Introduction

To maintain its decisive edge, the Army must shift its culture from a constraint-based mindset to one that strategically embraces prudent risk in decision-making. This recalibration is especially true for Special Forces commanders at lower echelons, who often operate with limited support and high autonomy. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) created a risk-averse culture and a lack of empowered leadership at lower echelons, which will limit the effectiveness of United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) support to conventional forces during future large-scale combat operations (LSCO). This article provides historical context for SOF risk tolerance, examines the challenges and benefits of high-risk operations, and identifies ways to develop risk-tolerant leaders.

Historical Context

During the GWOT era, technological advances allowed commanders at higher echelons to maintain continuous oversight, enabling them to scrutinize tactical operations. The nature of counterterrorism (CT) operations against an adversary that presented a myriad of asymmetric threats, such as improvised explosive devices and insider attacks, combined with the political pressure to minimize casualties, drove advancements in command-and-control systems and command oversight requirements. Constant blue force tracking and the standing requirement to utilize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets during operations provided persistent situational awareness for higher echelons of command. This allowed commanders to micro-manage operations and led to the implementation of a series of controls to reduce risk to the force. Excessive control fostered a risk-averse culture in which constant operational oversight limited tactical commanders’ decision-making and, at times, led to decision paralysis due to fear of reprisal from higher.

As the shift towards LSCO becomes prevalent, tactical commanders must be empowered to make sound decisions based on their own risk analysis and knowledge of the operational environment. Commanders at higher echelons must become comfortable with less visibility of maneuver elements in a communications-denied environment against a near-peer adversary. As SOF seeks to support conventional forces in LSCO, this mindset shift must be embraced at all levels to empower subordinate commanders and ensure mission success.

Challenges and Benefits of High-Risk Operations

There are many challenges with high-risk operations conducted during LSCO, foremost among them a projected increase in casualties during combat operations. As SOF strives to provide value to conventional forces in LSCO, they will likely be tasked to provide effects on the periphery and in the deep space, contrary to the conduct of CT operations during GWOT. In an article posted on War on the Rocks, Spencer Reed discusses how future combat operations in denied areas will create dilemmas for commanders by writing, “The Golden Hour concept undoubtedly saved hundreds if not thousands of lives in Iraq and Afghanistan by decreasing the time between injury and medical care. However, the concept assumes the existence of resources and access that will not be present during a future fight with a strategic adversary.”⁰¹ Limited air superiority will degrade medical evacuation capabilities and reduce friendly force freedom of maneuver. This will force commanders to balance risk acceptance with mission success while facing critical resource limitations with potential strategic consequences. As the focus of SOF operations shifts toward LSCO, subordinate leaders face the additional challenge of convincing commanders at echelon to break the mold and adopt a culture that supports calculated risk to overcome future dilemmas.

There are significant benefits to commanders embracing calculated risk during LSCO. Calculated risk-taking provides opportunities for decisive action against strategic competitors, increasing overall lethality and effectiveness. A key to empowerment is the refinement of rules of engagement (ROE), which, during GWOT, were typically viewed as a constraint. Lieutenant General (retired) Milford Beagle Jr. writes, “Considering the scale, scope, and violence of LSCO—as envisioned by TRADOC⁰²—the ROE will need to be permissive to effectively execute mission command with the appropriate level of control.”⁰³ Fostering a culture that grooms tactical leaders to take calculated risks based on a comprehensive understanding of ROE, refined for LSCO, will encourage them to adapt and respond quickly to evolving threats in an ambiguous environment.

A modern-day example of the effectiveness of reducing risk-adversity is demonstrated by Ukrainian SOF tactical commanders in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Doug Livermore emphasizes this in an article in Small Wars Journal, “Ukrainian SOF have consistently shown their ability to quickly adopt new technologies and tactics based on battlefield feedback. Perhaps most importantly, they have implemented flexible command structures that enable decentralized decision-making at tactical levels, allowing for rapid response to emerging threats and opportunities.”⁰⁴ A decentralized decision-making process encourages outside-the-box thinking and reinforces the development of ground-breaking solutions to address complex problems. Additionally, an unencumbered decision-making process allows leaders to gain experience in high-risk situations, which enhances their ability to make quick assessments that enable rapid decisions.

Reducing Risk-Adversity

There are several ways that the SOF enterprise can develop the next generation of effective tactical leaders, the first being training and education. As the force transitions from GWOT to LSCO, it is imperative that units focus on realistic, high-risk training that will force subordinate commanders to make decisions in an uncertain environment. The Army’s Combat Training Centers must ensure their scenarios offer realistic, complex dilemmas that force junior leaders to adapt and develop innovative solutions. With this in mind, it is essential that commanders at echelon promote a culture that encourages leaders to learn from their failures. Subordinate leaders must be allowed to make mistakes and learn from them without fear of reprisal. In today’s ever-changing environment, adaptability is the key to success. An example of this is training in communications denied environments that replicate projected conditions during LSCO. As SOF seeks to support LSCO by conducting operations in the deep fight, it is imperative that commanders are comfortable with minimal oversight and communication with tactical elements. Gone are the days of constant situation reports. Commanders must have full trust and confidence in their subordinate leaders' ability to make sound decisions in the face of adversity.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.⁰⁵ The principles of mission command (competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance) and their implementation are critical to success during SOF operations in support of LSCO. Commanders must clearly define their intent and have trust in their subordinates to seize the initiative to successfully accomplish high-risk missions. It is critical to instill the tenets of mission command at all levels while encouraging tactical leaders to take risks that could have strategic implications.

Conclusion

The importance of creating a culture of calculated risk-acceptance at all echelons is critical to keeping pace with near-peer competitors during LSCO. While GWOT created a culture of risk-adversity, the focus must shift to empowering subordinate leaders. These leaders must be taught to be adaptable so they can make timely, well-informed decisions about actions which may have strategic implications. A shift in mindset, realistic training, and the instillation of the tenets of mission command from senior commanders will breed a new generation of capable leaders, flexible and confident in their decision-making. We must embrace change if we are to be successful in modern conflict.

Author’s Note: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Matthew van der Graaff is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer with more than 19 years of service. He wrote this as part of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course graduation requirements. The view, opinions, and analysis expressed do not represent the position of the U.S. Army or the Department of War.

References

01  Reed, S. (2023). Recalibrating special operations risk tolerance for the future fight. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/recalibrating-special-operations-risk-tolerance-for-the-future-fight/

02  Editor’s Note: TRADOC merged with U.S. Army Futures Command to form a new command, U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM) as of Oct. 1, 2025

03  Beagle Jr., Lt. Gen. M., Berger III, Lt. Gen. J., & Einhorn, Lt. Col. J. (n.d.). Lethal force, risk, and LSCO: Preparing for permissive rules of engagement in large-scale combat operations. Army University Press. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2025-OLE/Lethal-Force-Risk-and-LSCO/

04  Livermore, D. (2025). Ukraine Special Operations Forces and the lessons learned for large-scale combat operations. Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/31/ukraine-special-operations-forces/

05  Headquarters, Department of the Army. Mission Command. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0. Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Publishing Directorate, 2019.