Special Warfare Journal - Tag Southern Border

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Stability by Design: How ARSOF Culture Empowers the Operator and Anchors the Household

Military service is built on a shared cultural identity. Conversations across the force often default to the concept that every Soldier is part of one Army. All Soldiers, from Stryker infantrymen to Special Forces weapons sergeants, share the foundational identity represented by the U.S. Army nametape worn above their heart. Likewise, every Soldier is bound by the same oath and serves the same Constitution. However, this shared foundation overshadows the profound organizational and cultural differences between the conventional force and Army special operations forces (ARSOF).

Tag: Southern Border

July 2, 2026

Sparking a Discussion About Transient Criminality: Excerpts from The Deceptive Delinquent to The Illusive Illicit Alien

Border security professionals lack confidence in combating transient criminality due to insufficient training as well as inadequate communication and intelligence-sharing within their networks. Transient criminal enterprises have evolved significantly, especially since the 1920s, with their activities intensifying during the 1980s and 1990s, driven by South American drug cartels (Glenny, 2008; Liddick, 2004). These criminal organizations have proven to be more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive than U.S. homeland security policies (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021). While specialized cross-silo collaborative efforts such as Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), and Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) exist, this analysis argues that systemic gaps persist. Scholars and practitioners have missed opportunities to counter these threats due to deficiencies in intelligence processes and a lack of psychosocial training programs, indicating that lessons from existing task forces have not been institutionalized across the broader security apparatus.