army casualties sustained during the Global War on Terror led to rapid advancements in personal protective equipment and up-armored vehicles. This rapid increase in historically lightweight military vehicles saw their weight nearly double their original design weight. These innovations in military protection equipment and vehicles ultimately increased survivability; however, the enemy also adapted its tactics, techniques, and procedures by developing new munitions and improvised explosive devices to defeat these countermeasures. As a result, the U.S. military and the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan were locked in a vicious cycle, where one side spent more to protect its forces and the other side spent less. Additionally, this protective equipment required additional logistical support and resourcing, which contributed to the workload of an already stressed logistics team.

The Army continues to search for technological solutions to address the problem of maintaining combat agility. Despite advances in robotic solutions, such as the small multipurpose equipment transport or “Mule” for the logistical sustainment of ground forces, these solutions bring their own associated challenges. The increased utilization of robotics on the battlefield would likely lead to an increased electronic signature, which the enemy could use to direction-find U.S. forces. Additionally, these robotic initiatives, while designed to alleviate supply issues, would likely make U.S. ground forces less agile and dependent on technology that has yet to be battle-proven.

During this pivotal transition, the U.S. Army must empower its commanders to trade the illusion of perfect protection for the battlefield advantage of superior speed. This requires fostering a culture where calculated risk is not just accepted but seen as essential for seizing the initiative in a contested LSCO environment. The future battlefield will be won not by the force most burdened with contingencies, but by the one that can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-pace its adversary. The lessons from the Jedburghs and the philosophy of Blitzkrieg are clear: The ultimate form of force protection is the ability to overwhelm an adversary before they can effectively react, and that can only be achieved by an unburdened, agile, and relentlessly lethal force.

Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Aaron McClendon is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer with more than 18 years of service. The view, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.