July 2, 2026

Sparking a Discussion About Transient Criminality: Excerpts from The Deceptive Delinquent to The Illusive Illicit Alien

Border security professionals lack confidence in combating transient criminality due to insufficient training as well as inadequate communication and intelligence-sharing within their networks. Transient criminal enterprises have evolved significantly, especially since the 1920s, with their activities intensifying during the 1980s and 1990s, driven by South American drug cartels (Glenny, 2008; Liddick, 2004). These criminal organizations have proven to be more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive than U.S. homeland security policies (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021). While specialized cross-silo collaborative efforts such as Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), and Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) exist, this analysis argues that systemic gaps persist. Scholars and practitioners have missed opportunities to counter these threats due to deficiencies in intelligence processes and a lack of psychosocial training programs, indicating that lessons from existing task forces have not been institutionalized across the broader security apparatus.

June 29, 2026

Perspective from the Force: SOF Sustainment for Denied Area Operations in LSCO

Denied-area operations in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) require Green Berets to provide their own sustainment. For this article, the focus is only on food procurement, as the saying often attributed to Napoleon goes, “An army marches on its stomach.” In 20 years within the special operations community, I have never practiced or trained on sustainment operations during pre-mission training, especially for deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). We have always prioritized tactical training, and rightfully so. The GWOT Era rarely required sustainment training as we had staging bases throughout the area of operation.

June 18, 2026

What’s Old Is New: Venezuela, Access, and the Structure of Hemispheric Competition

Venezuela has figured in U.S. strategic thinking for more than a century because it repeatedly sits at the intersection of access, energy, and regional competition. It has done so across administrations, ideologies, and international systems. The pattern spans European imperial rivalry, U.S. regional consolidation, Cold War competition, and today’s great-power contest. Historian Sean A. Mirski traces this continuity in his book We May Dominate the World, showing how Venezuela repeatedly emerged as a site of U.S. concern regardless of the global order.

June 15, 2026

The Joint Force in the Jungle: The Alamo Scouts Blueprint for Special Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations

Over the last 20 years, the U.S. military has been highly focused on counterinsurgency operations as we engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This focus, along with expertise in irregular warfare and partner force operations, enabled Special Forces to take a predominant role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today we face a different world. Competition among the great powers is increasing, requiring the U.S. military to shift focus to prepare for LSCO undertaken against a peer enemy. This transition is a natural fit for the conventional force as tankers prepare for armored clashes, naval officers plan fleet engagements, and pilots contemplate a world without airspace supremacy. For Special Forces, this shift can be more confusing. As divisions and corps become the units of action, where does a small team of Green Berets fit?

June 5, 2026

Perspectives: Civil Affairs in the Civil-Military Coordination Center, Israel

This article examines how Civil Affairs operates within the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel, highlighting the interplay with intergovernmental, international, and non-governmental organization (NGO) stakeholders. It underscores why understanding these dynamics are essential to effectively support humanitarian efforts and operational goals.

May 29, 2026

The U.S. Army's Bold New Approach to Psychological Operations and Cognitive Warfare

On April 2, 2026, the SOCoE graduated 44 its first class in the initial transformation of Psychological Operations, as part of the Total Army solution to cognitive warfare. The new graduates included PSYOP service members from all three components, Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, as well as members of the Joint Force.

May 20, 2026

Relationships Forged in Fire

Editor’s Note: This is the first time that this story has been documented from the U.S. side. The Soldiers in this story were never recognized for their actions; they did it selflessly because it was the right thing to do. This historical vignette is applicable to every Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Soldier in our formation, especially as members of the Army’s premier partner force.

May 15, 2026

Masters of Chaos Theory: Why SOF Thrives in Ambiguity

Special Operations Forces (SOF) thrive in ambiguous, chaotic environments because the principles of chaos theory directly enable and accelerate innovation in modern warfare. To understand this connection, it is important to explore the interconnections between chaos theory and innovation. This analysis defines their key principles, highlights their similarities, and shows how SOF uniquely leverages these dynamics to create operational advantages.

May 7, 2026

The Relentless Pursuit of an Exceptional Experience

The most meaningful similarity between my time as a collegiate baseball coach and my time as an Army officer is not the presence of hierarchy, discipline, or standards—it is the responsibility to cultivate an exceptional experience for the people entrusted to me. In both professions, performance is inseparable from experience. Leaders who pursue experience deliberately and relentlessly are rewarded not only with better outcomes but with stronger teams, deeper trust, and organizations capable of sustaining success over time.

May 1, 2026

General James Van Fleet: Lessons for Modern Special Operations Soldiers

One can be forgiven for not associating Gen. James Van Fleet with special operations or Special Forces. He is best known as the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army from April 1951 to February 1953 during the Korean War. The majority of Van Fleet’s career was spent in traditional infantry roles, as a machine gun battalion commander in World War I and as a regimental, division, and corps commander during World War II. However, his assignment as head of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Greece (JUSMAG-Greece) in 1948, and his leadership and design of “Operation Rat Killer” during the Korean War, should grab our attention.