June 18, 2026

What’s Old Is New: Venezuela, Access, and the Structure of Hemispheric Competition

Venezuela has figured in U.S. strategic thinking for more than a century because it repeatedly sits at the intersection of access, energy, and regional competition. It has done so across administrations, ideologies, and international systems. The pattern spans European imperial rivalry, U.S. regional consolidation, Cold War competition, and today’s great-power contest. Historian Sean A. Mirski traces this continuity in his book We May Dominate the World, showing how Venezuela repeatedly emerged as a site of U.S. concern regardless of the global order.

June 15, 2026

The Joint Force in the Jungle: The Alamo Scouts Blueprint for Special Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations

Over the last 20 years, the U.S. military has been highly focused on counterinsurgency operations as we engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This focus, along with expertise in irregular warfare and partner force operations, enabled Special Forces to take a predominant role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today we face a different world. Competition among the great powers is increasing, requiring the U.S. military to shift focus to prepare for LSCO undertaken against a peer enemy. This transition is a natural fit for the conventional force as tankers prepare for armored clashes, naval officers plan fleet engagements, and pilots contemplate a world without airspace supremacy. For Special Forces, this shift can be more confusing. As divisions and corps become the units of action, where does a small team of Green Berets fit?

June 5, 2026

Perspectives: Civil Affairs in the Civil-Military Coordination Center, Israel

This article examines how Civil Affairs operates within the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel, highlighting the interplay with intergovernmental, international, and non-governmental organization (NGO) stakeholders. It underscores why understanding these dynamics are essential to effectively support humanitarian efforts and operational goals.

May 29, 2026

The U.S. Army's Bold New Approach to Psychological Operations and Cognitive Warfare

On April 2, 2026, the SOCoE graduated 44 its first class in the initial transformation of Psychological Operations, as part of the Total Army solution to cognitive warfare. The new graduates included PSYOP service members from all three components, Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, as well as members of the Joint Force.

May 20, 2026

Relationships Forged in Fire

Editor’s Note: This is the first time that this story has been documented from the U.S. side. The Soldiers in this story were never recognized for their actions; they did it selflessly because it was the right thing to do. This historical vignette is applicable to every Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Soldier in our formation, especially as members of the Army’s premier partner force.

May 15, 2026

Masters of Chaos Theory: Why SOF Thrives in Ambiguity

Special Operations Forces (SOF) thrive in ambiguous, chaotic environments because the principles of chaos theory directly enable and accelerate innovation in modern warfare. To understand this connection, it is important to explore the interconnections between chaos theory and innovation. This analysis defines their key principles, highlights their similarities, and shows how SOF uniquely leverages these dynamics to create operational advantages.

May 7, 2026

The Relentless Pursuit of an Exceptional Experience

The most meaningful similarity between my time as a collegiate baseball coach and my time as an Army officer is not the presence of hierarchy, discipline, or standards—it is the responsibility to cultivate an exceptional experience for the people entrusted to me. In both professions, performance is inseparable from experience. Leaders who pursue experience deliberately and relentlessly are rewarded not only with better outcomes but with stronger teams, deeper trust, and organizations capable of sustaining success over time.

May 1, 2026

General James Van Fleet: Lessons for Modern Special Operations Soldiers

One can be forgiven for not associating Gen. James Van Fleet with special operations or Special Forces. He is best known as the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army from April 1951 to February 1953 during the Korean War. The majority of Van Fleet’s career was spent in traditional infantry roles, as a machine gun battalion commander in World War I and as a regimental, division, and corps commander during World War II. However, his assignment as head of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Greece (JUSMAG-Greece) in 1948, and his leadership and design of “Operation Rat Killer” during the Korean War, should grab our attention.

April 24, 2026

Institutionalizing Artificial Intelligence Integration in Special Forces: The Case for a Group-Level AI Cell

Artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and large language models are no longer emerging technologies; they now reshape global military, commercial, and informational areas. For Special Forces Groups (SFG), the question is not adoption but method: Will it be synchronized and institutional, or fragmented? Special Forces excel at decentralized execution. Special Forces operational detachments - alpha (SFOD-As) innovate in contact, adjust to local conditions, and solve problems with limited direction. This culture is a strength. Yet with complex technologies like AI, decentralized experimentation alone falls short. Without institutional focus, modernization is uneven. Some battalions advance while others lag. Tools multiply without standards, and security measures differ. Lessons learned remain isolated. A small, dedicated two-person AI Integration Cell at the SFG level institutionalizes innovation, enables decentralized execution, synchronizes AI initiatives, and ensures competitiveness as adversaries rapidly integrate AI.

April 17, 2026

Special Forces Deep Operations

Not long after open-source reporting on Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE (OAR) broke, to include the article “The Medvedev Corollary” shared by the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) Commanding General, our soldiers began dissecting the operation. They discussed the implications for Special Forces (SF) deep operations in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). During a battalion forum, an 18-series Soldier raised a concern he and his team had been pondering. They had trained for infiltration and target development against integrated air defense systems (IADS) components, and enabling joint strikes, assuming air access would be contested or denied. Yet OAR showed that the U.S. could rapidly defeat air defenses through integrated air, cyber, and electronic warfare assets, leveraging a joint conventional force (CF) and special operations force (SOF) force package.01 The follow-up question was blunt: If this can be done without SF, what exactly is SF’s mission in LSCO? Simply put, if the joint force can, at times, penetrate anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) systems, how does that affect the necessity and purpose of SF deep operations in LSCO? What elements remain essential to SF’s mission?