Denied-area operations in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) require Green Berets to provide their own sustainment. For this article, the focus is only on food procurement, as the saying often attributed to Napoleon goes, “An army marches on its stomach.” In 20 years within the special operations community, I have never practiced or trained on sustainment operations during pre-mission training, especially for deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). We have always prioritized tactical training, and rightfully so. The GWOT Era rarely required sustainment training as we had staging bases throughout the area of operation.

Particularly for the Special Forces Operational Detachment- Alpha (SFOD-A) located on a large base, there were multiple dining facilities offering four full meals a day. For SFOD-As operating in austere environments, regular air drops delivered all classes of supply. Currently, SFOD-As are training for LSCO. We will no longer dominate the air domain as we had during GWOT, and as a result, air and ground resupply will not be possible. If SFOD-As are to be successful in LSCO, they must allocate training time towards sustainment operations in three forms: local procurement, battlefield recovery, and foraging.

My vision of LSCO, as it applies to an SFOD-A, is that teams will operate in denied areas where air and ground resupply is impossible. Teams will be expected to remain in these denied areas for extended periods—weeks, months, and maybe even years. In a training event at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Hawaii, teams attempted to replicate these conditions in a warm environment. Teams packed the usual Robin Sage rucksack with overpacked MREs, batteries, and Class 5 (ammunition). Teams discovered that without a reliable food resupply method, their operational duration was only a few days. Water was easy to find and filter—especially if individuals had personally purchased water filtration systems. However, food was the limiting factor.

So, how should an SFOD-A procure food? For a Green Beret who experienced Robin Sage, local procurement, battlefield recovery, and foraging are known methods. Local procurement might be as simple as personally buying food or having someone else buy it. Battlefield recovery is another method, but it carries significant risk, as it puts teams in direct confrontation with the enemy. Finally, teams could forage their own food by fishing and hunting.

How do we train these procurement methods? For local procurement, the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) is the primary training method for unconventional warfare. Teams on a JCET should focus on area familiarization, exploring local foods and cooking methods, and preparing meals from local ingredients. We all know teammates who only eat safety food—predominantly Western-style cuisine—on a JCET, but we need to get them away from this mentality. The counterargument is, “We have too much going on with training.”

While tactical training is paramount, a detachment that cannot feed itself is not tactically useful beyond a few days. For battlefield recovery, full mission profile scenarios should be longer to stress the sustainment aspect of operations. We need to test and validate that teams can sustain long-term operations. Training scenarios should not end after “actions on objective.” Technically, they are only halfway done. Finally, foraging may be unpopular with commands. But teams must train in procuring food from plants, fish, and game animals. Unless the individual Green Beret hunts and fishes on the weekends, the majority of modern Green Berets are untrained when it comes to food procurement, processing, and preparation for consumption in an austere environment.

SFOD-As are generally proficient in their tactical skills. Of course, we can always do better, but we should not forget that people need to eat. If we are expected to operate for “extended periods of time,” we must train to sustain the fight. Higher echelons have directed SFOD-As to operate in denied areas during LSCO. Resupply simply isn’t going to happen the way it did during GWOT. Detachments must be fully self-sufficient if they are to survive long-term in a denied area.
           
Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Yuwei Lee is a Regular Army Soldier and Special Forces Officer with more than 27 years of total service. He wrote this as part of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course graduation requirements. The views, opinions, and analyses expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.