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News | March 23, 2026

Resistance in Total Defense: The Role of Citizens in LSCO

By Captain Ryan Davis Special Warfare Journal

During the opening moments of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a local source reported that Russian troops were seen in Chernihiv to a local editor at a Kyiv publication. The editor - whose family and friends lived near Chernihiv, just 30 miles from the Belarus border – used the Ukrainian public service application, ‘Diia’, to upload videos of the Russian Troops advancing (Druziuk, 2022). Diia allows citizens to speak with a chatbot about what they are seeing in current time. The chatbot then uploads the information to a database verified by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and, once reviewed, provides military leaders with real-time open-source intelligence (OSINT). “In the first month of the invasion alone, 260,000 individuals used Diia to report Russian activity” (Cronin, 2023). This information allowed Ukrainian military leaders to make decisions on troop movements based on open-source reporting corroborated with other intelligence sources.

The Argument

Citizens can and should illuminate the enemy by reporting the locations, disposition, and composition of an invading force through any means necessary.

Ukraine Case Study:

Since the 2022 invasion, Ukraine has weaponized smartphones and the pervasiveness of social media to erode the opacity of the battlefield. In this model, Ukrainians have turned every citizen into a sensor. During the initial invasion and the following months, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states that about 80% of its intelligence today comes from open–source material (Tau & Volz, 2021). The ability of the Ukrainian government, military, and people to tap into this wealth of information has helped shape the war in Ukraine’s favor (Smith-Boyle, 2022). Citizens now have the means to provide geolocated enemy information to the Ukrainian Army directly from their smartphones. In the opening days of the invasion, Ukrainian citizens began posting on Twitter with images and videos of Russian convoys and fighting. OSINT analysts used this information to identify the size and locations of Russian troops. Twitter users @GirkinGirkin and @no_itsmyturn identified more than 400 vehicles in the first ten days of the invasion alone (Vandersmith, 2023). Additionally, UAWarData, an open-source website, created a map of Russian troop movements along the front line, updated every 3 days (Vandersmith, 2023). In parallel, a MapHub user created the Eyes on Russia project (Vandersmith, 2023). This project created a database of images taken in Ukraine and organized them by content, location, and date. The conglomeration of open-source information enabled Ukrainian supporters’ ability to discern the adversary's current movements and disposition.

Prior to the war, Diia was launched as a Ukrainian government app that provided public services, including payment centers for speeding fines and pothole reporting. However, after the invasion, the Ukrainian government added a feature that “allowed members of the public to send geolocated images of Russian military equipment and movements” (Milmo, 2023). Users also shared, “intelligence on officials collaborating with Moscow” (Milmo, 2023). Due to the government-produced app's previous popularity and public familiarity, citizens could report Russian activity with ease. The ability to report enemy locations was quickly added during the initial Russian invasion. The Ukrainians' successful implementation provides a powerful argument for other governments to build a similar hidden feature into widely used apps. The pre-emptive decision to add this feature would be beneficial during an enemy invasion, because it could be quickly enabled and utilized. This information is crucial not just for military decision-making but also for ensuring that governments can effectively disseminate it to citizens seeking safe passage or refuge.

Total Defense

Governments need to develop the capability and promote the willingness of all members of society to contribute in their own way. Total Defense is a concept that states “the government should enhance and institutionalize collaboration among and across governmental organizations, civic organizations, and the larger public in order to prepare the society for resistance as part of building societal resilience” (Fiala, 2023). Total Defense is not a new term or thought process. In 1980, Horst Menderhausen wrote ‘Reflections on Territorial Defense’ for The Rand Corporation. In this article, he discusses the importance of a Total Dense concept and why a mix of conventional alliances, national military forces, and the ability to harness the untapped potential of a nation’s population planning is the three-legged stool that nations should build their sovereign defense around. Total Defense is vital for countries that face a more powerful adversary. Governments need to prepare for a conflict by leveraging the country's greatest strength: its own population. With proper planning and implementation, citizens can be used as sensors during the initial stages of an invasion, when information is needed and vital to supporting national defense.

It is important to emphasize that there is an ethical messaging component that must be communicated to civilians; reporting enemy movements will categorize citizens as direct participants in hostilities. This is something not everyone will be willing to do, but for those who are, it will help them defend their country.  Additionally, a concept to understand in the context of citizens participating in armed conflict is levée en masse. “The law of Armed Conflict recognizes that a levée en masse occurs when inhabitants of a non-occupied territory spontaneously take up arms to resist an invading force without an opportunity to form into a regular armed unit. Levée en masse participants are neither required to be commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates nor wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, but gain combatant status” (NATO, 2020).  “Article 4A(6) of GC III explicitly entitles inhabitants participating in a levée en masse, upon capture, to prisoner-of-war status (NATO, 2020).  Under this article, citizens who participate in the early stages of an invasion gain all prisoner-of-war status without having to join a military unit. This status would protect citizens from being treated as criminals. This legal protection could help push citizens to act as sensors, knowing they are protected under the Geneva Convention.

Other Case Studies

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the only example of countries relying on citizens to report enemy movements. In 1940, during the Battle of Britain in WWII, the Observer Corps, composed almost entirely of volunteers, was used to spot and report German aircraft flying over the countryside and to prepare cities for incoming bombing runs (Kerrison, 2020). During this period, the volunteers were required to receive training to identify whether incoming aircraft were friendly or hostile (Kerrison, 2020). This in-depth training to identify enemy equipment has been rendered obsolete by the creation and development of AI. Now, citizens can quickly upload descriptions of what they are seeing, and the AI can identify the type, country of origin, and suspected unit of the uploaded information.

The Baltic countries are already calling on their patriotic citizens to support their National Defense Plans. In 2015, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense issued the third edition of its citizens’ guide, Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War: A Cheerful Take on Serious Recommendations. This 75-page manual focuses on a realistic invasion scenario and ways for citizens to survive and help resist the invaders. The manual primarily focuses on a Russian invasion of the country and provides Lithuanian citizens with ways to report suspicious Russian activity, basic first aid, and survival instructions. The manual specifically calls on the Lithuanian Government to “recognize that citizens are a crucial part of the country’s early warning system” and for citizens to “take video footage of the aggressive actions of enemy forces and use media available (e.g., the Internet) to transfer it to international media outlets (CNN, BBC, etc.)”(Lithuania's Ministry of National Defense, 2015).  Additionally, “as part of its early warning system, the government has even established a telephone hotline for Lithuanian citizens to report suspected foreign spies” (Fiala, 2020, 19). This is an important step; it lacks the development of current modern technology to create a more robust and reliable reporting system. Overall, this manual is a very overt and transparent form of strategic communication used to deter aggression.

The Way Ahead

Governments need to leverage existing systems to enable all citizens to rapidly report information; then they can use AI to scrub the data and provide real-time enemy information to commanders to make decisions. Many governments already have apps, phone lines, and booklets that are used to inform citizens about resistance concepts and to receive reports; however, efforts need to be made now to harness the power of a country’s patriotic population. Military commanders must take steps to harness the potential of this important intelligence asset. This will enable better Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) and Common Operating Picture (COP) development, reduce the fog of battle, and enable the elimination of adversaries in accordance with the military’s Joint Prioritized Target List (JPTL). Enabling this shift allows citizens to serve as sensors, providing real-time situational awareness of the world around them.

Military Commanders need to be prepared to operationalize OSINT reporting from their nation’s citizens. This system will not replace the traditional means in which militaries gather intelligence; it can be another means to contribute. It is crucial that users can upload detailed information quickly, which will encourage the development of a user-friendly application. The app will also need to mitigate misinformation and be able to handle a large volume of data without overloading the database. It is unnecessary for citizens to identify the exact tank nomenclature, placing the onus on AI to determine both the equipment type and origin. This information will be routed to a certified analyst who can use OSINT reporting to queue other forms of intelligence gathering. Once all the information is gathered, this now corroborated intelligence can feed the CIP/COP that commanders will use to make military decisions. It is equally important that the information be disseminated to the local government to inform civilians of current military movements and locations. This enables civilians to seek shelter or safe passage in contested conflict areas.

Author’s Note: Captain Ryan Davis is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer with more than 8 years of service. The view, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.

References
Cronin, A. K. (2023, August 25). Open Source Technology and public-private innovation are the key to Ukraine’s strategic resilience. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/open-source-technology-and-public-private-innovation-are-the-key-to-ukraines-strategic-resilience/
Druziuk, Y. (2022, April 18). A citizen-like chatbot allows Ukrainians to report to the government when they spot Russian troops - here’s how it works. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-military-e-enemy-telegram-app-2022-4
Fiala, O. C. (2020, April). Resistance Operating Concept (ROC). Joint Special Operations University. https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25
Kerrison, A. (2020). How did the observer corps help win the battle of Britain?. Imperial War Museums. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-did-the-observer-corps-help-win-the-battle-of-britain  
Lithuania’s Ministry of National Defense. (2015). Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War: a Cheerful Take on Serious Recommendations. ms, Vilnius. Retrieved 2015.
Menderhausen, H. (1980). Reflections on territorial defense. Rand.
Milmo, C. (2023, February 19). How drones, start-ups and civilian spotters have changed conflict forever in Ukraine War. The i Paper. https://inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-war-drones-start-ups-civilian-spotters-conflict-2149768
NATO Special Operations Headquarters. (2020, December 1). Comprehensive defence handbook—vol II 1 edition a ... https://www.nshq.nato.int/Library/DownloadFile/25e65162-e2f3-1d38-dd99-b7574e421d3f
Smith-Boyle, V. (2022, June 22). HOW OSINT has shaped the war in Ukraine. American Security Project. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/osint-in-ukraine/
Tau, B., & Volz, D. (2021, December 10). Defense Intelligence Agency Expected to Lead Military's Use of 'Open Source' Data. The Wall Street Journalhttps://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/defense-intelligence-agency-expected-to-lead-militarys-use-of-open-source-data-11639142686
Vandersmith, O. (2023, March). How open-source intelligence is changing warfare | Proceedings - March 2023 vol. 149/3/1,441. U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/how-open-source-intelligence-changing-warfare
 

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