Introduction
Border security professionals lack confidence in combating transient criminality due to insufficient training as well as inadequate communication and intelligence-sharing within their networks. Transient criminal enterprises have evolved significantly, especially since the 1920s, with their activities intensifying during the 1980s and 1990s, driven by South American drug cartels (Glenny, 2008; Liddick, 2004). These criminal organizations have proven to be more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive than U.S. homeland security policies (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021). While specialized cross-silo collaborative efforts such as Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), and Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) exist, this analysis argues that systemic gaps persist. Scholars and practitioners have missed opportunities to counter these threats due to deficiencies in intelligence processes and a lack of psychosocial training programs, indicating that lessons from existing task forces have not been institutionalized across the broader security apparatus.
This article aims to spark discussions about border security professionals’ ability to employ their capabilities, competencies, and capacities, coined “Triple C’s” against transient criminal activities. It emphasizes the need for improved collaboration, enriched training programs, and the integration of social science concepts to proactively identify emerging transient criminal organizations and their recruits.
Setting the Stage
Combatting transient criminality is challenging for U.S. border security professionals due to the multitude of illicit activities such as drugs, weapon, human and sex trafficking (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made strides in countering organized border crime, gaps remain in identifying and addressing the sociological drivers of criminal behavior (DeLisi, 2016).
Rational choice theory is a criminological framework that seeks to explain why individuals engage in criminal behavior by analyzing the decision-making processes behind their actions. According to this theory, individuals are rational actors who make deliberate choices based on a cost-benefit analysis of their circumstances. When deciding whether to commit a crime, they weigh the potential rewards, such as financial gain, social status, or other personal benefits, against the risks, including the likelihood of apprehension, legal penalties, and moral or social consequences. This theory assumes that people have the capability to evaluate their options and then make a calculated decision on whether to commit a crime, rather than an impulsive act.
Albanese (2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020) emphasizes the importance of understanding the factors that influence this decision-making process. For example, individuals may be more likely to engage in criminal behavior if the perceived rewards outweigh the risks due to weak law enforcement, low penalties, or social environments that normalize or even incentivize criminal activity. Conversely, the presence of strong deterrents, such as effective policing, severe punishments, or community programs offering legitimate opportunities, can tip the scales and discourage criminal behavior.
Rational choice theory also highlights the role of situational factors in shaping decisions. For instance, a person may be more inclined to commit a crime if they believe the chances of getting caught are low or if they are in a setting where oversight is minimal. Similarly, economic hardship, lack of education, or limited access to legitimate opportunities can make crime appear to be the most rational option for achieving personal goals or merely surviving. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policymakers and border security enforcement agencies in designing interventions that reduce the appeal of criminal behavior by increasing risks or enhancing rewards for lawful alternatives.
The concept of transient criminality is defined as “illegal activities that move goods, people, and services between or across geographical borders and barriers” (Palme, 2024). Transnational criminal organizations differ from other organized crime entities due to their geo-dispersity, organizational composition, and cross-border operations (Shelley & Picarelli, 2010; Albanese, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019). Although transient criminality and transnational criminal organizations indeed have an intermeshing relationship, there is a current missing hierarchical acknowledgement in the U.S. DHS’ doctrine to provide U.S. border security. This discrepancy is found in the lack of the term “transient” in the Department of War’s (DOW) policies, authorizations, and designations of foreign and domestic U.S. border threats. The DOW continues to limit both its U.S. law enforcement and military responses to border security threats because the definition of “transnational” requires criminal or terroristic activities to cross international borders. This creates a significant potential friction point regarding authorities, limiting the capacity for Title 10 forces to assist DHS and other law enforcement officials (LEOs) in domestic-facing operations unless a clear international link is established. The remedy for this authoritative limitation is simple: Replacing “transnational” with “transient” allows all border security agencies to aggressively arrest and attack the Transnational Criminal Enterprise (TCE).
The southern U.S. border has seen a 30% increase in trafficking-related criminal activity over the last two decades (DEA, 2023; FBI, 2023; ATF, 2023). This growth necessitates a framework for preparing border security professionals to combat transient criminal recruitment. Vulnerable populations are increasingly targeted for recruitment, exacerbating the challenges faced by border security agencies. Furthermore, globalization has fundamentally reshaped the dynamics of international trade and communication, enabling the rapid movement of goods, services, and people across borders. While these developments have brought significant economic and cultural benefits, they have also created new vulnerabilities and challenges for border security. Albanese (2015) highlights how globalization has facilitated the movement of illicit goods, such as drugs, weapons, counterfeit products, and other contraband, as well as the trafficking of people for exploitation, including forced labor and sex trafficking. The interconnectedness of global markets and the advancement of transportation and communication technologies have made it easier for criminal enterprises to operate across borders, exploiting gaps in international cooperation and enforcement.
One of the key challenges posed by globalization is the sheer scale and complexity of monitoring border activity. The volume of legitimate trade and travel has increased exponentially, making it more difficult for border security personnel to identify and intercept illicit activities without disrupting lawful commerce. Criminal organizations take advantage of this complexity by using sophisticated methods to conceal their operations, such as blending illegal goods with legitimate shipments, using fraudulent documentation, or employing advanced technologies to evade detection. Furthermore, the rise of global supply chains has created opportunities for illicit goods to be moved through multiple countries, complicating efforts to trace their origins and disrupt their distribution networks.
Globalization has also facilitated the movement of people, both legally and illegally, which presents additional challenges for border security. Human trafficking and smuggling have become transnational issues, with criminal networks exploiting porous borders, weak enforcement mechanisms, and vulnerable populations. Migrants seeking better opportunities or fleeing conflict are often targeted by traffickers, who use globalization's infrastructure such as international transportation systems and digital communication platforms to coordinate their operations. Border security agencies must balance the need to address these crimes with humanitarian concerns, ensuring that vulnerable individuals are protected while criminal networks are dismantled.
Moreover, globalization has increased the need for international cooperation and intelligence-sharing among countries to address transnational crimes effectively. Criminal organizations often operate across jurisdictions, taking advantage of inconsistencies in laws, enforcement practices, and border security capabilities. This necessitates the development of multilateral agreements, joint operations, and shared technological tools to combat illicit activities. However, differences in political priorities, resource allocation, and legal frameworks can hinder these efforts, leaving gaps that criminals can exploit.
Forging Effective Cross-Silo Collaboration
Valuable lessons from existing partnerships between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the DOW can significantly enhance cross-silo collaborative efforts within specialized units like JTF-SB, JIATF-W, and JIATF-S, primarily by emphasizing unified effort, robust intelligence sharing, and clear operational frameworks. A core takeaway is the necessity of "unity of effort," driven by leadership commitment to foster a shared purpose and break down agency-specific barriers, as exemplified by JTF-West's Operation "All In," which successfully disrupted smuggling networks by integrating personnel from CBP, ICE, and the Coast Guard into a cohesive team (US GAO, 2017). This integration is critically dependent on structured intelligence and information sharing, moving beyond informal networks to a formalized process. The success of JIATF-S, often considered the "gold standard" of interagency cooperation, is built upon its ability to network law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets, a model that overcomes the persistent challenge of information silos (Thoumi, 2022). Adopting centralized, AI-powered platforms can further automate threat detection and ensure seamless, real-time data sharing among all partners. However, for such collaboration to be effective, it must be guided by a clear mission and supported by outcome-based performance metrics, a lesson learned from early DHS JTF challenges which were later addressed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to justify resource allocation and prove operational value (US GOA, 2019).
This framework is strengthened through regular joint training and cross-border cooperation, which build the mutual trust and interoperability essential for complex international operations, similar to how JIATF-S leverages its partnerships with 20 other nations. Finally, it is crucial to proactively address the potential friction points arising from different legal and jurisdictional authorities, particularly the "who's in charge?" dilemma between military and law enforcement entities (Manwaring, 2005). This requires establishing clear protocols and memorandums of understanding that define roles and designate a lead federal agency based on the specific nature of a threat, ensuring a swift and coordinated response.
The Discussion
A concerted effort is required to address the rise in transient criminality and the TCE’s continued recruitment surge. Additionally, an enhanced border security operations training pipeline and standardized testing methods require development and redesign. The current training program and resource distributions to combat and compete with the TCE fails to adequately prepare practitioners. To improve communication and coordination during transient criminal events, a leadership framework, similar to emergency management’s Incident Command System, should be established. Enhanced training programs are also necessary, involving collaboration between academics and experienced field agents to co-develop and deliver curricula focused on transient criminality, supported by federal funding and a stringent selection process. Additionally, a Joint Operations Advisory Board comprising representatives from local, state, and federal partners—including the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its components like the FBI, DEA, CBP; as well as academic sectors should be created to oversee operations related to transient criminal activities. This inclusive structure ensures that the response is not limited to DHS and DOW but leverages the full spectrum of intergovernmental capabilities.
Instructional methods must shift away from standardized testing and objective-based instruction, instead emphasizing engagement and practical application. Instructors at federal, state, and local levels should possess relevant field experience and expertise to ensure effective knowledge transfer. Furthermore, mentorship programs for at-risk youth should be developed to redirect vulnerable populations away from criminal recruitment by providing positive role models, guidance, and opportunities. Border security should also employ psychological operations to influence criminal recruiters and influencers within transient criminal enterprises, flipping them into assets to aid law enforcement efforts.
Finally, creating operational chaos for criminal enterprises by isolating their operations in areas of constant stress and pressure can force mistakes, frustration, and relocation, effectively disrupting their activities. Together, these recommendations aim to strengthen border security’s capabilities and counter the growing threat posed by transient criminal enterprises.
Conclusion
Border security must unify its subject-matter experts across all levels to achieve collective genius and optimize their Triple Cs. Collaboration and synergy are essential to counter the TCE effectively. This article calls for more research and action to address the growing threats posed by transient criminality, urging homeland security professionals to tackle this dynamic and prosperous criminal realm.
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Note: October 24, 2025 (Original) - April 13, 2026 (Revised)