One can be forgiven for not associating Gen. James Van Fleet with special operations or Special Forces. He is best known as the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army from April 1951 to February 1953 during the Korean War. The majority of Van Fleet’s career was spent in traditional infantry roles, as a machine gun battalion commander in World War I and as a regimental, division, and corps commander during World War II. However, his assignment as head of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Greece (JUSMAG-Greece) in 1948, and his leadership and design of “Operation Rat Killer” during the Korean War, should grab our attention.
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This article argues that Gen. Van Fleet’s operations in Greece and Korea hold historical weight to modern-day special operations and explores why he was considered a special operations expert by his foreign peers.
02 Modern special operations doctrine is used as a framework of analysis. U.S. policy implemented what could be argued as foreign internal defense, security cooperation, security force assistance, and counterinsurgency in the early days of the Cold War, prior to the doctrine becoming commonplace.
General James Van Fleet and the SOF Truths
General Van Fleet already surpassed what most officers would consider the pinnacle of a military career. He’d commanded a regiment, division, and an Army corps in arduous combat since landing at Utah Beach in June 1944. As fate, or rather the Army, would have it, there were two more wars ahead of Van Fleet before his retirement in 1953.
The selection of Van Fleet points to SOF Truth #1: Humans are more important than hardware, and SOF Truth #2: Quality is better than quantity.
03 At the time, few senior officers had experience with special missions, special operations, or leading coalition forces. Most of the Army’s special operations seed corn were still at field-grade rank when the Second World War ended. What made Van Fleet the top pick for JUSMAG-Greece was his reputation in combat and in training forces for combat. George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, wrote to the chief of the American mission for aid, Dwight P. Griswold, and called Van Fleet “one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders of the campaign in Europe.” Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower said Van Fleet was “…direct and forceful and has a fighting record that would make anyone respect him.”
04 Greece needed the military hardware of the U.S. to beat back the communists, but they needed to improve the quality of their Army even more.
Security Cooperation and Counterinsurgency in Greece, 1947-1949
Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was serving as deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. European Command when he was nominated by President Harry S. Truman to take over the JUSMAG-Greece, with Senate confirmation on Feb. 18, 1948.
05 Truman had two days earlier stated “that economic recovery in Greece must await the establishment of internal security.”
06 A communist guerrilla movement ravaged Greece, its economy, and civilian populace. At the time Van Fleet was confirmed, the U.S. committed $172 million to the military aid program to support the formation of 100 National Defense Corps Battalions. The local battalions would protect local villages and recruitment, “thereby freeing the Greek National Army to conduct a more offensive warfare.”
07 Van Fleet oversaw the whole project from recruiting, organizing, and training the National Defense Corps Battalions to advising and assisting the Greek Army against communist guerrillas.
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President Truman’s request to Congress and the creation of JUSMAPG-Greece as part of the Marshall Plan marked the beginning of U.S. security assistance efforts in Europe. Currently, Security Force Assistance is defined as “activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”
09 This capacity building was bought for the price of nearly $400,000,000 and less than 700 American military personnel.
10 The communist insurgency was defeated through a variety of means, however unified U.S. assistance enabled the legitimate Greek government to reassert control.
Unity of effort and command was reinforced at the national level through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of various advisory groups. JUSMAG-Greece served as a security cooperation platform—using modern doctrine—that gave a war-weary U.S. options to address communist guerrillas, nascent independence movements, and power struggles left by receding European empires. It both supported a campaign plan and acted upon U.S. national strategy while “[demonstrating] commitment to partner nations and [building] relationships to counter adversaries and major global powers.”
11 While U.S. Army Special Forces were not officially founded until 1952, the U.S. was familiar with special operations through its World War II experience.
Van Fleet’s leadership, advice, and assistance to the Greek Army foreshadowed the special forces remit that would emerge. JUSMAG-Greece aligns with the modern definition of security force assistance: “activities based on organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of Foreign Security Forces.”
12 Aside from 200,000 soldiers in the Greek Army, the infusion of capital, weapons, and training brought about “50,000 militiamen and 21,000 more in the tiny Greek navy and air force.”
13 His natural tendency to get along with his foreign colleagues is a natural fit for the cultural alignment of today’s Special Forces. He expressed love and admiration for his Greek partners, demanding that training, aggressiveness, and strong leadership become part of their military culture.
14 His Greek counterpart, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, “shared Van’s will to win.”
15
Operation Rat Killer: Joint Counterinsurgency During the Korean War
The Korean War was not just fought on the front lines along the 38th parallel. It was a brutal civil war that saw communist guerrillas establish freedom of movement zones across the southern peninsula. North Korean and Chinese-supplied guerrilla units endangered Korean civilians and allied supply lines. The insurgents operated out of the Chiri Mountains, close to major Allied units in Pusan, Taegu, and Taejon.
What is notable about Operation Rat Killer
is that Van Fleet did not lead it. He resourced it, supported it, and provided mentorship to the overall commander, Gen. Paik Sun Yup. 8th Army pulled two Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions from the front lines for “Task Force Paik,” which was supported by the ROK Air Force, Korean National Police, and U.S. Psychological Operations support from Tokyo.
16 Advising the force on Van Fleet’s behalf and led by one of his most trusted subordinates was the Korean Military Advisory Group, 60 soldiers who were “experts at operational liaison, communications, air-ground liaison, reconnaissance, or psychological warfare.”
17 The joint, combined nature of a major operation in the rear area should not be understated. It is an example of future special operations where field-grade officers would advise generals.
Counterinsurgency is defined as the “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root cause.”
18 The counterinsurgency operation began on Dec. 2, 1951, and ended in February 1952 after approximately twelve weeks of hard fighting. Although he does not cover civil government efforts in the short operational history of Rat Killer, Gen. Paik repeatedly emphasizes that local popular support was paramount to winning the battle. Local civilians provided intelligence, defections, and proved to be valuable force multipliers to his counterinsurgency efforts.
19 The communist guerrillas in the rear area were ultimately neutralized.
Training, detailed planning, and operational ownership mattered to Van Fleet. His Korean counterpart, Gen. Paik Sun Yup, met his challenges with aplomb. Even as Gen. Paik struggled to achieve tangible results in the initial phases of Rat Killer, Van Fleet remained a steadfast partner, providing joint forces support and handling the media while Gen. Paik handled the operational details.
20 It is noteworthy that Van Fleet co-authored the forward to Gen. Paik’s memoir when he was nearly 100 years old.
21 Van Fleet maintained a strong relationship with the Republic of Korea until the end of his life. Current special operators should aspire to such life-long relationships with partners and allies.
Insights
A few insights arise from studying Gen. Van Fleet and his leadership of JUSMAG-Greece and the 8th Army during the Korean War. First, we see a clear case of special operations contributions during war. Special operations forces amplify joint capabilities, especially through fires, and enhance warfighting functions, particularly in sustainment, intelligence, and mission command. Under Van Fleet, JUSMAG-Greece trained and resourced a growing Greek Army with U.S. weapons and equipment and reorganized its command and control structure.
22 Security force assistance and training gave the Greek Army mass and fires, and mobility gave them an advantage over their communist guerrillas. SOF assistance is even more robust when coupled with economic aid and aligned with strategic priorities.
Second, we see clear roles for special operations during security force assistance and during war. The former is a SOF core activity that can be interposed with deterrence, coercion, counterinsurgency, or foreign internal defense. As one Greek Army private told Time magazine in 1949, “We have the heart,” he told an American correspondent, “you have the means.”
23 The latter is the role of special operations to ensure the success of the main effort and to provide solutions to operational and strategic problems.
A tertiary insight into Gen. Van Fleet's experiences is his relentless focus on training and the establishment of training centers. As special operators, we should consider ourselves master trainers and professional soldiers. This quest for mastery is designed, structured, and organized to generate combat power during peace, conflict, and war. A noteworthy aspect of Van Fleet’s career is his previous experience as an instructor at Fort Benning’s Infantry School. Many famous World War II generals cut their teeth as instructors at various company-grade, field-grade, and senior service college schools. Do modern general officers and senior enlisted leaders have similar instructor experiences? If not, is that to our collective detriment or the detriment of our allies and partners? Mastery of the fundamentals is what our Army and our foreign partners expect of us.
Finally, studying Gen. James A. Van Fleet shows that special operations expertise is not just the purview of graduates from the Special Warfare Center and School. Special operations is an Army core competency
24 and
any Army leader must be prepared and capable of leading complex security force assistance, foreign internal defense, or counterinsurgency operations. Army leaders must be comfortable with leading and employing special operations. The right leaders don’t just show up; they are trained and prepared, through rigorous schooling and self-discipline, and with “the will to win” for such an eventuality.
25 Prior to leaving Greece, General Van Fleet said, “We must therefore be keen on diligently studying guerrilla warfare and never assume that our lesson is learned and school is over.”
26 We would do well to study his example.
Marshall McGurk is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer. He is a graduate of West Point (2005), the School of Advanced Military Studies (2023), and was a 2025 Irregular Warfare Initiative Fellow.
Endnotes
01 Korean General Paik Sun Yup praises Van Fleet’s actions in Greece multiple times in his memoir
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Van Fleet commanded the U.S. 8th Army and served as Gen. Paik’s commander, advisor, and mentor. Paik’s laudatory praise of Van Fleet’s efforts in Greece caught my attention. The author highly recommends General Paik’s memoir.
02 Paik Sun Yup.
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Potomac Books, Inc., 1999, 198.
03 USSOCOM. “SOF Truths.”
Socom.mil, 2019,
www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.
04 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., et al., eds.,
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. 21 vols. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001], 9: 2184–85.
05 Letters of Appreciation on the Third Anniversary of the Greek-Turkish Aid Program | Harry S. Truman.”
Trumanlibrary.gov, 2026, www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/142/letters-appreciation-third-anniversary-greek-turkish-aid-program. Accessed 1 Feb. 2026
06 Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Second Report on Assistance to Greece and Turkey | Harry S. Truman.”
Trumanlibrary.gov, 2025,
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/28/special-message-congress-transmitting-second-report-assistance-greece-and
07 Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Second Report on Assistance to Greece and Turkey | Harry S. Truman.”
Trumanlibrary.gov, 2025,
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/28/special-message-congress-transmitting-second-report-assistance-greece-and
08 Braim, Paul.
The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet. Naval Institute Press, 2001, 160, 163.
09 A Congressional research service report defines SFA as “activities based on organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of Foreign Security Forces.” JUSMAG-Greece fits both definitions. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress.
www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/RS21048/RS21048.88.pdf.
10 TIME. “GREECE: With Will to Win.”
TIME, 23 May 1949, time.com/archive/6785647/greece-with-will-to-win/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2026.
11 Field Manual 3-05,
Army Special Operations, Department of the Army. Army Publishing Directorate, Washington, DC. 26 June 2025, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44116-FM_3-05-000-WEB-1.pdf, 33.
12 USSOCOM. “USSOCOM.”
Socom.mil, 2019,
www.socom.mil/about/core-activities.
13 TIME. “GREECE: With Will to Win.”
TIME, 23 May 1949, time.com/archive/6785647/greece-with-will-to-win/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2026.
14 TIME. “GREECE: With Will to Win.”
TIME, 23 May 1949, time.com/archive/6785647/greece-with-will-to-win/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2026.
15 Braim, Paul.
The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet. Naval Institute Press, 2001, 189.
16 Paik Sun Yup.
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Potomac Books, Inc., 1999, 180-181.
17 Paik Sun Yup.
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Potomac Books, Inc., 1999, 183.
18 Field Manual 3-05,
Army Special Operations, Department of the Army. Army Publishing Directorate, Washington, DC. 26 June 2025, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44116-FM_3-05-000-WEB-1.pdf., 78.
19 Paik Sun Yup.
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Potomac Books, Inc., 1999, 184-186, 191.
20 Paik Sun Yup.
From Pusan to Panmunjom. Potomac Books, Inc., 1999, 187.
21 The other co-author was General Matthew Ridgeway, Commander in Chief of United Nations Command from 1950-1952. Van Fleet retired in February 1953, and the Korean War ended with the armistice on 27 July 1953.
22 Braim, Paul.
The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet. Naval Institute Press, 2001, 169, 190-193.
23 TIME. “GREECE: With Will to Win.”
TIME, 23 May 1949, time.com/archive/6785647/greece-with-will-to-win/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2026.
24 Army Doctrine Publication 1-0
The Army. Army Publishing Directorate, Washington, DC, 31 July 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18008-ADP_1-000-WEB-2.pdf, 2-8.
25 For a biography of General James A. Van Fleet, see Braim, Paul.
The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet. Naval Institute Press, 2001. While it covers Van Fleet’s commands in Greece and Korea, Operation
Rat Killer is not mentioned.
26 Braim, Paul.
The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet. Naval Institute Press, 2001, 222.