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News | April 1, 2026

Historical Examples of Modern Warfighting Terms

By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kristopher Carroll Special Warfare Journal

Clear definitions are crucial for enabling a shared understanding as we adapt to modern times. This article argues that simply rebranding old military concepts with new terminology, without critically examining and learning from history, risks creating the illusion of innovation and leads us to repeat past mistakes. Without grounding our terminology in historical understanding, we risk repeating failures and overlooking successes from prior conflicts. It also presents examples of conventional forces - special operations forces integration, interoperability, and interdependence (CF-SOF I3) employed in the 20th and 21st centuries. The key argument is that effective adaptation to contemporary challenges requires both doctrinal clarity and historical insight.

Recent decades have seen major shifts in U.S. military focus and terminology. From 2001 to 2021, efforts centered on nation-building, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Now, as great power competition (GPC) has risen in prominence, China and Russia challenge the U.S. across political, military, economic, and informational domains. New doctrinal terms such as large-scale combat operations (LSCO), multi-domain operations (MDO), and joint forceable entry operations (JFEO) are prevalent. Conventional forces (CF), special operations forces (SOF), and multinational partners are collaborating for GPC. Many of these concepts have historical counterparts, reinforcing the need to learn from the past as we adapt to current challenges.

Strategic Competition

Strategic competition refers to the strategic rivalry between major world powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, characterized by competition for global influence across political, military, economic, and informational domains. The Cold War lasted from 1947 to 1991, where there were prolonged periods of geopolitical tension between the United States and the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, pitting them against the Soviet Union. It was characterized by ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, nuclear arms races, espionage, proxy wars, and political propaganda. While it did not escalate into direct large-scale warfare between the superpowers, it significantly influenced global politics, economics, and military strategy. Key events included the Berlin Blockade, Cuban Missile Crisis, Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold War (Gaddis, 2005).

GPC has strong similarities to the Cold War. Today, major peer adversaries include China and Russia, with Iran and North Korea contributing to nuclear proliferation and regional instability. China, a political, economic, informational, and military peer, threatens U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific and expands influence in Africa. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine have heightened tensions, testing the U.S. and NATO's resolve. Russian misinformation has targeted U.S. elections. Iran’s support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the former Assad Regime destabilizes the Middle East. Recent events include Hamas's attack on Israel and U.S./Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. The end of the GWOT and rising threats push the U.S. to focus on LSCO and modernize forces for MDO.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2019).

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a LSCO campaign marked by the rapid, integrated use of air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to seize critical terrain and enable follow-on operations. The campaign began with air strikes known as “shock and awe,” followed by the ground offensive from Kuwait, led by Army and Marine Corps units, supported by Air Force strikes and Navy cruise missiles (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Simultaneously, U.S. SOF played a critical role by conducting deep reconnaissance, seizing airfields, disrupting Iraqi command structures, and linking up with Kurdish forces in the north. Notably, SOF helped facilitate the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s parachute assault into northern Iraq, opening a crucial front and diverting Iraqi troops (Scales, 2004; Robinson, 2008). These actions demonstrated LSCO principles by overcoming access challenges, establishing lodgments, and rapidly deploying combat power to collapse Saddam Hussein’s regime on 9 April 2003.

The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is also a great example of MDO and JFEO. There are still some within our ranks who were part of the Iraq invasion, and we must harness their experience for GPC. A major push for many years has been CF-SOF I3, especially with the renewed emphasis on LSCO, where SOF typically plays a supporting role to the CF commander. Historical examples include Operation Just Cause in Panama, Urgent Fury in Grenada, Desert Storm in Iraq, and the Normandy landings in WWII. It is vital that SOF units participate in Comat Training Center rotations and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises so that both CF and SOF understand how to incorporate capabilities on today’s rapidly evolving battlefield. Major threats today include China invading Taiwan or Russia escalating tensions by attacking a NATO partner. Both situations could necessitate U.S. involvement in LSCO, for which we must be prepared to execute if required.

Multi-Domain Operations

Operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s (or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in time and space to achieve operational and tactical objectives. (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2018).

Blitzkrieg, or “Lightning War”, is known by U.S. doctrine as a combined arms maneuver in which multi-domain coordination is a key element (FM 3-0, 2025). Blitzkrieg used the land and air domains to conduct rapid, coordinated attacks that disrupted and overwhelmed enemy defenses. Forced modernization was a key factor that enabled the German Army to capture Western Europe. It integrated fast-moving mechanized infantry, tanks, and close air support to break through enemy lines and encircle forces (Citino, 2004). A key enabler of Blitzkrieg’s effectiveness was Germany’s advanced use of radio communication. Radios were installed in tanks and aircraft, allowing real-time coordination between ground and air units (Zaloga, 2006). This capability enabled German commanders to mass fires quickly, direct artillery and air strikes with precision, and adapt tactics on the battlefield, creating chaos among slower, less-coordinated enemy forces (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2015).

As a prelude to war, German forces aided Franco’s Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. From 1936 to 1939, German forces employed combined-arms maneuver, employing Panzer I tanks, Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers, 88mm anti-aircraft guns, and close air support. This combat experience honed Luftwaffe doctrine and armored tactics, which were vital to Germany’s early World War II successes (Alpert, 2013; Corum, 2020).

Within the Maritime domain, the German Navy wreaked havoc in the Atlantic. German U-boats sank approximately 2,779 Allied ships, totaling around 14.1 million gross registered tons of war supplies bound for the United Kingdom and other allied nations, severely threatening their war logistics, especially during the early years of the conflict (Blair, 1996). Due to technological advances, allied forces adapted tactics and gained air and maritime dominance, defeating German U-boats through convoy escorts, improved sonar and radar, long-range aircraft, and breaking Enigma codes. These innovations enabled effective tracking, interception, and destruction of U-boats, turning the tide in the Battle of the Atlantic by mid-1943 (Hinsley, 1993; Blair, 1996).

Unlike World War II, space and cyberspace domains are a dominant part of the 21st-century landscape. Advanced communication systems are quickly defeated, making their use less of an option. Information warfare is on the rise due to social media’s ability to rapidly disseminate messages. Innovation cannot come fast enough, as our competitors in GPC are rapidly adapting. The winner of the space and cyberspace domains will only maintain their dominance if they can outpace their adversary’s innovation.  Although these two domains are consuming a significant amount of our attention, we must avoid becoming target fixated. It is equally vital that we maintain our ability to dominate the land, air, and maritime domains and work in tandem with our multinational partners to integrate new capabilities in space and cyberspace.

Joint Forcible Entry Operations

Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).

The invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 (D-Day for Operation Overlord) stands as a textbook example of JFEO. Operation Overlord combined land, air, and naval forces to breach German defenses along the heavily fortified French coast and establish a crucial Allied foothold in Western Europe. Over 156,000 troops were transported across the English Channel by an immense naval armada, while U.S. and British airborne divisions conducted nighttime parachute assaults to seize key terrain, disrupt enemy movements, and isolate the beaches (Ambrose, 1994). These airborne forces enabled the amphibious landings on Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches, fulfilling core JFEO principles of seizing entry points under fire and rapidly deploying combat power inland (Hastings, 1984).

On D-Day, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and French elements supported Operation Overlord by coordinating with the French Resistance to conduct sabotage and intelligence operations. The OSS gathered vital intelligence and supplied resistance fighters to disrupt German communications. The SOE parachuted agents to train and arm local resistance elements for sabotage missions. The French carried out guerrilla warfare and sabotage behind enemy lines, hindering German reinforcements. These combined efforts delayed German responses and aided the success of the Allied landings (Foot, 2004; Kern, 2009).

There are many similarities between the Normandy invasion and how we operate today. The Allies operated as a joint and combined force, with General Eisenhower serving as the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, similar to modern terms like Joint Force Commander (JFC) and Supreme Allied Commander. The Normandy invasion included U.S. forces from the Navy, Coast Guard, Army, and the Army Air Corps. Allied participation included the U.S., British, French, Canadian, and Polish Forces, among others. Allied SOF played a key role in setting conditions for conventional forces while supporting resistance forces. Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forceable Entry Operations, emphasizes the need for rapid deployment, synchronization across domains (land, air, maritime, space, and cyber), and the integration of the amphibious force, air assault force, airborne force, and special operations force, comprising U.S. and multinational forces. This was relevant on 6 June 1944 and remains true today.

Conclusion

History shows that every breakthrough, such as advanced radios, submarines, aircraft, and satellites, was once a new technology that only became decisive when paired with lessons from past conflicts, training, and trial and error. The Taliban understood mine warfare and quickly adapted by learning to build and use improvised explosive devices. Today’s rapidly evolving technology feels like someone threw a monkey wrench into the system. In Ukraine, we are learning from history every hour by applying lessons learned within hours. By grounding our knowledge in history and lessons learned, we can integrate emerging technologies more effectively, adapt faster than our adversaries, and avoid repeating costly mistakes. To remain the dominant force and protector of the free world, we must study history, apply its lessons, and ensure that the strategist, operational planner, and rifleman are equally equipped to have a seat at the table.  Learning and understanding history will ensure you are relevant at that table.
  
Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kristopher Carroll is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer with more than 26 years of service. He wrote this as part of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course graduation requirements. The view, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.


References:
  1. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). Joint Publication 3-18: Joint Forcible Entry Operations. https://www.jcs.mil/
  2. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2018). The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1). https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf
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