July 2, 2026

Sparking a Discussion About Transient Criminality: Excerpts from The Deceptive Delinquent to The Illusive Illicit Alien

Border security professionals lack confidence in combating transient criminality due to insufficient training as well as inadequate communication and intelligence-sharing within their networks. Transient criminal enterprises have evolved significantly, especially since the 1920s, with their activities intensifying during the 1980s and 1990s, driven by South American drug cartels (Glenny, 2008; Liddick, 2004). These criminal organizations have proven to be more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive than U.S. homeland security policies (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021). While specialized cross-silo collaborative efforts such as Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), and Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) exist, this analysis argues that systemic gaps persist. Scholars and practitioners have missed opportunities to counter these threats due to deficiencies in intelligence processes and a lack of psychosocial training programs, indicating that lessons from existing task forces have not been institutionalized across the broader security apparatus.

Nov. 25, 2024

Strategic Disruption: An Operational Framework for Irregular Warfare

FORT LIBERTY, NC — The effectiveness of special operations forces (SOF) in irregular warfare is hindered by the lack of a clear and structured operational-level framework tailored to irregular warfare, akin to what large-scale combat operations (LSCO) offers in conventional warfare. Whereas LSCO provides a systematic framework for planning and preparing for conventional warfare, the concept of irregular warfare lacks any such framework – irregular warfare lacks its LSCO, so to speak. The absence of this nested, operational-level concept has introduced ambiguity for Army special operations forces (ARSOF). The broader joint force community has led to varied interpretations and approaches to irregular warfare. This ambiguity complicates the understanding of irregular warfare and challenges planners to align their efforts effectively.