Aug. 6, 2026

Has F3EAD Outlived Its Usefulness?

It may be time to update F3EAD. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) has been in the Army Targeting manual (FM 3-60) for many years and is still the standard targeting methodology used at the tactical level. But the methodology was purpose-built for a mission, an enemy, and an operational environment, that most US forces no longer face.

July 30, 2026

Outside the Wire: Information Warfare As Long-Range Effects

Information warfare is often treated as a messaging problem, but in modern conflict it can function as a long-range effector. A narrative, image, video, or allegation can be delivered across continents, aimed at a specific audience, amplified through social media, and used to create physical or operational effects: delaying a ship, disrupting logistics, suppressing weapons shipments, influencing legislators, or forcing commanders to divert resources. This does not mean that every protest or unpopular opinion is enemy action. In a democracy, dissent is part of the terrain the military exists to defend. But adversaries understand that free societies can be influenced without being invaded. If a missile, mine, or saboteur can delay a military cargo movement, and a narrative can produce a similar delay by mobilizing people against that movement, then the narrative deserves to be planned against, defended against, and assessed with the same seriousness as other long-range effects.

July 23, 2026

Guns AND Butter: How SOF’s enduring relationships provide value for the Joint Force

The United States’ most significant advantage against its adversaries in the competition space is its allies and partners, who have become more vulnerable to adversarial influence. U.S. allies and international partners have increasingly succumbed to (and even welcomed) partnerships under China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) or arms sales with Russia. The battle to seize control of narratives in the information and human dimension will be paramount to maintaining the U.S.’ competitive advantage.

July 16, 2026

The Missing Link? Modernizing the Role of the Special Forces Company in Combat

To prepare for LSCO on the 21st century battlefield, the often-overlooked SF Company Headquarters (SFOD-B) should be modernized to model the autonomous SOF Tactical Group employed by Ukraine against Russian force. This Modernized SFOD-B should include multi-domain assets including UAS and EW units of action to operate independently behind enemy lines. Once properly task-organized, the Modernized SFOD-B should be tested and refined at Combat Training Centers to prepare for the SF Regiment for the future fight at echelons above the SFOD-A.

July 9, 2026

The Human Domain in an Autonomous Age

In April 2026, Ukrainian forces reportedly seized a Russian position using only unmanned systems—ground robots and aerial drones—with no infantry involvement. The operation, resulting in the surrender of defending forces without friendly casualties, was described as a glimpse of the future of warfare. It also raises a more enduring question: If machines can increasingly conduct the most dangerous aspects of combat, what ultimately determines whether those actions produce meaningful outcomes?

July 2, 2026

Sparking a Discussion About Transient Criminality: Excerpts from The Deceptive Delinquent to The Illusive Illicit Alien

Border security professionals lack confidence in combating transient criminality due to insufficient training as well as inadequate communication and intelligence-sharing within their networks. Transient criminal enterprises have evolved significantly, especially since the 1920s, with their activities intensifying during the 1980s and 1990s, driven by South American drug cartels (Glenny, 2008; Liddick, 2004). These criminal organizations have proven to be more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive than U.S. homeland security policies (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021). While specialized cross-silo collaborative efforts such as Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), and Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) exist, this analysis argues that systemic gaps persist. Scholars and practitioners have missed opportunities to counter these threats due to deficiencies in intelligence processes and a lack of psychosocial training programs, indicating that lessons from existing task forces have not been institutionalized across the broader security apparatus.

June 29, 2026

Perspective from the Force: SOF Sustainment for Denied Area Operations in LSCO

Denied-area operations in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) require Green Berets to provide their own sustainment. For this article, the focus is only on food procurement, as the saying often attributed to Napoleon goes, “An army marches on its stomach.” In 20 years within the special operations community, I have never practiced or trained on sustainment operations during pre-mission training, especially for deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). We have always prioritized tactical training, and rightfully so. The GWOT Era rarely required sustainment training as we had staging bases throughout the area of operation.

June 18, 2026

What’s Old Is New: Venezuela, Access, and the Structure of Hemispheric Competition

Venezuela has figured in U.S. strategic thinking for more than a century because it repeatedly sits at the intersection of access, energy, and regional competition. It has done so across administrations, ideologies, and international systems. The pattern spans European imperial rivalry, U.S. regional consolidation, Cold War competition, and today’s great-power contest. Historian Sean A. Mirski traces this continuity in his book We May Dominate the World, showing how Venezuela repeatedly emerged as a site of U.S. concern regardless of the global order.

June 15, 2026

The Joint Force in the Jungle: The Alamo Scouts Blueprint for Special Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations

Over the last 20 years, the U.S. military has been highly focused on counterinsurgency operations as we engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This focus, along with expertise in irregular warfare and partner force operations, enabled Special Forces to take a predominant role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today we face a different world. Competition among the great powers is increasing, requiring the U.S. military to shift focus to prepare for LSCO undertaken against a peer enemy. This transition is a natural fit for the conventional force as tankers prepare for armored clashes, naval officers plan fleet engagements, and pilots contemplate a world without airspace supremacy. For Special Forces, this shift can be more confusing. As divisions and corps become the units of action, where does a small team of Green Berets fit?

June 5, 2026

Perspectives: Civil Affairs in the Civil-Military Coordination Center, Israel

This article examines how Civil Affairs operates within the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel, highlighting the interplay with intergovernmental, international, and non-governmental organization (NGO) stakeholders. It underscores why understanding these dynamics are essential to effectively support humanitarian efforts and operational goals.