Over the last 20 years, the U.S. military has been highly focused on counterinsurgency operations as we engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This focus, along with expertise in irregular warfare and partner force operations, enabled Special Forces to take a predominant role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today we face a different world. Competition among the great powers is increasing, requiring the U.S. military to shift focus to prepare for LSCO undertaken against a peer enemy. This transition is a natural fit for the conventional force as tankers prepare for armored clashes, naval officers plan fleet engagements, and pilots contemplate a world without airspace supremacy. For Special Forces, this shift can be more confusing. As divisions and corps become the units of action, where does a small team of Green Berets fit?
The answer to this question may rest with a little-known, highly classified U.S. Army special operations unit that operated in the Southwest Pacific during WWII. The 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit, better known as the Alamo Scouts, lacks the glamour and present-day name recognition of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sponsored Jedburghs. However, their operational history provides an outstanding framework to conceptualize and articulate the value of modern Special Forces, particularly in the Pacific. Throughout WWII, the Alamo Scouts completed special reconnaissance, deep sensing, partner force liaison, and direct-action missions to accomplish theater campaign objectives and enable conventional force maneuver.
Who were the Alamo Scouts? In 1942, the Imperial Japanese military raised the Rising Sun banner over the Philippines and steamrolled through Papua New Guinea on their way to Australia. General MacArthur licked his wounds in Brisbane and planned his drive back through New Guinea to the Philippines. Operationally frustrated, Gen. MacArthur refused to allow any forces in theater that were not under his control; he perceived defeat as a personal humiliation and craved victory to receive personal glory. In this spirit, Gen. MacArthur viewed the OSS as an outside entity that would steal credit and undermine him politically in Washington. Lt. Gen. Krueger, Gen. MacArthur’s field commander leading the 6th Army, still saw a need for pre-invasion and deep-area intelligence gathering and special operations. In the absence of the OSS, Lt. Gen. Krueger is forced to develop his own capability.
Lt. Gen. Krueger knew that the campaign to drive the Japanese out of New Guinea and the Philippines will require unprecedented levels of Army-Navy cooperation to amphibiously maneuver throughout the archipelagos. Lt. Gen. Krueger knew that timely, accurate intelligence on terrain and enemy force composition was vital to the 6tth Army’s success. He issued direct orders to establish the Alamo Scouts to fulfill these goals. He termed the tasks “raider work”, which consisted of amphibious special reconnaissance in the jungles, mountains, and swamps of the South Pacific.
The Alamo Scouts were organized into small, 6- or 7-man teams with minimal staff superstructure. Their training was conducted in-theater, first on New Guinea and later in the Philippines. The training focused on amphibious infiltration, special reconnaissance, and jungle survival and patrolling. Once formed, Alamo Scout teams reported directly to Lt. Gen. Krueger. As a result, the Alamo Scouts were extremely responsive to 6th Army requirements. Subordinate commanders were unable to sideline or misallocate them. When the Alamo Scouts deployed, it was in support of 6th Army’s priority intelligence requirements to accomplish tasks from the highest level of command in the theater.
The Alamo Scouts’ specialty throughout the war was special reconnaissance. Prior to amphibious operations, they infiltrated to provide critical intelligence that shaped the operational maneuver plan. They worked closely with Navy and Army Air Force elements. Their missions directly impacted major operational decisions throughout the theater. On Luzon, in response to guerrilla reports of massive concealed Japanese artillery emplacements blocking 6th Army’s planned advance route, Alamo Scout teams deployed into the deep area. Operating in small teams behind enemy lines, the scouts identified Japanese artillery and reported target coordinates for airstrikes and long-range artillery fire. This contribution directly enabled the 6th Army to break through Japanese defenses and drive toward Manila.
As the war continued, the Alamo Scouts’ portfolio expanded to include unconventional warfare and indigenous force liaison. In the Philippines, guerrilla forces fought valiantly for years, either independently or under U.S. officers. However, many of these units had been disconnected from Gen. MacArthur’s headquarters and were critically short of resources and munitions. Capitalizing on expertise in maritime operations, jungle patrolling, and military mountaineering, Alamo Scout teams infiltrated behind enemy lines to coordinate with guerrilla formations. Their ability to resupply, advise, and lead the guerrillas directly supported the 6th Army’s operational plan.
The Alamo Scouts efforts are perfectly exemplified by their legendary 1945 raid to rescue Allied prisoners of war (POW) from the Japanese POW camp at Cabanatuan. In response to a highly time-sensitive tasking, Alamo Scout teams infiltrated the area and gathered timely intelligence on camp defenses and Japanese disposition and activities. Simultaneously, they coordinated Filipino guerrilla operations to support the 6th Ranger Battalion assault on the camp itself. Highly trained and equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment, the Alamo Scouts provided crucial command and control linkages between Philippine guerrillas and U.S. commanders.
In the current operational environment, the joint force faces a daunting prospect as it contemplates LSCO in the Pacific. Naval and air elements will predominate, and conventional ground operations will require island hopping and contested maneuver through unforgiving terrain. Just getting to the fight will require accurate intelligence and targeting data. Of necessity, ground combat scenarios will depend heavily on indigenous forces due to resource constraints. The time, difficulty, and danger involved in getting U.S. divisions and corps to the area of operations will further complicate operations.
In this operational environment, Special Forces will find themselves essential to joint force commanders. However, their role may require a mindset shift. During the GWOT, Special Forces frequently operated as the main effort. In LSCO, Special Forces must understand that their job is to enable conventional maneuvers at the division, corps, or higher echelon. Special Forces are built to operate in the deep area; conduct special reconnaissance and terminal guidance operations (TGO); train, advise, and lead indigenous partner forces; and execute or facilitate direct action strikes on high-priority targets. Special Forces exist to create dilemmas for adversaries through the indigenous approach. Their unique selection, equipment, and training allow them to plan and conduct operations forward of the conventional force, in sensitive and resource-constrained environments.
However, these missions must be tied to joint force maneuver objectives. Ultimately, special operations victories do not matter if the conventional force cannot defeat the enemy, achieve ground dominance, or receive critical information. Special operations forces (SOF) must avoid rendering themselves irrelevant through stove-piped, cumbersome command structures that lead to provincialism and niche taskings. The Alamo Scouts were successful because they reported directly to Lt. Gen. Krueger. Further, they filled a specific gap and Lt. Gen. Krueger ensured that Alamo Scout efforts directly supported 6th Army campaign plans.
Throughout the war, the Alamo Scouts maintained a lean and operationally focused structure. They accomplished objectives with minimal staff and intermediate commanders, unlike the massive superstructure of staff and layers of subordinate command that burden and slow modern SOF. When faced with a dilemma requiring a Scout team’s capabilities, Lt. Gen. Krueger provided the scouts with his intent and the priority intelligence requirements. The Alamo Scouts, in turn, conducted their mission planning, deployed, and executed the mission within a responsive timeline—sometimes in a matter of days rather than weeks.
The Alamo Scouts were responsive and successful because of two-way trust and respect between the Alamo Scouts and Lt. Gen. Krueger. This trust allowed for extremely rapid results because of the direct link between Lt. Gen. Krueger and his operators. Orders, Concept of Operation(s) (CONOP(s)), and reporting were not delayed due to layers of bureaucracy, but were streamlined to allow Lt. Gen. Krueger (or a direct, trusted deputy) and an Alamo Scout team leader to discuss operations while standing over a map together.
This personal command relationship—and minimized staff insulation—will be difficult to replicate in the modern military structure. To mitigate, special operations command and control elements should be present at high-level operational headquarters to ensure that joint force commanders task Special Forces with operations that are suitable for their skillset. This will ensure that Special Forces planning and operations accurately reflect joint force requirements and support the commander’s campaign plan.
SOF integration should not stop with the Army. Integration should be a priority across the joint force. Particularly in the Pacific, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force commanders often have primacy in planning and operations. SOF must build iterative, integrated relationships with these force providers and operational headquarters at the fleet and Marine expeditionary force level. This coordination will ensure the commander and staff fully understand the capabilities best way to utilize a SOF element.
A key ingredient in building these integrative relationships will be partnering to train special operations-conventional force integration at a much deeper level than is currently practiced. Special Forces companies and operational detachment alphas (ODAs) must grow accustomed to working for conventional force commanders, and those commanders must learn to use Special Forces to best effect. The incredibly lean and direct command relationship between Lt. Gen. Krueger and the Alamo Scouts was effective because of trust and familiarity between commander and operators.
Lt. Gen. Krueger was intimately familiar with the Alamo Scouts’ capabilities. He developed their selection and training. This led to a level of trust and mutual respect that was reinforced with every successful mission. Lt. Gen. Krueger knew what his Alamo Scouts could do, and he gave them the independence to do it. In turn, the Alamo Scouts gave him unparalleled results, successfully executing at least 100 known missions over their two years of existence while never suffering a POW or KIA.
Today, the greatest barrier to interoperability is unfamiliarity. While the doctrine guiding Special Forces exists in field manuals and joint publications, limited joint training between conventional and special forces prevents the ingrained understanding of the capabilities and limitations of Special Forces. To overcome this current status quo requires a persistent, iterative partnership in garrison and field exercises. Combat training center rotations and international partnered exercises are an excellent venue to test integration, but SOF and conventional units must build and maintain those relationships prior to deployment.
Virtually all Special Forces groups and forward-stationed battalions are co-located with major conventional forces. While conventional and SOF daily training is conducted in their own compounds, the Army does not exist in a vacuum. Conventional and SOF elements should reach across their respective fences to collaborate for training exercises. This ground-level approach to joint training should include conventional Army units, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen as often as possible to foster mutual understanding and trust.
While many Special Forces units and conventional units already attempt to build relationships; these initiatives should be encouraged and resourced at the highest level possible to build trust and familiarity across the entire force. It is rare to see a conventional infantry exercise at battalion level or higher that could not benefit from Special Forces expertise, and vice versa.
Beyond the immediate benefit of exercise collaboration, there are opportunities to cross-pollinate knowledge and expertise between leaders in Special Forces and conventional force formations. A junior Non-Commissioned Officer(s) (NCO(s)) on an ODA is highly trained, but that NCO(s) can learn from a veteran infantry platoon sergeant. While these exercises at home station may be small scale, they are important as sets and repetitions to build trust and confidence between conventional and Special Forces leaders. This in turn leads to better results as units partner at combat training center rotations and multinational exercises, and ultimately to seamless integration in combat.
Forging these relationships across the force will require humility from Special Forces and conventional force commanders as well as a high level of professionalism from operators. At ground level, operators must project professionalism, discipline, and competence. At the command and staff level, Special Forces companies and battalions must work to demonstrate value in joint force exercises which bring together multiple services. Special Forces leaders who have been accustomed to conventional forces supporting their operations must not balk as the role is reversed. Instead, they must educate their conventional counterparts and senior leaders on how they can best be utilized. Special Forces must continuously work to reestablish their reputation as an elite, specially trained unit that can go places and do things the conventional force cannot.
As the U.S. military prepares for LSCO across the archipelagos of the Pacific, we must leverage historical lessons from the last successful archipelagic campaign against a peer adversary. The Alamo Scouts’ operations are not just legends and war stories, but rather a blueprint for Special Forces’ role in LSCO, particularly in the Pacific theater. The Alamo Scouts’ ingenuity, flexibility, and ability to excel in special operations tasks, all enabled by their integrated link with 6th Army Headquarter(s) (HQ) and Lt. Gen Krueger’s objectives, provide a case study for the future fight encapsulating the need for full integration and painting a picture of that integration in action. The Alamo Scouts achieved massive successes through audacity, flexibility, and by aligning their unconventional skills with conventional force objectives; as their 21st century heirs, we must follow their example to win the next war.
References
Stringer, K. D. (2021). Force Integration in Resistance Operations: Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts. Joint Force Quarterly, 102. https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-View/Article/2692835/force-integration-in-resistance-operations-dutch-jedburghs-and-us-alamo-scouts/
Finlayson, K. (2008). Alamo Scouts Diary. Veritas, 4(3). https://arsof-history.org/articles/v4n3_alamo_scouts_page_1.html
Michael, K. E. (2018). Rescue at Cabanatuan: A Tactical Masterpiece of World War II. Veritas, 14(2). https://arsof-history.org/articles/v14n2_cabanatuan_page_1.html
Alexander, L. (2014). Shadows in the jungle: the Alamo scouts behind Japanese lines in World War II. New York: New American Library.
Camp, R. D. (2013). Shadow warriors: the untold stories of American special operations during WWII. MBI Pub. Company LLC and Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing.
Dilley, M. F. (2013). Behind the lines: a critical survey of special operations in World War II. Pennsylvania: Casemate.